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Abstract  
 
The purpose of this paper was to illustrate the rich and turbulent history of South 
African people, places and events that took place in and around the Witwatersrand 
between the discovery of gold in 1886 and the outbreak of the South African War in 
1899. By the mid-19th century South Africa was a complicated patchwork of British 
colonies, Boer republics and African chiefdoms. The country offered little economic 
prospects for the scrupulous European imperialist drive into Africa and the complex 
racial structure created a perfect violent formula for a massive wave of disputes, wars 
of territorial conquest and forced population displacements.  
The socio-economic outlook had however changed from the prior dismal 
prospects to outright euphoria in the late 19th century, when the richest deposits of 
diamonds and gold were discovered. As profitable, crass and exploitive the discovery 
of diamonds was, it was gold that took South Africa from the Empire’s periphery to 
the core of imperial economic strategy. 
The paper connects the Witwatersrand, its riches and people, to the greater 
imperial economic and social initiative of the British for Southern Africa at the end of 
the 19th century. The working hypothesis links gold to the socio-economic changes 
that would eventually create the structural basis for the South African War, 
concluding a strong correlation between the discovery of gold and the intensification 
of British imperialism in South Africa.  
As controversial and sensitive South African history was for the nation’s 
political transformation and identity in 1994, the paper evaluates archival primary 
sources and secondary literature to contribute to the reconciliation purpose of the 
’New South African’ narrative.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  4 
Abstract 
 
Die Zielsetzung dieser Arbeit war es, die reiche und bewegte Geschichte der 
südafrikanischen Bevölkerung, Orte und Ereignisse, die sich am Witwatersrand 
zwischen der Entdeckung des Goldes im Jahr 1886 und dem Ausbruch des 
Südafrikanischen Krieges im Jahre 1899 abspielte, darzustellen. Mitte des 19. 
Jahrhunderts war Südafrika ein komplexer Flickenteppich von britischen Kolonien, 
Burenrepubliken und afrikanischen Gesellschaften. Dem europäischen 
imperialistischen Expansionsbestreben bot das Land zunächst kaum wirtschaftliche 
Perspektiven, doch die komplexe Rassenstruktur bereitete eine Welle von 
gewaltsamen Auseinandersetzungen, territorialen Eroberungskriegen und 
Zwangsvertreibungen den Boden.  
Im späten 19. Jahrhundert veränderte sich mit der Entdeckung von reichen 
Diamanten- und Goldvorkommen das wirtschaftliche und soziale Potenzial 
schlagartig. Obwohl die Entdeckung von Diamanten eine neue Ära des Profitdenkens, 
der Ausbeutung und der Verwüstung einläutete, war es das Gold, das Südafrika aus 
der anfänglichen Marginalisierung in den Mittelpunkt der imperialen 
Wirtschaftsstrategien katapultierte. 
Diese Arbeit stellt eine Verbindung zwischen Witwatersrand, seinen 
Reichtümern und Menschen, und den imperialen wirtschaftlichen und sozialen 
Initiativen der Briten in Südafrika am Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts her. Die 
Arbeitshypothese rückt Gold in einen engen Zusammenhang zu den 
sozioökonomischen Veränderungen, die schließlich die strukturelle Basis für den 
südafrikanischen Krieg darstellten. Die Arbeit führt zur Schlussfolgerung, dass eine 
starke Korrelation zwischen der Entdeckung des Goldes und der Intensivierung des 
britischen Imperialismus in Südafrika besteht. 
Kontroversen um die südafrikanische Geschichte spielten eine sehr wichtige 
Rolle in der politischen Transformation des Landes im Jahr 1994 und berühren die 
Frage der Identitätsbildung aufs Empfindlichste. Diese Arbeit nutzt Primärquellen und 
Sekundärliteratur, um zur Versöhnungsfunktion des "New South African Narrative" 
beizutragen.  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Note on terminology used 
 
All writers of South African history are faced with many problems of finding accurate 
terminology to describe different racial and ethnic groups in the country. Having spent 
the majority of my life in South Africa, I am very well aware of the complexities 
associated with the use of this terminology and will attempt to stay away from any 
terminology that may be offensive, disrespectful, derogatory or historically inaccurate 
towards any racial and ethnic groups in South Africa. I will use the term African when 
referring to indigenous, black people from the Bantu linguistic group of Southern 
Africa. Any other terms used for indigenous African people will be conceptualized 
and used in the context being addressed. 
The term white will be used for all Europeans who came to South Africa. I 
will, on a number of occasions, refer to neo-Africans as African-born Europeans. The 
term Afrikaners is reserved for African-born Europeans, mainly of Dutch, German 
and French Huguenot descent, who identify themselves with the Afrikaans language, 
which is a member of the West Germanic group of languages. The term Boer (Dutch= 
Farmer), which has over the years been incorrectly used as a generic term for all 
Afrikaans-speakers will be used specifically for members of the Afrikaner community 
living in rural parts of South Africa and engaging in mostly agricultural professions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Setting the scene  
 
Writing African history is never an easy task. After more than centuries of European 
empire building and colonialism in Africa, the continent is still in an ideological 
conundrum, trying to shape its political path for the 21st century. The recent 
revolutions in North Africa have shown that the African continent is dynamically 
seeking political and social change. At the end of the 20th century, it was South Africa 
where the winds of change blew through the Apartheid regime, creating a model of 
transition with Nelson Mandela uniting a country on the brink of civil war. The 
country has managed to overcome major racial, political and economic differences to 
unite and build a nation based on tolerance and equality.  
As promising as the political transformation at the end of the 20th century may 
have been for projecting an image of unity and reconciliation, the South Africa of the 
19th century was a very different place. When Britain took over the Cape Colony from 
the Dutch in 1806, Britain’s only interest in the Cape was its use of a strategic naval 
base at the foot of Africa1, designed to keep Napoleon’s navy and French merchant 
ships away from the lucrative route to India. When the British annexed the Cape 
Colony they also acquired new European subjects who were not of British heritage. 
The largest European group were the 30,000 Afrikaners, who quickly became known 
as the Boers as in most cases they were sparsely scattered farmers in possession of 
large portions of land throughout the Cape2.  
 
 
                                                        
1 Meredith, Martin. Diamonds, Gold and W ar: The Making of South A frica (2007: p. 1) 
2 Marshall, Peter James. The Cambridge Illustrated History of the British Empire (1996: p. 40) 
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The Cape Colony in 1809. Map by John Pinkerton Source: David Rumsey Map Collection. 
http://www.davidrumsey.com/maps4704.html. Accessed on 8 May 2011. 
 
Since 1806, the broad imperial objectives had been to control the Southern 
African coasts. The British soon became involved in strategic military campaigns on 
the expanding frontier of the Cape Colony. However these imperial factors of 
governance did not function in the interior, where from the 1850s a policy of limited 
intervention had been devised as the most effective strategy of maintaining stability 
and order for the demands of the imperial economy in Southern Africa3. Constant 
clashes between white settlers and African populations for the control of the limited 
arable land led British troops to repeatedly intervene and play a crucial role in 
supporting the colonial settlers who were determined to displace African farmers4. 
This new racial structure with the original African majority and the recently-arrived 
white minority would create the line of division on which natural resources and the 
source of labour for the extraction of these resources would be based on. 
As the white colonial population grew, white settlers expanded into the South 
African hinterland, forcing the African population onto the undesirable land. Violent 
confrontation, conquest and destruction for the Zulu, Ndebele, Bemba and Yao 
became unavoidable as they and the European colonizers were determined to rule the                                                         
3 Jeeves, Allan. The Rand capitalists and the coming of the South A frican W ar 1896-1899 (September 
1996: p. 56) 
4 Saunders, Christopher/Smith, Iain: Southern A frica 1795-1910 in Andrew Porter (Ed.): The Oxford 
History of the British Empire. Vol: III. The Nineteenth Century (1999: p. 597) 
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same land and the same people5.  This pattern of European land-grabs defined the first 
half of the 19th century. The history of South Africa became the history of Africans, 
British, Dutch, Portuguese and neo-Europeans clashing over the land and its rich 
resources.  
South Africa soon became the British Empire’s problem child. As long as the 
struggle between the Europeans and Africans went on, there could be no hope of 
transferring imperial authority to a settler government, the way Canada, the Australian 
colonies or New Zealand were governed6. The white colonial population, made up of 
the British and the Afrikaner majority, were politically and culturally divided, making 
imperial colonial initiatives difficult to implement. As divided as the Europeans might 
have been, they were united by their common fear of Africans, whose land they 
desired. But even in this respect, every imperial effort to promote settler unity and 
implement a common policy towards Africans and colonial expansion would arouse 
suspicion against London’s imperial hegemony – especially among the Afrikaner 
majority7.  
The Cape Government saw its official policy as that of civilising all the 
inhabitants of the Colony8. In this way, a ‘civilised man’ was to be a Christian but 
could also have been white or black. Unhappy with the labour jurisdiction from the 
British administration and the need for new farming land, the Afrikaners decided to 
seek their luck north-east of the Cape frontier. Between 1836 and 1846 about 14,000 
Afrikaners embarked on the Great Trek9, setting off a chain of conflicts with Africans, 
on their quest to establish independent Afrikaner states. In a letter to Queen Victoria 
on 26 July 1856, the then Secretary of State for the Colonies, Baron Henry 
Labouchere, stated that “a British intervention into the Afrikaner attempts to create 
their own states would come with immense expenditure for the Cape Colony and 
                                                        
5 Chanaiwa, D. African initiatives and resistance in Southern A frica in: Boahen, Albert Adu (Ed.) 
General History of A frica: Vol. V II A frica under Colonialism 1880-1935 (1990: p. 96)  
6 Darwin, John. The Empire Project (2009: p. 217) 
7 Darwin, John. The Empire Project (2009: p. 217) 
8 Doxey, G.V. The Origins of Racial Discrimination in the South A frican Labour Market. In: 
Konczacki, Zbigniew/Parpart, Jane/Shaw, Timothy (Eds.). Studies in the Economic History of 
Southern A frica: Vol. II. (1991: p. 21) 
9  The Great Trek (Afrikaans: Die Groot Trek) was the major Afrikaner migration out of the British-
controlled Cape Colony during the 1830s and 1840s. Around 12 000 Afrikaners left the Cape to occupy 
territories beyond the British controlled territories. See: Marshall, Peter James. The Cambridge 
Illustrated History of the British Empire (1996: p. 40) 
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would further complicate relations with [Africans]”10. The Afrikaners were left alone 
to find their own place under the African sun.  
By 1869, South Africa consisted of two British Colonies (the Cape Colony 
and Natal) and the Boer (or Afrikaner settler colonies) of Transvaal and the Orange 
Free State. At this time, South Africa was economically as poor as any of the 
European colonies and settlements in Africa11. This economic fate was soon about to 
change. Just two years before that, in 1867, the discovery of Diamonds in Kimberley 
led to a rapid change in economic outlook for South Africa. The discovery of 
diamonds and the exploitation of the rich reserves and thousands of African workers 
that came with it, soon led to the annexation of Griqualand West by the Cape Colony 
in 1871. Britain and various British entrepreneurs, including the young Cecil John 
Rhodes, gained control of the most productive mines that enabled the funding of a 
responsible government in the Cape. South Africa had finally gained its impetus for 
an imperial consolidation of the Cape Colony and its growing economy. From 1872 
the Cape Colony was under a responsible government, and with the administrative 
help of the Colonial Office, mediated closer ties to the London financial market.  
The growth and development of the diamond-mining sector in and around 
Kimberley, in the Cape Colony-annexed Griqualand West was only the prequel to the 
turbulence to come. This was where the necessary capital base was accumulated, the 
capital that would be required to get to the heart of South Africa’s mineral wealth. 
In 1870 new rumours of riches spread through the Boer Republics as small 
amounts of alluvial gold were found in the streams north of the Vaal river in the 
Murchuson range of the Zoutpansberg district. In 1873 larger deposits of alluvial gold 
were found in the streams of Pilgrim’s Rest and the Lydenburg district in the north of 
Transvaal12. In 1886 the most significant reef deposits were discovered on the range 
of hills known as the Witwatersrand13, changing the course of Southern African 
                                                        
10 Letter to Queen Victoria on 26 July 1856. In: Benson, Arthur and Esher, V iscount. The Letters of 
Queen V ictoria 1837-1961. Vol.III 1854-1861 (1908: p. 201) 
11 Kaniki, M. The colonial economy: the former British zones. In: Boahen, Albert Adu (Ed.). General 
History of A frica: Vol. V II A frica under Colonialism 1880-1935 (1990: p. 183)  
12  Van Onselen, Charles. Studies in the Social and Economic History of the W itwatersrand 1886-1914. 
(1982: p. 1) 
13 Witwatersrand (Dutch: White water’s ridge) refers to the low-lying hills in today’s Gauteng 
province. The name was also often used to denote Greater Johannesburg, where to core of the South 
African gold mining industry took place. 
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history. The richest deposits of gold were found very close to the surface in the 
vicinity of a 65km reef14, in what very quickly became known as Johannesburg. 
 
 
Gold Reefs on the Witwatersrand. Source: 
www.anglogold.co.za/subwebs/InformationForInvestors/AnnualReport98/states/map2.gif. Accessed on 
29 March 2011. 
 
The discovery of gold on the Rand15 and the powerful economic centre of 
Johannesburg where the new economic core was established, intensified the pace of 
economic and social change by attracting imperial capital, manufacturers and settlers 
and by drawing more labour from African agricultural communities16. With many 
settlers on the search for wealth having their initial capital bought up by wealthy 
corporations, such as Cecil Rhodes’s De Beers, the gold riches of Johannesburg 
became the new hope for thousands of Europeans. From this point onwards the 
economic history of South Africa becomes driven by a unique mix of the indigenous 
populations, European settlers, and mineral resources that were all brought together in 
                                                        
14 Ross, Robert. A Concise History of South A frica (2nd Ed.). (2008: p. 71) 
15 Shorter form of Witwatersrand. Will always be used as a geographical location and not the currency 
unless specified otherwise. 
16 Feinstein, Charles. The Economic History of South A frica. (2005: p. 3) 
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a process of conquest, dispossession, discrimination, and development to encourage 
rapid economic progress17.   
 
1.2 South African Economy in the British World-System  
 
As bright as the economic prospects for Southern Africa were in the 1870s, the 
beginning of the 19th century presented a very different scenario. With little financial 
backing from London, the Cape Colony and Natal were nothing more than large 
trading posts with strategic Royal Navy ports up until the second half of the 19th 
century.  In order for Britain to make the most of trade, the colonies and the capital 
flowing in and out of them had to be financially and institutionally integrated into the 
British global economy.  
 In the 1840s, the rapid development of the British banking sector and the 
steamship industry created a new structural basis for the Cape Colony’s agricultural 
exports and created a small market for British products18. Wool quickly replaced wine 
as the Cape’s main export and growth in the internal market made wheat the largest 
earner for the agricultural community19. By the time Natal was fully colonised in 
1846, the Cape and Natal had a network of trade links based on the Cape Town to 
Durban shipping route and the inland ox-wagon trade. The trade capacity of the two 
British colonies experienced significant growth throughout the first 70 years of the 
19th century (see table below), diversifying the economy away from its food and drink 
supply function for British ships heading to India. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
17 Feinstein, Charles. The Economic History of South A frica. (2005: p. 3) 
18 Cain, Peter/Hopkins, Anthony (Eds.). British Imperialism 1688-2000 (2002: p. 318) 
19 Ross, Robert. A Concise History of South A frica (2nd Ed.) (2008:p. 70) 
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Annual average exports from the Cape Colony and Natal 1807-70 
Year  Food and drink (A)  Raw Materials(B)  Other Products  Total 
In £ '000 
1807‐10  ‐  ‐  ‐  36.5 
1811‐15  ‐  ‐  ‐  93.6 
1816‐20  ‐  ‐  ‐  194.3 
1821‐25  142.6  51.5  ‐2.7  191.4 
1826‐30  151.2  57.0  13.3  221.5 
1831‐35  126.8  102.4  5.3  234.5 
1836‐40  131.5  93.9  28.1  253.5 
1841‐45  89.6  172.5  36.0  298.1 
1846‐50  72.5  268.2  32.7  373.4 
1851‐55  84.0  352.3  248.1  684.4 
1856‐60  191.2  1 406.9  143.7  1 741.8 
1861‐65  107.2  1 888.9  119.9  2 116.0 
1866‐70  112.7  2 251.8  156.1  2 520.6 
A: Products including wine, fresh fruit, maize, sugar and meat. 
B: Raw materials including wool, hides and skins, ostrich feathers, and mohair. 
 
Source: Feinstein, Charles. The Economic History of South Africa. (2005: p. 29) 
 
 As positive as the economic growth of the Cape and Natal may have been up 
into the late 1860s, the British territories in Southern Africa were far from an 
economic paradise with significant future prospects. This position was however 
changed after Britain’s acquisition of Basutoland in 1868, and the incorporation of the 
diamond fields of Griqualand West into the Cape Colony signalled a new economic 
imperial drive into the South African interior20. Britain wanted to make the most out 
of the new territories in Southern Africa, with special attention being drawn to growth 
in the mining sector and the need for improvements in transportation.  
 After the Great Depression of 1873 a profound crisis of confidence gathered 
momentum in British economic and political circles. A way out of the crisis was seen 
in increasing the economic capacity of the colonial territories and increasing the links 
to the British economic core. In the early 1880s, the then President of the Board of 
Trade, Joseph Chamberlain, believed that imperialism was the best cure for Britain’s 
growing social and class tensions and that a more radical stance of enhancing the 
imperial economy would appeal to a new mass electorate in the country21. The 
colonies would become the political pawns of the British voters, making imperialism 
a political necessity for Britain. The London financial market of the 1880s facilitated                                                         
20 Giliomee, Hermann/Mbenga, Bernard (Eds.). New History of South A frica (2007: p. 194) 
21 Cain, Peter/Hopkins, Anthony (Eds.). British Imperialism 1688-2000 (2002: p. 130) 
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major economic links to the colonies, allowing British investors, large or small, to 
invest in imperial industries as diverse as coal mining in Wales, railroads in China, 
ground-nuts trade in West Africa and diamond mining in the Cape22. From 1850 up 
until WWI, the outflow of British capital to British colonies represented the largest 
voluntary outflow of financial capital in the history of the world23.   
 In South Africa, Britain’s new imperial drive was increasingly becoming 
troubled by the political divisions between the settler colonies of the Cape Colony and 
Natal, the Afrikaner nationalism in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, and the 
resistance from Africans under British authority. In order to consolidate all troubled 
areas under British authority, British Colonial Secretary Lord Carnarvon, began to 
push for a federation of colonies and republics24. A federation under British rule was 
to be able to address common policies on trade, defence and the controversial 
questions around the African labour force, on which the industrialising economy was 
becoming increasingly dependent.  
 The two Boer republics, although recognised by other colonial governments 
throughout the British Empire, were in no way in full control of their territories and 
subjects25. As Africans moved off to the diamond fields in the Cape, the Transvaal 
started experiencing labour shortages in the agricultural sector. Between 1874 and 
1881 the average number of African workers (mostly from the Boer republics) 
employed in the Cape diamond industry increased from 10,000 to 17,00026.  
 At this point in time the Transvaal was suffering from a major debt crisis that 
held the Boer republic at the brink of bankruptcy. The British administration used this 
to their advantage and in January 1877, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, the British 
Secretary for Native Affairs in Natal, annexed the Transvaal as a British Colony, only 
backed by a small party of armed men. 
 The colonisation of the Transvaal would greatly affect the historical 
development of Anglo-Afrikaner relations. The Boers felt they were cheated out of 
their republic and had to submit to the British. During this time of despair Paul 
Kruger, a conservative farmer, took the lead in organising a resistance movement 
against the British. Paul Kruger proved to be the courageous, traditional leader the                                                         
22 Davis, Lance/Huttenback, Robert. Mammon and the Persuit of Empire (1988: p. 274) 
23 Davis, Lance/Huttenback, Robert. Mammon and the Persuit of Empire (1988: p. 60) 
24 Gilliomee, Hermann/Mbenga, Bernard (Eds.). New History of South A frica (2007: p. 194) 
25 Ross, Robert. A Concise History of South A frica (2nd Ed.) (2008: p. 65) 
26 see Table 2 (The average number of black mineworkers in South Africa 1871-1948). Allen, Victor. 
The History of Black Mineworkers in South A frica. Vol: 1, 1871-1948. (1992: introduction xix)  
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Boers were looking for to bring them out of their national existence crisis. Kruger’s 
resistance started taking momentum and he was able to round up the support of 
thousands of Boers by the end of 1880. On 27 February 1881, at the famous battle at 
Majuba, the Boers were able to overcome a small British army support unit from the 
Natal, and were able to restore the independence of Transvaal, proclaiming it as the 
South African Republic. Peace talks still took a few months. On 3 August 1881 the 
Convention of Pretoria was signed, recognising Transvaal’s complete right to self-
government and described its borders in detail27. 
 The South African Republic was able to establish itself in a much better state 
than before the British annexation. During the four years of occupation, the British 
were able to reform the Republic’s finances and administrative system28. In 1883 Paul 
Kruger was elected president and his new Afrikaner government had no intention of 
doing away with the British-established Department of Native Affairs, which was 
responsible for legislation on tax collection and labour service from Africans. Kruger 
quickly became a strong and respected leader, seeking to integrate Afrikaner 
nationalism to his policies, believing a strong Afrikaner-led state could act as a 
counter to British imperialistic campaigns in Southern Africa29. 
 In the mid-1880s the discovery of gold in the South African Republic was just 
the impetus Kruger needed to finance his centralised state and impose an active policy 
of industrialisation for the Republic. The Rand would soon become the economic 
heart of the African continent and would shift the economic balance of Southern 
Africa in favour of the South African Republic, fuelling Kruger’s passion for 
Afrikaner nationalism. The opening up of the rich gold fields of Johannesburg was not 
what the British had expected, concentrating their search for gold in Zambesia, as 
ordered by Rhodes’s Imperial British East Africa company, which was given a charter 
to mobilise a search for a second Witwatersrand30. 
The government of the Cape Colony became very enthusiastic about forming a 
customs union, joining the Boer Republics and the British colonies in Southern Africa 
in a common market. Kruger was against this imperial proposition and in return 
imposed heavy duties on goods and produce coming out of the Cape Colony and 
Natal. The British drive to expand the railway into the Boer Republics was also                                                         
27 Stephens, John. Fuelling the Empire: South A frica’s Road to W ar (2003: p. 16)  
28 Gilliomee, Hermann/Mbenga, Bernard (Eds.). New History of South A frica (2007: p. 194) 
29 Ross, Robert. A Concise History of South A frica  (2008: p. 65) 
30 Meredith, Martin. Diamonds, Gold and W ar: The Making of South A frica (2007: p. 214) 
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blocked by Kruger until the South African Republic built its own line to Delagoa Bay, 
in Portuguese Mozambique31.  
The rapid rise in the Transvaal’s economic and political confidence would 
drive colonial strategy in Africa in a new direction, combining opportunity and 
imperial loyalty, whilst having total disregard for the rights of indigenous Africans. 
The way British colonialists, European foreigners (known as the Uitlanders), neo-
Africans and indigenous Africans became entangled in a web of economic 
imperialism after centuries of military-based separation and land grabs, would not 
only lead to the cultural fusion, but also to the problematic evolution of the modern 
South African state.  
 
1.3 Gold in Global and Local Context 
 
The second half of the 19th century came with a notable expansion of the global gold 
mining sector. After the Californian Gold Rush of 1849, new discoveries were made 
in other parts of the US, Australia (New South Wales and Victoria), New Zealand, 
Canada (the Klondike), in Alaska, Siberia and South America32. Once again, the 
confines and riches of geology would influence South Africa’s history. Despite the 
fact that gold was not found in significant profitable quantities up until 1886, the 
possibility of its existence was speculated for a long time before that. Even if gold has 
a number of commercial and industrial uses, the demand for it is primarily driven by 
capital markets, where it functions as a guarantor of the capitalist world’s monetary 
system. If considered outside of the functioning of the capitalist system, not only does 
the role of gold appear to be absurd, but for many a scholar, can also become 
incomprehensible33. As these parameters are beyond the scope of my study, I will 
only concentrate on gold as a strategic monetary value of the global monetary system 
at the end of the 19th century. 
When looking at the discoveries on the Witwatersrand, they came at a time 
when the world was adjusting to a monetary system based on the gold standard. 
Britain had already adopted the gold standard at various times during the 18th century, 
but officially adopted, implemented and advocated the monetary policy after the                                                         
31 Gilliomee, Hermann/Mbenga, Bernard (Eds.). New History of South A frica (2007: p. 197) 
32 Katz, Elaine. Outcrop and deep level mining in South A frica before the Anglo-Boer W ar: re-
examining the Blainey thesis (1995: p. 307) 
33 Ally, Russell. Gold and Empire: the Bank of England and South A frica’s Gold Producers (1994: p. 7) 
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Napoleonic Wars in 1821. The British gold standard would still face much internal 
opposition well into the second half of the 19th century.  
The gold standard’s career as a global monetary guarantor was launched by 
the new united German Empire’s step to adopt a gold currency over silver in 1871, 
quickly followed by Sweden in 1874, Holland in 1875, France and Spain in 1876, 
Russia in 1893, India in 1898 and the United States in 190034. Gold was to provide 
greater price and exchange stability as a result of closer integration with the world 
financial centres35.  
For Britain, and more specifically the financial City of London, the gold 
standard became critical for the maintenance of the credit system, which was highly 
dependant on Britain’s rising invisible income36. The majority of the trade in the City 
of London was denominated in sterling, which under the global monetary system was 
dominated by the gold standard, making the sterling unrivalled as an international 
currency37. With the Bank of England dictating the level of savings in gold, the 
dynamics of London as the largest financial market forced the Bank to take drastic 
gold-protection measures on numerous occasions. In such events, facing a drain of 
gold, the bank was able to raise its interest rate, forcing the commercial banks of the 
city to restrict their credit, thus preventing inflation, discouraging imports, correcting 
the balance of payments and in the process, stopping the drain of gold38.  
In the early 1880s, gold and the prospects of significant gold mining in 
Southern Africa were mainly seen as a future possibility, but it was by then well 
known that any significant discovery would impact on the world stage, where gold 
and silver had become regarded as the fundamental economic values39. Back in 
Britain, irrespective of speculation about discoveries in other parts of the Empire and 
the world, London’s leadership of the gold standard combined with the firmly-
established gold-dependant financial market of the City, as directed and facilitated by 
the Bank of England, put the value of gold as monetary security under much 
economic and political strain. As a consequence, producers had little or no control 
over its price, and with respect to the imperial developments in Southern Africa at the                                                         
34 Ally, Russell. Gold and Empire: the Bank of England and South A frica’s Gold Producers (1994: p. 7) 
35 Eichengreen, Barry/Flandreau, Marc. The Gold Standard in Theory and History (1997: p. 7) 
36 Cain, Peter/Hopkins, Anthony (Eds.). British Imperialism 1688-2000 (2002: p. 130) 
37 Ally, Russell. Gold and Empire: the Bank of England and South A frica’s Gold Producers. (1994: p. 
11) 
38 Cain, Peter/Hopkins, Anthony (Eds.). British Imperialism 1688-2000 (2002: p. 130) 
39 Stephens, John. Fuelling the Empire: South A frica’s Road to W ar (2003: p. 136) 
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end of the 19th century, there was no advantage to be gained, as was the case with 
diamonds, from forming cartels and monopolies to drive up prices40. Mines could 
therefore increase their profits only by lowering costs and increasing production.  
As the largest and most flexible of the costs involved in gold production was labour, 
the economic realities of gold mining would create a basis on which thousands of 
South Africans, African and white, would be exploited. The total effect of the 
economic measures was to drive Africans from their homes and farms into the new 
mining and industrial centres, and to keep them on European farms as wage earners41.  
 The vulnerability of African workers in the Boer Republics was further 
increased by the impact of rinderpest that swept through Southern Africa between 
1895 and 1896. The cattle disease swept through Southern Africa in 1895-6, killing 
about 90 per cent of the region’s cattle and probably as large a proportion of the big 
game animals42. This event had a major impact on Southern African society and for 
many Africans was the impetus that brought about mass urban migration. Gold would 
now drive the desperate Africans and greedy industrialists, ready to exploit them, to 
the Rand. 
 
1.4 Overall Aims  
 
Viewed from a global economic perspective, the discoveries on the Witwatersrand in 
1886, with Johannesburg at the centre of the new gold rush, transformed the South 
African Republic from a modest agricultural economy into a Boer Republic on the 
brink of a gold mining revolution. Although it must be said that significant 
industrialization of South Africa would only take place after the formation of the 
South African Union in 1910, the mineral revolutions would encourage a particularly 
narrow development of sheltered institutions dependent on the gold mines of the 
Transvaal Republic43. These auxiliary developments led to the establishment of a 
railway, a thriving dynamite industry and most importantly a stock exchange, which 
would raise capital for financial endeavours in and around Johannesburg. As with 
other aspects of South African mining, the sheer change that capital-intensive industry                                                         
40 Ross, Robert. A Concise History of South A frica (2008: p. 73) 
41 Kaniki, M. The colonial economy: the former British zones. In: Boahen, Albert Adu (Ed.) General 
History of A frica: Vol. V II A frica under Colonialism 1880-1935 (1990: p. 184)  
42 Ross, Robert. A Concise History of South A frica (2008: p. 73) 
43 Lumby, Anthony. Industrial History in South A frica: Past Trends and Future Needs (1995: p. 75) 
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brought upon South Africa’s position with respect to European territorial and financial 
imperialism is here of causal importance to the polarisation of South African society.  
The Rand would soon become the economic heart of the African continent and 
would shift the economic balance of Southern Africa in favour of the two Boer 
republics, namely the Transvaal44 and the Orange Free State, and reignite the passion 
for Afrikaner nationalism. With this sudden and dynamic development of the gold 
industry in the foreground, the purpose of this work is to illustrate the rich and 
turbulent history of Southern African people, places and events that took place in and 
around the Rand between the discovery of gold and the South African War (1899-
1902). My thesis will attempt to link the Rand, its riches and people, to the greater 
imperial initiative of the British at the end of the 19th century. 
As Eric Hobsbawn maintains in his master work The Age of Empire: 1875-
1914, mines were the major pioneers in opening the world to imperialism as their 
profits were sensational enough to justify the construction of auxiliary industrial 
systems that would ‘feed’ the Empire45. In the South African context, mines and the 
natural resource revolution they serviced in the late 19th century would change the 
course of South Africa’s history and the economic basis on which the Boer Republics 
were integrated into the global economy and the British Empire was to expand its 
territories in Southern Africa.  
 
1.5 Sources 
 
There are a number of approaches to social research and it is without a shadow of a 
doubt evident that politicised historical investigations of this nature will involve a fair 
amount of controversial analysis and interpretation. As it is very difficult to 
scientifically distinguish between objective and subjective information, this thesis 
relies on extensive use of primary sources, mostly made up of the well-maintained 
annual reports of the South African Chamber of Mines in Johannesburg. The 
transparency and availability of the annual reports allowed me to engage in a lengthy 
and rewarding data-mining process, at a time when the heated question on the future 
of South African gold mining was being heavily debated by various ministries and 
parastatal organisations.                                                          
44 officially known as the South African Republic 1881-1902 
45 Hobsbawm, Eric. The Age of Empire: 1875-1914 (1987: p. 168) 
  24 
 Using primary sources does also come with its share of academic pitfalls as it 
clearly needs to be analysed if the information is intended to represent fact, fiction, or 
in many cases, propaganda. The majority of my primary sources come from a period 
when South African institutions were clearly geared to the exploitation of Africa’s 
resources and people. The annual reports of the South African Chamber of Mines are 
aligned towards facilitating the supply of cheap African labour for the mines and seek 
to promote financial autonomy vis-à-vis the South African state, in many ways 
undermining the authority of Kruger’s administration. Afrikaner resentment will also 
be analysed using the fair share of original British documentation outlining the 
progression of Anglo-Boer relations throughout the 19th century, beginning with the 
promotion of coexistence and ending with outright disfellowship and call for military 
intervention.  
 My primary source analysis will provide analysis and offer explanation of the 
main tasks and functions of the South African Chamber of Mines and how its 
lobbying linked to the greater British imperial ambitions on the Rand. The analysis of 
the reports will, to a significant extent, develop my position on institutional links to 
British colonial objectives, illustrating how gold, the capitalisation of mines and the 
acquisition of a cheap labour force led inevitably to economic and social unrest, in the 
process, polarising South African society to a point of racial and imperial hostility.  
Going beyond the primary source analysis of the mining annual reports, legal 
documents and political correspondences, the broad selection of historiographical 
traditions in the secondary literature used seeks to find a balance between statistical 
data and a solid theoretical framework. Although I have not developed my own 
statistical models, the study looks into analysis and interpretation of empirical data,  
providing clear examples of statistical differences and inaccuracies, which have added 
to the different approaches used by the historical schools discussed. This balance 
between analysis and interpretation is critical to recognising the causality between the 
economic and social transformation under investigation. 
My archival work at the South African Chamber of Mines in Johannesburg, 
and various other institutions such as the Rhodes Cottage Museum (Muizenberg, 
South Africa), City of Johannesburg section of the Museum Africa in Johannesburg, 
Southern African Documentation and Cooperation Centre (Vienna, Austria) and the 
British History Archives at the History Studies library at the University of Vienna 
uses a broad array of primary and secondary sources to find consensus between the 
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national history interests of academic institutions, South African, British and English-
speaking media, and the governments of South Africa and the United Kingdom within 
the administrative framework of the Commonwealth of Nations. It is with this global 
scope in mind that the evaluation of sources localises the analysis to specific structural 
outcomes, such as mining laws, labour policy, taxation and investments, to formulate 
the argument around the socio-economic impact of the growth in the gold mining 
sector.  
The selection of secondary sources will at all times attempt to complement the 
controversial nature of the primary sources, finding a balance between liberal and 
radical historiographical traditions. As the analysis of secondary sources and its data 
is often predetermined rather than adapted to the argumentation of the research being 
undertaken, I have opted to look at a long line of secondary literature, evaluating the 
supposed consistencies of the various theoretical schools and its historical progression 
from heavily-debated publications in the late 19th century British Empire to 
reconsolidating grand narratives of a post-1994 democratic South Africa, looking at 
re-investigating a common history of all its people.  
With many of the primary and secondary sources showing discrepancies 
between the official government and academic accounts of the events such as the 
success of diamond mining in Kimberley, the South African Republics ties with the 
German Empire, the Jameson Raid and the diplomatic row between the South African 
Republic and the British Empire in the weeks building up to the South African War, 
this thesis looks at recognising clear trends and interactions between networks of 
political actors and the thousands of people in Southern Africa and the British Empire 
whose lives underwent formidable changes at the end of the 19th century. Keeping 
these possible methodological irregularities of previous research close to my 
argumentation, the thesis seeks to investigate the relevance of authorship, integrity 
and most importantly, the credibility of the sources used and its links to the greater 
social discourse on imperialism in Southern Africa. 
 
1.6 Periodization of the Study: 1886-1899 
 
As praised by Charles von Onselen in his extensive study of the social and economic 
history of the Witwatersrand, the rapid pace of development between the discovery of 
gold and outbreak of the First World War could be described as a “historian’s 
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dream”46. My study will be narrowed down in temporal scope to the discovery of gold 
in 1886 and the outbreak of the South African War in 1899, which would end the 
‘long 19th century’47 for Britain with the most expensive war since the defeat of 
Napoleon48. Although the causality between the discovery of gold and the outbreak of 
the war remains a much disputed historical debate, the set of events that propelled 
South Africa from the economic developments on the Rand to the frontline of the 
most expensive and bloodiest war of the Victorian era is traced in the progression of 
the debate.  
My investigation will begin with the discovery of diamonds in Kimberley, in 
north-western South Africa, which was a mere introduction to the turbulent ways by 
which neo-Africans would use their manpower and institutions to finance their 
colonial ambitions. The diamonds of Kimberley would prove to be a necessary 
prerequisite to the success of gold mining on the Witwatersrand, attracting fresh 
capital to the reefs of the Transvaal49. The capitalisation of the Rand and the 
transformation of the economic parameters that accompany the later shift to deep-
level mining, constitute the core of my argumentation, culminating with the outbreak 
of the South African War.  
The periodization of my investigation (1886-1889) is also critical to the socio-
economic nature of the study as the historical period taken into account illustrates a 
transformation of economic into social, and then further into political power. It is 
therefore my intention to draw a clear structural division between the economic and 
social analysis of the investigation, illustrating the temporal nature of economic 
progression, and its direct social consequences, within a causal framework, making 
sure to consolidate all the aspects of the debate after each section. 
Although all attempts have been made to structure the investigation in 
chronological order, the work follows a thematic structure, formulating links between 
people, events and political decisions, rather than a progressive schedule of historical 
occurrences. Themes are, however, always laid out chronologically and avoid most 
temporal overlaps that would distort the progression of economic and social 
                                                        
46 see introduction of Van Onselen, Charles. Studies in the Social and Economic History of the 
W itwatersrand 1886-1914. (1982: p. 1) 
47 for a conceptual framework of Eric Hobsbawm’s definition of the long 19th century see the 
introduction of Hobsbawm, Eric. The Age of Empire: 1875-1914 (1987) 
48 Pakenham, Thomas. The Boer W ar (1979: p. 16) 
49 Stephens, John. Fuelling the Empire: South A frica’s Road to W ar (2003: p. 16)  
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processes, which although (in my work) occur simultaneously, are nevertheless 
clearly ordered to outline economic into social transformation.  
 
1.7 Historiography, methodology and specific aims  
 
As outlined by Hermann Giliomee and Bernhard Mbenga, traditional white 
historiography in South Africa untill the 1930s dealt more with the relations between 
the British and the Afrikaner than with the question of indigenous Africans50. Up until 
the political changes in 1994, historical writing in South Africa was made up of broad 
historiographical schools, namely the British imperialist, a settler or colonialist, an 
Afrikaner nationalist, a liberal and a revisionist or radical school51. The political 
changes in 1994 brought about a new wave of critical social analysis, keeping the 
gruesome nature and injustice of Apartheid at the core of the historical investigations.  
The two historiographical schools that have in many ways influenced the 
development of South African social sciences and led to a number of epistemological 
controversies during Apartheid, were that of radical and liberal academic traditions52. 
My thesis attempts to accommodate both of the schools of thought, underlining the 
crucial issues that have led to disagreements over the development of South African 
financial and most importantly, social capital. Radical Marxist historians analysed the 
political economy of South Africa with particular attention being paid to the need of 
capital (especially mining capital) for cheap (‘black’) labour and the consequences of 
this for public policy53. The climate of repression, the move of many left-orientated 
academics into exile, and the rise of the new left in the West combined to create a new 
wave of South African radical scholarship in the late 1960s54. My thesis takes on 
many of these influences in the form of works published by prominent representatives 
of the South African radical school, namely Colin Bundy, Martin Legassick, Shula 
Marks and Charles van Onselen. 
                                                        
50  see introduction of Giliomee, Hermann/Mbenga, Bernard (Eds.). New History of South A frica 
(2007) 
51 Visser, Wessel. Trends in South A frican Historiography and the Present State of Historical Research. 
(2004: p. 1) 
52 see Wright, Harrison. The burden of the present (1977) 
53 Seekings, Jeremy. The Rise and Fall of W eberian Analysis of Class in South A frica between 1949 
and the Early 1970s. (2009: p. 865) 
54 Bozzoli, Belinda/Delius, Peter. Radical History and South A frican Society. (1990: p. 19) 
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The Liberal school of South African historiography emerged between the two 
world wars and was based on an intellectual tradition of classical liberalism55. Their 
work dealt with social and economic issues and gave greater importance and value to 
the role of Africans in South African history, thereby rejecting the notion of 
‘segregated’ history, and placing people of colour in the past on equal academic terms 
and importance with that of whites56. These South African historians rejected racial 
discrimination and together with a liberalist Weberian theoretical framework 
integrated all racial and social groups in South Africa into a grand narrative, asserting 
that the history of South Africa was a common history of all South Africans. In my 
thesis this liberal school is represented by the works of C.W. De Kiewiet, David 
Welsh and the much more recent economic investigation into South African gold by 
Russel Ally. 
The localised views of South(ern) African scholars, as represented by the 
liberal and radical historiographical traditions, are able to link local economic and 
sociological scholarly traditions to a global discourse. When taking this localised 
historiographical tradition into a broader global historical framework, the aspect of 
Southern African history I will be dealing with, namely the mineral revolutions of the 
19th century, one can not overlook the major amount of research into the South 
African War. In my thesis, the works of John Hobson and Eric Hobsbawm represent 
the two most significant contributions by British historians of British imperialism. 
Hobson’s major contribution to the analysis and interpretation of the South African 
War has in many ways created the theoretical foundations for the economic critique of 
the factors that led to the war. Although in recent times Hobson’s view that the war 
effort was represented by a small bunch of like-minded capitalists fighting for the 
control of the South African economy has been deemed as over simplified, Hobson’s 
in-depth field work and empirical reasoning in South Africa before the war has 
become the standard work for economic historians of 19th century imperialism.  
Hobsbawm did follow many of Hobson’s theoretical foundations, but 
expanded further using orthodox Marxist analysis in linking the South African gold 
production and the subsequent war to a greater imperial phenomenon of product 
interchange, where imperialism was to transform the world into a set of economies                                                         
55 Visser, Wessel. Trends in South A frican Historiography and the Present State of Historical Research. 
(2004: p. 6) 
56 Visser, Wessel. Trends in South A frican Historiography and the Present State of Historical Research. 
(2004: p. 6) 
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dependant on and complementary to the British57. If Hobson made his name in linking 
Johannesburg capitalists’ demands to the territorial demands of the Empire, 
Hobsbawn linked South Africa and its native population to the late-19th century 
narrative of worker exploitation. 
As economic and social history offers multiple methodological possibilities, 
leaving social scientists to find a balance between quantitative and/or qualitative 
research approaches, I have chose to base my methodology on a quantitative approach 
to narrative inquiry. Using narrative inquiry, I will balance the historical narrative 
with thematic contextualisation to develop an understanding of how economics 
combines with different experiences of people to influence causal factors of British 
imperialism in Southern Africa. To avoid many analytical difficulties that may arise in 
a socio-economic study of this nature, I use many descriptive source-based examples 
to find a balance between the narrative historiography and the empirical primary 
source analysis, which is combined in my methodological outlook. Although narrative 
inquiry may take on many theoretical assumptions, I have based my approach on 
using a historical narrative to order specific events and allow for coherence in the 
economic and social evolution of South Africa.  
Whatever the theoretical approach and methodology, gold has remained at the 
heart of this debate, but as historians, we do have to be aware of the dangers 
associated with reducing complex historical events to mono-causal explanations58. I 
plan not to contest the causes of the war, but will rather investigate the socio-
economic parameters of gold, and the function it served in paving the road to war.  
With the inter-disciplinary nature of history and historiography being 
expanded and diversified within the social sciences year by year, it is my intention to 
use economics within a grater study of social analysis and more specifically, focusing 
on how financial capital was linked to social capital, influencing the development of a 
complex racial and economic struggle that is still evident in many facets of South 
African society. As socioeconomics focuses on the social impact of economic change, 
it is my intention to use the discovery of gold on the Rand as an economic history 
event that guided (and still does to this day) the social dynamics of South African 
people.                                                         
57 Hobsbawm, Eric/Wrigley, Charles. Industry and Empire from 1750 to the present day. (1966: pp. 
196-198) 
58 Balchandran, Gopalan. Power and markets in global finance: the gold standard, 1890-1926. (2008: p. 
319) 
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One investigation into the socio-economic parameters that came with the 
discovery of Gold on the Witwatersrand and had a profound impact on my course of 
research on the topic was that of Charles van Onselen59. Van Onselen was able to take 
his investigation away from the numerous works historians have produced on the 
capital and political developments as led by the financial moguls of the 
Witwatersrand, known as the Randlords, and how they shaped the South African War. 
He successfully shed new light on the marginalised social groups of the Johannesburg 
metropolis such as Zulu washmen liquor sellers, prostitutes, cab drivers and Afrikaner 
brickmakers. Following Van Onselen’s approach of looking beyond and below the 
financially and politically influential Randlords, I will, as already mentioned, not 
attempt to investigate the reasons for war, but will deal with how the social and 
economic factors (driven by gold) paved the way to war. 
 
1.8 Study outline 
 
As many narrative approaches to historical writing have strayed away from analysis, 
leaving the core of the investigation to be represented by interpretation, the outline of 
this study follows a certain thematic logic. The introduction serves the purpose of 
introducing the argumentation by localising global geopolitical and economic 
developments of the 19th century within the narrow geographical confines of Southern 
Africa. As broad as the scope of such an investigation might be, the economic and 
social development of South Africa is traced on the basis of Southern Africa’s 
interaction with Europe and Europeans, by way of territorial and financial 
imperialism.  
 Radical and liberal historiographical traditions are conceptualised through 
their theoretical differences based on their respective ‘social stratifications’ of South 
Africa, quickly directing the debate to the commodified medium of argumentation in 
the form of gold. Gold is placed within the teleological framework of the mineral 
revolutions and their progressive influence on industrialisation.  
The economic section builds up a theoretical framework out of the discovery 
of gold and the subsequent development of the capital and labour intensive mining 
industry. Clear industrial links between the respective economic and political centres                                                         
59 see Van Onselen, Charles. Studies in the Social and Economic History of the W itwatersrand 1886-
1914. New Babylon I and New Nineveh II (1982) 
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of Johannesburg and Pretoria are investigated against the backdrop of British financial 
and political engagement in Southern Africa.  
 The economic section then consolidates the debate by investigating the 
development of gold mining and its function as an economic catalyst with relation to 
the industrialisation of South Africa. Gold, the growth of mining and the inflow and 
outflow of financial capital is juxtaposed against the backdrop of Transvaal’s 
economic boom and its contradictory relationship with Britain and British capital. The 
logic then follows that the gold-driven Transvaal economy is not only integrated into 
a greater colonial European-dominated economic system of Southern Africa, but also 
directly into the British global economy. The overcoming of structural limitations of 
surface mining are directly linked to greater British financial and political influence 
on the Rand. The sensitive nature of the political outcomes of gold mining are 
reflected in the capital links between the City of London, Johannesburg and the 
colonial administration in Cape Town. The economic growth of the mining industry is 
then held hostage by the diverging relationship between Afrikaners and non-
Afrikaners, represented by the charismatic figures of President Paul Kruger and Cecil 
John Rhodes respectively.  
 The economic consequences of the gold boom are quickly integrated into a 
social study of Johannesburg’s urbanisation and its respective social groups, namely 
the African Workers, the British population, the Randlords and Uitlanders, and the 
Afrikaners. It was my intention to use the social analysis to address the direct social 
consequences of economic growth, as initiated by the booming gold mining sector. 
The close relationship between economic and social contextual factors is not only 
theoretically investigated, but supported by empirical logic, stemming from an 
excellent pool of original reports of the South African Chamber of Mines.  
The core of the analytical interpretation is devoted to establishing the link 
between economic growth and social unrest that in many respects has cast a shadow 
on South Africa till the present day. The growth of gold mining is investigated as a 
social factor of importance in the economic empowerment and social marginalisation 
of indigenous Africans. The pressure on the factors of production of gold is reflected 
in the greater dependence on social capital and how this transformation was reflected 
in the politicised nature of labour relations on the Rand.  
 The friction between Kruger’s government, the Randlords, the South African 
Chamber of Mines, the colonial administration in Cape Town and the British 
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parliament are investigated with close proximity to the social factors that arose from 
the production in gold. The political and ideological tension between the Afrikaners 
and their nationalism on one side, and the British and imperialism on the other side, 
makes up the core of the social debate, showing critical social links branching to all 
other social groups in Southern Africa.  The debate is synthesized by the convergence 
of all the social groups investigated into a concluding section on the dynamics of 
South African society at the brink of the South African War. 
The economic and social investigation is then concluded in a formalised 
discussion about the outcomes, difficulties, limitations and links to the evolution of 
the modern, post-Apartheid, “new” South Africa and its unstable relationship with the 
British Empire. As narrowly periodized the study may be, the analysis draws on many 
elements of economic and social developments that have made gold into the precious 
element that transformed the economic and social structure of South Africa, 
continuing to influence most aspects of economic empowerment of all South Africans 
until this day. 
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2. Economic Factors 
 
2.1 British Policy in South Africa: the economics of Empire and the fortunes 
of South African gold. 
 
As Cain and Hopkins assess in their comprehensive study of British imperialism, the 
impulses which drove the British beyond the Cape Colony and into north-eastern 
South Africa, culminating later in the South African War and the eventual Union of 
South Africa in 1910, have inspired many historians to approach the topic of 
imperialism to this day60. When undertaking a socio-economic study of imperialism in 
late 19th century South Africa, one clearly has to trace ties that connected economics, 
social development, colonial strategy and private ambition.  
Liberal and radical historians have taken very different approaches to 
analysing South Africa’s position in the world economy. With many liberals 
analysing the causality behind the capitalist world system facilitating significant 
growth and allowing a significant degree of local autonomy, and Marxist historians 
questioning the intentions of the developed world in creating inequalities as foreign 
capital extracted surpluses by taking profits to the imperial core and foreign markets 
deterring prices for local scarce goods61, it quickly becomes evident that South 
Africa’s economic history within the academic networks of African and Imperial 
History scholars is anything but academically consistent and integrated into the grand 
narrative of African development.  
From an orthodox Marxist perspective, the extractions of diamonds and gold 
connected together massive investment of capital, the application and development of 
technology, and a formalised mobilisation of labour at a scale never seen before in 
South Africa62. As already mentioned, by the 1880s, white authority in South Africa 
stretched over the Cape Colony, Natal and the two independent Boer republics of the 
Transvaal and the Orange Free State. Besides the areas affected by the up and coming 
                                                        
60 Cain, Peter/Hopkins, Anthony (Eds.). British Imperialism 1688-2000 (2002: p. 318) 
61 Kubicek, Robert, Mining: Patterns of Dependence and Development 1870-1930. In: Konczacki, 
Zbigniew/Parpart, Jane/Shaw Timothy (Eds.). Studies in the Economic History of South A frica: 
Volume II: South A frica, Lesotho and Swaziland (1991: p. 64) 
62 Kubicek, Robert, Mining: Patterns of Dependence and Development 1870-1930. In: Konczacki, 
Zbigniew/Parpart, Jane/Shaw Timothy (Eds.). Studies in the Economic History of South A frica: 
Volume II: South A frica, Lesotho and Swaziland (1991: p. 64) 
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mineral revolutions, European settlers lived mostly in farming communities, without 
the means of industrial production, concentrating their colonial economies on the 
export of wool and agricultural produce in the exchange for manufactured imports 
they could afford63.  
The period between 1870 and 1900 was generally one of expansion and 
prosperity for the world economy64, but what changed everything in South Africa was 
the discovery of gold and the development of the gold industry on the Rand in 1886. 
The rapid pace at which gold mining developed, would bring about sudden and 
dynamic changes for the Southern African economy at large. In 1886, the new gold 
industry was only producing 0.16% of the world’s gold, placing South African 
production far behind Australia and the US. By 1898, this share of the global gold 
production was no less than 27%65. In a space of just 13 years, Transvaal went from 
being an agricultural economy in a remote part of Southern Africa, to a powerful 
resource-based economy, with the world’s largest gold production, having a 
significant impact on the world monetary system.  
By the end of 1886 news of the new fortunes to be had in South Africa had 
spread to the financial centres of London and Paris, and to all corners of the British 
Empire, as far afield as New Zealand66. As significant as the news was all over the 
world, it was in Southern Africa where it made the biggest impact, especially in the 
mining circles around Kimberley. The fortunes and the experience made in the 
diamond industry were a significant factor in the early development of the gold mines, 
with the international financial connections established in Kimberley being of great 
importance to raising capital for the mines around Johannesburg67.  
Two notable figures who stood out in the ‘Kimberley transfer of knowledge’ 
to the Rand were Cecil John Rhodes and his financial partner, German-born Alfred 
Beit. At the time of the gold strikes on the Rand, Rhodes was already one of the 
biggest mining moguls in Kimberley, then in the process of uniting all mines of 
Kimberley under De Beers68, a company in which he had a major shareholding and a                                                         
63 Davidson, Basil. The Search for A frica: A  History in the Making (1994: p. 130) 
64 see Table F-1. Value of Merchandise Exports at Current Prices, 1870-1998. In: Maddison, Angus: 
The world economy: a millennial perspective. (2001: p. 359) 
65 Statistical comparison from Van Onselen, Charles. Studies in the Social and Economic History of the 
W itwatersrand 1886-1914. New Babylon (1982: p. 1) 
66 Tuapeka Times. South A frican Gold Rush (3 January 1883: p. 3) 
67 Feinstein, Charles. The Economic History of South A frica (2005: p. 3) 
68 Stephens, John. Fuelling the Empire: South A frica’s Road to W ar (2003: p. 158) 
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company which to this day is the world’s largest producer of diamonds. Beit 
facilitated many of Rhodes’ investments in Kimberley and encouraged Rhodes to take 
his capital to the gold mines of the Rand. After helping him to establish the Royal-
Chartered British South Africa Company in 1889, Beit left for London from where he 
managed his powerful finances and supported Rhodes’s interests in Southern Africa. 
The British South Africa Company enabled Rhodes to have direct sponsorship from 
Queen Victoria. Rhodes, as the biggest shareholder and stakeholder of the initiative, 
would also keep thousands of shares in the British South Africa Company, which 
were specially designated as gifts for influential people in Cape Town, London and 
other European financial centres69.  
The development of gold mining on the Rand came with its share of 
geological, economic and legal challenges. After many gold mining experts from the 
US and Australia published mixed geological reviews on the Witwatersrand, it was 
well known and documented that the reefs had significant gold deposits, but they were 
also of very poor quality70. What made things even more complicated was that the 
gold layers were distributed unevenly (see graphic on next page) and in low 
concentrations in thin sheets throughout the reef. Even in the richest sections, it would 
take 3 tons of ore to recover 1 ounce of gold71 (With one ounce of gold fetching 
£4.2472 on the global gold market, the cost structure of production would need 
immense capital investments, before economies of scale would make mining 
affordable). With these geological limitations, it was clear that the development of the 
Rand’s gold industry would be capital and labour intensive. A large and constant 
supply of labour, heavy machinery and chemical technology would be needed to 
profitably recover gold from low-grade ore73. With no railway connection from the 
Rand to the coast at the time of the 1886 discoveries, the transportation of machinery 
for the production and the eventual delivery gold to the global markets were 
structurally very limited.  
 
                                                         
69 Flynn, Laurie. Studded with Diamonds and Paved with Gold (1992: p. 160)  
70 Stephens, John. Fuelling the Empire: South A frica’s Road to W ar (2003: p. 165) 
71 Ross, Robert. A Concise History of South A frica (2008: p. 71) 
72 Gold Market and Price 1800-2009 www.finfacts.ie/Private/curency/goldmarketprice.htm accessed on 
24 March 2011 
73 Kubicek, Robert. Economic Imperialism in Theory and Practice: The case of South A frican Gold-
mining finance 1886-1914. (1979: p. 40) 
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1. Ventersdorp Contract Reef 
2. Mondeor Conglomerate formation 
3. Kimberly Conglomerate formation 
4. Bird Conglomerate formation 
5. Livingstone Conglomerate formation 
6. Johnstone Conglomerate formation 
7. Main Conglomerate formation 
8. Crown Formation 
9. Veldschoen Reef (inner basin reef) 
10. Magnetic Horizon in in lower Jeppestown shale 
11. Buffelsdoorn (Outer Basin reef) 
12. Boulders Reef 
13. Magnetic shale in Witport Jie Formation 
14. Magnetic West Rand shales 
15. Rietfontein tillite 
 
Source: South African Chamber of Mines. Cutaway of the gold-bearing reefs of the 
W itwatersrand. http://info.goldavenue.com/info_site/in_mine/in_min_sa_geol.htm. Accessed on 16 
October 2011. 
 
The legislation of the reefs, as specified by the Transvaal Mining Law, would 
also add to the economic constraints the gold mines were subjected to. Early 
discoveries of gold in the eastern parts of the Transvaal led to the passing of the first 
Gold Law of the Transvaal. Law No 1 of 1871 stated “the right of mining for and 
disposing of all precious stones and metals belongs to the state”74. The government of 
the Transvaal never wanted to hide its intentions with respect to absolute authority 
                                                        
74 Barber, Sydney Hilton. Transvaal Gold Law. Translation into English of Law No. 15 of 1898. (1904: 
p. 1) 
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over the mineral wealth of the Republic and laws facilitating the ‘privatisation’ of 
Transvaal’s gold fields were carefully formulated.  
Mining claims in 1886 were set out to be 155 feet x 413 feet, granting the 
owner of the claim the right to mine on or beneath the claim, but he could not follow a 
reef underground outside the limits of the surface boundary75. The Gold Laws added a 
high degree of bureaucracy to the mining endeavours of many independent investors, 
making it in many cases very difficult to recognise and uphold the boundaries of the 
claims76. This became a great point of discussion for the Volksraad77 in 1889.  For 
small-scale miners with little capital and geological assessment capabilities, 
purchasing a claim was anything but a low-risk investment. This scenario prompted 
larger operators to buy up multiple claims, thereby spreading out their risk. As Robert 
Kubicek summarises in his analysis of the initial economic challenges to the mines, 
the complexities of the Transvaal Mining Law, the asymmetric access to information 
on the mineral potential of a claim, and the opportunities for miners to become 
company promoters, encouraged the formation of multiple mining companies78. By 
the end of 1886 there were some 90 private ventures specialising in gold mining, with 
the number increasing to 270 by the end of 1887, and nearly 500 in 188979. 
 
2.2 Mining companies and growth on the Witwatersrand: foreign capital 
and local limitations  
 
The gold mining on the Rand did not get off to the prosperous start President Kruger 
of the Transvaal Republic had wished for. After the initial hype and enthusiasm gold 
mining approached a major hurdle. By the middle of 1889 producers discovered that 
gold reefs below 120 feet resisted amalgamation in the later stages of the gold-
recovery process used on the ore80. This sudden lack of profitability was quickly 
exposed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, which was established in 1887 to cater                                                         
75 Kubicek, Robert. Economic Imperialism in Theory and Practice: The case of South A frican Gold-
mining finance 1886-1914. (1979: p. 40) 
76 South African Chamber of Mines Annual Report for the year ending 1889. (1890: p. 15) 
77  The Volksraad (People’s Council) was the official Pretoria-based parliament of the South African 
Republic (Transvaal) between 1857 and 1902. 
78Kubicek, Robert. Economic Imperialism in Theory and Practice: The case of South A frican Gold-
mining finance 1886-1914. (1979: p. 42) 
79 Kubicek, Robert. Economic Imperialism in Theory and Practice: The case of South A frican Gold-
mining finance 1886-1914. (1979: p. 42) 
80 Van Onselen, Charles. Studies in the Social and Economic History of the W itwatersrand 1886-1914. 
New Babylon. (1982: p.4) 
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to capital-hungry mining magnets. With no immediate solution to the problem, a 
significant financial crisis soon developed, forcing many large companies to 
decapitalise. Share prices tumbled and by March 1890, the total market value of 
shares on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange was down 40% on its value the previous 
year81. This can best be illustrated using the share price of the Salisbury Gold Mining 
Company that had previously peaked at 690 shillings and went on to trade at 50 
shillings by the end of 189082. For the next two years Johannesburg would remain in a 
state of economic depression83, leaving many capitalists to restructure their portfolios 
with respect to investments in the Transvaal and rethink their mining strategies. 
Two operators who made the most out of the depression were Julius Wernher 
and Alfred Beit. Both Wernher and Beit had been close partners of Rhodes’ De Beers 
and used their capital resources to invest in more mining ground and began searching 
for a solution to overcome the problems of deep mining and the chemical recovery of 
gold from the ore. Linked by their common desire to overcome the geographical 
limitations and belief in the riches of the Witwatersrand, the ‘Corner House,’ 
consisting of the Wernher & Beit partnership and its Johannesburg subsidiary, 
Eckstein and Company, founded Rand Mines in 1893. The Corner House was to 
facilitate the linking of capital and engineering expertise in order to develop and 
determine the future of deep-level mining on the central Rand84. The Corner House 
would become the most influential group of capitalists looking to strike at the heart of 
the Transvaal riches.  
The group was to represent what financial imperialism would eventually rise 
up to. Three of the Corner House’s most influential members were to become Prime 
Ministers of the Cape Colony, namely, Cecil John Rhodes (1890-1895), Leander Starr 
Jameson (1904-1908) and John Xavier Marriman (1908-1910)85, forming clear links 
between British imperialism in Southern Africa and the financial imperialism of the 
Rand that was soon to emerge. Late 19th century laws, passed largely at the instigation 
of powerful industrialists such as Rhodes, were specifically designed to maximise the                                                         
81 Stephens, John. Fuelling the Empire: South A frica’s Road to W ar (2003: p. 172) 
82 Bryant, Margot. Taking Stock: Johannesburg Stock Exchange- the first 100 years (1987: p. 21) 
83 see Ruin to the Mining Industry:  in South African Chamber of Mines Annual Report for the year 
ending 1889. (1890: pp. 16-17) 
84 Kubicek, Robert. Mining: Patterns of Dependence and Development 1870-1930. In: Konczacki, 
Zbigniew/Parpart, Jane/Shaw Timothy (Eds.). Studies in the Economic History of South A frica: 
Volume II: South A frica, Lesotho and Swaziland (1991: p. 69) 
85 Lang, John. Bullion Johannesburg: Men, Mines and the Challenge of Conflict (1986: p. 9) 
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returns on British capital and British involvement in Southern Africa, by forcing 
Africans into European-led mining, industrial, and agricultural enterprises86. As 
monocausal and grand the link between the Corner House and the intensification of 
British imperialist expansion in Southern Africa may seem to a critic of radical 
historiography, the causal geological link between decreasing profits and the 
limitations of surface mining are plausible for all historiographical schools analysing 
the capital expansion and capital application on the Rand. 
 
 
A Transvaal official looks down from a horse to competing claims from small prospectors and a 
‘Randlord’. Source: Giliomee, Hermann and Mbenga, Bernard. New History of South Africa (2007: p. 
201) 
  
The problem of extracting gold from the poor quality ore was soon to be solved. It 
took two brothers, medical doctors Robert and William Forrest, and the chemist, J.S 
MacArthur, to find the best answer to the treatment of gold ore87. The three Scots 
experimented with a sample of Rand ore in Glasgow and discovered that cyanidation 
could recover the greatest amount of gold from the ore. The ore was to be dissolved in 
a solution of cyanide of potassium, causing the gold in the ore to attract to zinc 
                                                        
86 Wright, Harrison. The burden of the present (1977: p. 22) 
87 Stephens, John. Fuelling the Empire: South A frica’s Road to W ar (2003: p. 174) 
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shavings88, making the pure gold easily and efficiently recoverable. The new method 
recovered 90% of gold in the ore as compared to 60% through amalgamation89, the 
method previously used.  
With the problem resolved, and many operators ready to reinvest huge sums of 
capital in the development of below-ground operations and the chemical processing 
plants needed to recover the gold, gold production began to recover. The output of 
gold rose from 0.13 million fine ounces in the period 1885-1889 to 1.06 million fine 
ounces in the period 1890-189490, in the process making the South African Republic 
the biggest global player in gold production.  
With the introduction of the cyanide extraction process, confidence in the 
industry had been restored91. The news of the new production boom had spread 
around the world and soon many shares of Johannesburg-listed companies were 
changing hands in London, Paris, Berlin, Moscow and as far afield as the bourses of 
Vienna, Madrid, Constantinople and Cairo92. Investors in South Africa and abroad 
could not get enough of the South African gold shares and just as production had 
increased, the value of shares reached new highs. During the year of 1894, the market 
value of shares of the 52 producing Johannesburg-listed mines rose from £13,5 
million to £31,7 million93. With the market in full swing, new profits presented the 
governments in London and Pretoria with new opportunities and threats. 
The economic development of the Transvaal Republic was soon seen as a 
constraint on British hegemony in South Africa94. Kruger’s republic was quickly able 
to increase its finances after the depression, which forced many lower-earning mines 
out of the market. As many of the financial houses of Johannesburg were still in a 
period of recovery in the early 1890s, President Kruger turned to the powerful 
Rothschild family of London, to obtain a loan of £2 500 000 for the finance of the 
railway to Delagoa Bay95. As the Rothschilds were also very closely linked to 
financing the railways lines of the Cape Colony, it took some major convincing for  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the government of the Cape Colony to come at ease with the new railway project of 
the Transvaal Republic. In 1894, the railway, built by the Netherlands South African 
Railway Company, completed the principal line connection to Johannesburg, linking 
the line to Lourenco Marques in 1895. The new railroad would reduce the freight rates 
from an average of £30 to £10 a ton96, giving Kruger a clear economic advantage over 
the bargaining options coming out of the Cape Colony. 
 
Table of Railway Distances (1892) 
from  to  miles  kilometres 
Cape Town  Johannesburg  1013  1621 
Port Elizabeth  Johannesburg  713  1141 
East London  Johannesburg  665  1064 
Durban  Johannesburg  439  702 
Durban  Charlestown  304  486 
Charlestown  Johannesburg (by road)  135  216 
Delagoa Bay  Pretoria  348  556 
Delagoa Bay  Nelspruit (Completed on 31 Dec)  128  205 
Nelspruit  Pretoria  220  352 
Pretoria  Johannesburg  47  75 
Source: South African Chamber of Mines Annual Report for the year ending 1892 (1893: p. 74) 
 
2.3 Gold and Kruger’s confident diplomacy: regional power politics 
 
The new confidence that gold gave the Transvaal quickly became evident in the 
Republic’s diplomatic relations. With gold being able to leverage a number of new 
critical political moves the stage was set for a new diplomatic stance of the Transvaal 
with respect to its neighbours in Africa and allies in Europe.  
In 1889 the Cape Colony and the Orange Free State had entered into a customs 
union. Kruger was approached by the administration of the Cape on numerous 
occasions to agree to a union, and constantly refused boldly. Kruger was well aware 
of the fact that the refusal to join the customs union meant that the mines would have 
to continue to pay duties levied on imported goods at Cape and Natal harbours97.  
Kruger was in full control of his diplomatic strategy towards the Cape and Natal, 
                                                        
96 Kubicek, Robert. Economic Imperialism in Theory and Practice: The case of South A frican Gold-
mining finance 1886-1914 (1979: p. 46) 
97 Lang, John. Bullion Johannesburg: Men, Mines and the Challenge of Conflict. (1986: p. 58) 
  42 
knowing that his grip on the Rand could prevent any extension of the commercial free 
rein the British had desired in all of Southern Africa98. 
With the rise of Rhodes to the position of Prime Minister in the Cape Colony 
in 1890, Kruger decided to counteract British pressures on the Transvaal by 
improving political links to Germany. With the support of Germany and significant 
revenues from the gold mines, Kruger was in a confident position to establish the 
Transvaal as the dominant state in southern Africa, challenging British hegemony in 
the region and going against Rhodes’ plans for a confederation of British-ruled 
states99.  
The British administration in the Cape was well aware of Kruger’s political 
stance, fearing that if Kruger were able to unite his economic power with a political 
agenda supported by the South African Republic’s foreign population, there would be 
little hope for extending British political domination into Afrikaner territory100. 
Kruger, with the power of gold on his side, could now only be stopped by an 
economic crisis or direct military intervention. As economically and politically 
confident Kruger may have perceived his position to be, a new economic structure 
would soon test his hold of the Rand.  
 
2.4 Deep-level mining and the cost structure: financial opportunities and 
geological constraints 
 
As the industry developed, the distinctive feature of the Witwatersrand gold mines 
was that all the mines produced the same product for which there was an unlimited 
market. With the elasticity of demand for gold on the Rand being very inelastic, 
meaning that the quantity demanded was not (or negligibly) affected by the (fixed) 
price of the commodity, gold miners on the Rand had not to worry about their 
commodity not being sold. For producers wanting to gain the largest profits, the 
critical factor of production came on the supply side, meaning that as long as it was 
profitable to mine gold, it would be produced and sold101. With the structural changes 
that came on the supply side of production after deep-level mining was expanded, 
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producers needed to squeeze their rising production costs to the bottom, to maintain 
their high rate of return.  
The deep-level mining revolution had changed the geological and economic 
scope of the mining endeavour on the Rand. As easy as the chemical process might 
have been in theory, the big plunge into the depths of the reefs would not have 
occurred had not the Rand had access to a cheap energy supply, that ran through the 
coal deposits of Witbank, and was perfectly linked through the railway to the coast102. 
The coal was used to fire the steam engines, which drove the hoists into and out of the 
shafts. Coal was also used for powering air compressors, which were used for the rock 
drills.  
 Another significant cost factor in deep-level mining was that of explosives that 
were used to break through the layers of rock and into the sheets of gold. Dynamite 
was supplied to the mining industry by the Alfred Nobel international dynamite trust, 
through a local monopoly, the Transvaal Explosives Company, at costs significantly 
higher than the going rate on most international markets103. The Chamber of Mines 
annual report for 1890 noted many complaints from mine owners, referring to the 
high costs and poor quality of the dynamite supplied by the Transvaal Explosives 
Company104. The discussion over dynamite would prove to be a major point of 
confrontation between the Afrikaner Volksraad and the Randlords vouching for lower 
production costs of gold. 
 With deep-level mining being significantly more expensive than surface 
mining, mine operators were looking at new ways of cutting costs. Variations in the 
grade of ore mined, technological limitations in the recovery of gold, fluctuating cost 
structure, poor infrastructural development and the instability associated with access 
to financial capital, all put pressure on the direct costs of gold production105.  
Historian De Kiewiet once boldly stated that modern South Africa was not 
built on gold and diamonds alone, but on the availability of cheap African labour106, 
that was used to recover the precious minerals. Labour historian Vernon Allen has  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gone as far as to claim that the main function of the South African Chamber of Mines 
was to reduce African wages107, which were an obstacle for white capitalists with 
narrow profit margins. Marxist analysis of this cost structure would most definitely 
conclude that the induced low wages of African labourers was conducive to the 
wealth of European mine owners108.  
In the initial stages of gold production in the 1880s, the question of labour was 
left to free competition, leaving demand and supply to dictate the market109. African 
workers were always paid far less than their white colleagues and after the period of 
depression between 1889 and 1892, even their relatively small wages became a 
problem for the white mine-owners. The pressure from the mine-owners resulted in 
the Chamber of Mines issuing a collective plea to all members to change their 
payment systems from monthly to daily, making the employment and retrenchment of 
labour far more flexible110. It was mentioned that with 15 000 African workers on the 
gold fields, a ‘great sum’ of £45 000 had to be spent at an average monthly wage of £ 
3 per worker. With such pleas and comparisons, the true value of South African 
labour was played down, and for the mining capitalists it soon became clear that in the 
mining sector labour cheap enough for capitalism’s needs could only be obtained by 
the application of various kinds of political, legal, and economic pressure111.  
The increased financial pressure that came with deep-level mining would 
quickly translate into collective action of gold mines, now further united in their quest 
to reduce production costs. In August of 1890 the first collective move of reducing 
wages was seen when 64 Rand companies agreed to reduce the maximum monthly 
wage to £2 112. In order to get a more centralised structure for controlling the wages of 
African workers on the Rand, the Chamber of Mines established the Department of 
Native Affairs by the end of 1893. 
 The cost of African labour arose mainly from cash wages (which excluded 
food and lodging) and recruitment fees. The recruitment often took on illegal 
methods, with white middlemen dressed as ‘white officials’ approaching African 
villages and settlements with promises of over-exaggerated sums of money. These  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‘freelancers’ would then take the men to the mines and ‘sell’ them off to mine-owners 
at various prices. Lies, trickery and deception were the main means of ‘attracting’ 
African labour to the mines of the Rand113.  
 After the mines went underground the extraction of gold became even more 
labour-intensive. The mine-owners went beyond the Chamber of Mines and to the 
Volksraad in order to introduce a steady stream of African labourers to the gold fields. 
At the peak of the depression in 1889, there were some 16 000 African workers in 
Johannesburg. By 1892, this figure had risen to 25 858 and by 1893 29 500114. In 
1895 the Transvaal Government introduced a hut tax of 10 shillings (£0.50), in 
addition to a poll tax of  £2 to force African men in the Transvaal Republic to work115. 
The way the Rand capitalist also saved on additional means of social security 
services, such as family housing, schools and hospitals, was as a result of the 
migratory worker scheme, which allowed them to pay wages based only on a single 
unit of labour116, namely the African working male, whose family had to stay behind 
in the rural villages. 
Although the greater social effects of the mining revolutions on the indigenous 
African populations will be discussed in the sociological section of this investigation, 
it must be said that discrimination on the Rand was made explicit and with the intent 
of maintaining a cheap labour force. There is very little evidence about the status and 
magnitude of paid African labour before the mass employment in the mines making 
causal relationships on the economic pitfalls of cost-reducing policies for Africans 
very difficult to formulate. It must however be said that the application of a regulated 
labour market on the Rand was developed to serve the needs of Rand capitalists. This 
is also evident in the number of laws under which African miners and workers were 
prohibited from purchasing mineral licenses, trading in minerals and establishing 
shops117 or residing in mining areas118. The classic Marxist scenario of capital being 
dependant on cheap labour and of labour being held at the mercy of capital would lead 
the African workers of the Rand into the 20th century, where discrimination and  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hardship would become a norm, rather than just the product of an exploitative mining 
system.  
As prominent and useful the Marxist school is in the analysis of the transition 
into deep-level mining and the development of the discriminatory cost structure, the 
Marxist school ignores (or plays down) empowering aspects of capital diffusion in 
South Africa, creating many structural changes for the economy as a whole and not 
only the ‘intentional’ exploitation of the African labour force. If Marxist analysis may 
be sufficient to interpret the capitalist gains due to the reductions of labour costs, 
Marxist analysis of the Rand is in many ways insufficient to address the dynamics of 
introducing the cash economy to the urbanised context of African labour. 
 
2.5 The “City” connection: British capital and financiers on the Rand 
 
With the confidence in the future of the Rand, and the opinion that the South Africa 
Republic would soon take over the US and Australia as the leading gold producer, 
global capital soon began to stream to the mining houses of Johannesburg. The 
development of the Rand gold could not have come at a better time. The industrialised 
economies of Europe were rapidly transforming their economic capabilities with the 
approach of the end of the 19th century. Relying heavily on the diffusion of steam-
engine technology from Britain and the later development of the service sector, an 
economic transformation, which became conceptualised as the Second Industrial 
Revolution by David Landes, had developed119. At the same time, the financial “City 
of London” was able to establish itself as the chief global financial provider to the 
capital revolution that was gaining momentum in Britain and mainland Europe.  
The greatest bankers and merchants of the Empire had established themselves 
in the City, close to the centre of imperial power, enabling them to form and maintain 
social connections, which were essential to their own success and that of the 
Empire120. Banks of the City took it upon themselves as their imperial duty to manage 
British capital that would once have gone into the national debt or into railways in 
Britain. After the economic turbulence of the early 1880s, City banks, which had long 
been engaged in the finance of trade in primary products from the furthest corners of 
the Empire and beyond, reacted to the challenge of falling mercantile profits by  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investing in the production of the commodities they serviced121. The most significant 
of these commodities was gold.  
As Russell Ally maintains, Britain’s powerful international financial system 
saw South Africa’s gold producers “being drawn into the orbit of the London gold 
market and the City of London almost from the beginning of mining operations on the 
Rand”122. The Bank of England also encouraged favourable economic conditions for 
South African gold producers. The Bank Charter Act of 1844 bound the Bank of 
England to the purchase of all unsold gold at the fixed official price, thus giving South 
African gold mines a guaranteed market123. Chapter 32 IV stated that “all persons 
shall be entitled to demand from the Issue Department of the Bank of England Notes 
in exchange for Gold Bullion, at the Rate of Three Pounds Seventeen Shillings and 
Nine Pence per Ounce of Standard Gold”124 (As previously mentioned, the price of 
gold between 1880 and 1914 was fixed at £4.24).  
The economic changes that came with the Second Industrial Revolution left 
many countries turning away from silver. After the united German Empire adopted 
the gold standard in 1871, silver prices tumbled, convincing many countries to move 
to a gold-based monetary system125. Germany moved from silver mono-metalism to a 
gold mono-metalism as opposed to other countries moving from bi-metalism126. This 
sudden surplus of silver on the market brought the price of silver down, and in the 
process, invited more countries to leave silver for gold. Gold was said to promise 
greater price and exchange stability than silver, closer integration with the world’s 
financial centres and cheaper capital from abroad127. The new era of gold as a global 
monetary system became firmly established.  
As the fate of Southern Africa would have it, the discoveries of gold on the 
Rand came just abut at the same time as the industrialised world was changing its 
monetary systems to the gold standard. Influential British and European capitalists  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quickly made it their imperial duty to buy out Rand gold and take it to the commodity 
markets of Europe.  
To some degree it would not be wrong in saying that the true capital decisions 
on Rand gold were made in London. The Bank Charter of 1844, the sheer growth and 
influence of the London financial market, growing British influence in the Transvaal 
and the imperial shipping network made it all the more attractive for gold investors to 
establish their holdings in London. With time, this imperial connection became so 
convincing that by 1899 all the leading mining houses were registered on the London 
stock exchange, raising most of their capital on the London capital market and 
establishing their head offices in the City128.  
The imperial factor simplified gold purchasing, channelling the precious metal 
to the vaults of the Bank of England. Getting gold from the Rand to the London 
market was a relatively easy task. Various mining houses would deliver their 
unrefined bullion to the two main local banks in operation in the Transvaal, namely, 
the Standard Bank of South Africa and the National Bank of South Africa. Weekly 
shipments to London took the raw gold from the mines of the Rand directly to the 
contracted refiners, who would then offer the bullion for sale on the open market in 
the City129.  
The most influential of the contracted refiners was the Rothschild family130. 
The Rothschilds were incredibly influential in the British political circles and already 
had close ties to investments in South Africa through their partnership with Rhodes 
and his De Beers operations in Kimberley. Rhodes had already in the early 1880s 
(when capital coming out of Kimberley was still limited and unstable) realised that the 
key to financial success in South Africa was the financial support of the most 
powerful and influential London financial houses131. The Rothschilds would refine the 
bulk of the raw gold they bought in London, storing it and selling it to the Bank of 
England after offering it for sale on the London’s bullion market at a premium of 
£0.25 per ounce above the fixed rate132.  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As conceptualised in the argument by Cain and Hopkins, the gentlemanly or 
leisurely class of late 19th century London linked the financiers of the City to the 
ruling class of the British Empire, combining personal ambition with the greater 
imperial duty. With bankers connecting capital to political power, the City had 
established itself as the chief financier of the British Empire, financing most imperial 
economic initiatives, home and abroad.  For these ‘gentlemen’, the Empire would 
prove to be a superb arena for testing responsibility, imperial duty and honour133.  
One ‘gentleman’ who would later epitomise the imperialist links between the 
City and Empire was Cecil John Rhodes. Even before the British South Africa 
Company was established, Cecil Rhodes and his financial partner Charles Rudd 
visited Johannesburg in 1886-1887 and became convinced the Rand was an 
investment one could not afford to ignore, although there was still much speculation 
about the future prospects134. For Rhodes, Kimberley was where he made his fortunes 
and where he wanted to capitalise the most on his De Beers initiatives, a company that 
by 1895 would become one of the largest and richest in the world135. While Rhodes 
stayed behind in Kimberley, Rudd went over to London and registered Gold Fields of 
South Africa on the London Stock Exchange in February 1887 with a start-up capital 
of £250 000136. With influential connections in London, Rhodes would have the 
capital and information base he would need to stay afloat on the Rand during the 
turbulent economic times that would test all mine owners. After the structural 
transition to deep underground mines was made, Rhodes stood firmly on a path of a 
lucrative investment. After he became Prime Minister of the Cape Colony his position 
gave him even more influence in the gentlemanly circles of the City, allowing him 
easy access to capital and imperial legislators, who were convinced of Rhodes’ 
commitment and loyalty to imperial duty in Africa.  
Another partnership, which was already introduced at the beginning of this 
work, was that of the Corner House group. With the Wernher and Beit partnership in 
London and the Eckstein and Company subsidiary in Johannesburg, Rand Mines was 
founded in 1893 to obtain capital and engage in the most ambitious deep-level 
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projects on the Rand137.  In addition to the £400 000 nominal capital in £1 shares, 
Rand mines issued an additional 100,000 shares. These shares were divided amongst 
mostly powerful investors in London. The Rothschilds were given 27,000 with 
another 15,000 going to consulting engineers employed by the powerful banking 
family. 6,000 shares were given to the influential German-born City banker, Ernest 
Cassel. What would later complicate matters was the fact that Rhodes’s Gold Fields 
were also presented with 30,000 shares138. With the majority of shares strategically 
positioned in the City, personal fortunes and imperial prospects in Southern Africa 
became connected in a web of London’s power-circles (see table below).  
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Geographic Distribution of Shareholders: Gold Fields of South 
Africa (1891) 
Geographical Area 
No. of 
Shareholders 
Amount 
Held (£)  % 
Great Britain          
City of London          
Co. offcials  12  20 516  4.92 
stockbrokers and 
jobbers  194  33 937  8.22 
other  439  80 858  19.6 
London (excluding the 
City)  866  96 579  23.41 
England (excluding the 
City           
and Greater London)          
Birmingham  98  7 698  1.86 
other  951  87 965  21.32 
Scotland          
bankers and 
stockbrokers  5  12 145  2.94 
other  89  10 213  2.47 
Ireland  64  5 731  1.39 
Wales  13  653  0.16 
           
Subtotal  2 731  356 295  86.34 
           
Continental Europe          
France   183  17 341  4.2 
Germany  138  14 428  3.5 
other  49  7 211  1.75 
           
Subtotal  370  38 980  9.45 
           
South Africa  95  13 601  3.3 
Unclassified   20  3 751  0.91 
           
Subtotal  115  17 352  4.21 
           
Total  3 216  412 672  100 
 
     
 Source: in Kubicek, Robert. Economic Imperialism in Theory and Practice: The case of South A frican 
Gold-mining finance 1886-1914. (1979: p. 87) 
 
The members of the Corner House soon developed a powerful financial network that 
maximised the flow of financial information between the Rand and London. Up until 
1899 the bulk of the correspondence among its members consisted of share dealings, 
and a very large part of their income came from financial market speculation rather 
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than gold mining139. The Randlords made the most out of their connections to London 
and it has been estimated that, with general progression, British capital had made up 
between 60% and 80% of all foreign capital on the Rand by 1899140.  
The Corner House and Gold Fields would engage in an imperial economic battle 
that would span between Johannesburg, Pretoria and London, linking imperial 
ambitions and economic exploitation in a way never before witnessed in Southern 
Africa. With personal capital and the economic future of the Empire at stake, the City 
of London became the façade on the house that the Rand had become.  
The link to the City has become a significant point of dispute between liberal, 
imperial and Marxist historians alike. For many liberal historians, the economic 
developments that led to the creation of capital networks to and from the City of 
London showed just how integrated the South African economy (the most lucrative 
sectors clearly being found within the Boer republics) was, and most notably the 
economic cluster that developed out of the gold industry, creating an (financial) 
institutional disequilibrium. The hegemony of Britain’s financial institutions within 
the City are seen as significant to the territorial and financial disposition of the Rand’s 
marginalised European and African poor communities. Although the dynamics of the 
British capital market make it difficult to identify a clear causality between the City 
and the economic exploitation of the South African Republic and its people, the 
liberal school141 sees the flow of capital to and out of the Rand (mostly represented by 
the work of City institutions) as crucial to understanding the failures of many 
principles of freedom and equality that directly impacted the South African 
Republic’s institutional and administrative freedoms.  
Conservative imperial historians have used the British imperialist school to 
glorify the expansion of British financial institutions and their investments into 
Southern Africa, underlining the capital gains that the gold mines of the South African 
Republic made due to the financial networks the British global economy offered. As 
out-dated this view may be with the political and academic rhetoric of the ‘new’ 
South Africa, prominent British historians such as Niall Ferguson, have glorified the 
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140 Allen, Victor. The History of Black Mineworkers in South A frica. Vol: 1 1871-1948 (1992: p. 140)  
141 see overview of Macmillan’s and De Kiewiet’s theoretical approaches.In: Visser, Wessel. Trends in 
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role of the City in spreading the dynamics of capitalism and economic liberalisms to 
all corners of the globe142.  
For radical Marxists, the links to the City represent, in many ways, the 
manifestation of white-led capitalism and financial expansion into Southern Africa. 
As most radical historians saw Africans as the only true inhabitants of the Rand, the 
history of capitalism in South Africa is associated and juxtaposed within the Marxist 
critique of colonialism, exploitation and oppression that was unleashed upon the 
inhabitants of country, intensifying at the end of the 19th century143.  
As Marxist revisionism is the school of thought that has most heavily influenced 
the theoretical and methodological outlook in my investigation, I firmly see the City 
at the economic core of fostering the dangerous relationship between British capital, 
South African gold and the European-owned mines of the Rand. While not necessarily 
directly causal in the relationship between the City and the intensification of British 
imperialism in South Africa, the City remains as the main actor in the financial and 
institutional framework that established and developed the capital network that would 
in 1899 lead to far more than just the need to protect British financial interests. 
 
2.6 The South African Chamber of Mines: institutionalising the Randlords’ 
common interests 
 
The Randlords knew well from many experiences in Kimberley that formalised 
institutionalisation would minimise the risks associated with asymmetric information 
and the inconsistent legislation of Kruger’s Transvaal Republic coming out of 
Pretoria. The first Chamber of Mines in Johannesburg was founded at a meeting at the 
Central Hotel on 7 December 1887144. This first Chamber would serve as not much 
more than a “Gentlemen’s Club” where the fate of the Rand was still widely 
speculated. After eighteen months the Chamber fell apart after a number of petty 
arguments amongst the original members divided the Chamber over real purpose and 
effectiveness of the Chamber. 
 As the belief and confidence in the riches of the Rand grew, the concept of a 
chamber representing the interests of the mines in the Transvaal Republic resurged.                                                         
142 see Ferguson, Niall. Empire (2002) 
143 Visser, Wessel. Trends in South A frican Historiography and the Present State of Historical Research 
(2004: p. 10) 
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The need for a much-improved chamber arose as the Randlords were determined to 
eliminate competition amongst themselves for labour145. They were also concerned 
with sharing technological costs and bringing down labour costs that would be needed 
with the advent of deep mining. On 5 October 1889 the Witwatersrand Chamber of 
Mines was launched, this time organised by a system of mining company 
representation, instead of individual membership146.   
 The Randlords who formed the Chamber of Mines were mostly British 
subjects, although many were of German Jewish or German Lutheran origin147. The 
national and ethnic backgrounds of the Randlords would constantly raise suspicion of 
the Afrikaner leadership in Pretoria, which was more than conscious of the problem 
foreigners would pose to testing loyalty towards the South African Republic. This was 
also made evident in the Chamber members’ attitude towards the South African 
Republic. Many were loyal to the national idea the South African Republic 
represented, but were personally disposed towards the conservative political stance of 
Paul Kruger148. Other members believed in the Afrikaner Volksraad’s great vision of 
reforming the Transvaal as the most powerful state in Africa. These ideological 
differences would prove to be the dividing factor in the turbulent future of the 
Chamber and its involvement in British imperialism.  
 After the first year of the Chamber’s existence, the issues the members 
challenged at the meetings would set the agenda for the next ten years. The annual 
report for the year ending 1890 (the Chamber’s first full year), which was printed 
relatively late in the year of 1891 due to a fire at the Argus Company where the 
manuscript was stored149, discussed the issues that would make up the core of the 
Randlords’ concerns towards the legislation bodies in Pretoria. The top of the list was 
made up of the question over the supply of dynamite, a urgently needed railway link 
to the mines and the supply of ‘native labour’.  
The report also raised concerns over the ambiguity of the Transvaal’s attitude 
towards supplying the Rand with a reliable railway link. In an interview with 
President Kruger on 25 February 1890 the Chamber stressed the urgency of a railway 
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connection to Johannesburg150. With a link to Bloemfontein already being built as part 
of the Orange Free State’s agreement with the Cape Colony, the Chamber urged 
Kruger to consider building a connection between Johannesburg and Bloemfontein. 
Kruger, weary of British imperialists’ growing influence in the Orange Free State 
hesitantly assured the Chamber that he would bring up the issue to the Volksraad, 
where a decision would be taken.  
The Randlords, concerned with their supply of heavy machinery that was to 
enable deep mining, were left to sit on their capital as Kruger pondered over how to 
overcome British expansion and the need to expand mining operations on the Rand. 
These concerns over the railway access would remain unresolved for the next 2 years. 
The Chamber’s pleas over the railway were not only of importance for the viability of 
the mines on the Rand, but would also challenge the regional political aspirations of 
Paul Kruger. President Kruger was opposed to any kind of co-operation with the 
British colonies, be it commercial or political151. While the Orange Free State 
remained on good terms with the Cape Colony, President Kruger was determined to 
create Transvaal’s own railway system, as an essential requirement to preserving the 
South African Republic’s independence152. The first train arrived in Johannesburg on 
15 September 1892153 and the complete connection to Delagoa Bay became functional 
at the end of 1894154.  
Apart from problems with the railways, Kruger was concerned with greater 
British commercial interests in the Transvaal and was determined to work against the 
Randlords by raising freight rates and the cost of the monopolised dynamite, 
interfering with the attempts to increase the supply of labour to the Rand (thereby 
reducing the price of labour), and by boycotting any British attempts to create a free-
trade area throughout Southern Africa155.  Up until the end of 1892, when finally the 
railway link from Bloemfontein to Johannesburg was complete, in its commercial 
struggle to transport goods to the Transvaal, the Cape railway avoided paying 
Kruger’s “extortionate Transvaal railway rates” by offloading all goods at the Vaal 
Station on the Transvaal-Orange Free State border, and taking the goods on further by 
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ox-cart156. This would remain a critical concern for the Chamber as Kruger’s 
transportation policies were deliberate measures to disrupt British imperialist 
economic links, which had already infiltrated the Orange Free State, and were gaining 
momentum in the Transvaal. 
 
2.7 The Chamber and labour: economic collusion and social marginalisation  
 
The core of the Chamber’s efforts would however be spent on exploitive collusion, 
attempting to converge the wage structure and supply of labour to levels where a 
constant supply of labour would be available at the cheapest rates. From their 
experiences with diamond mining in Kimberley, many of the Chamber’s members 
knew far too well that by supplying the minimum standards of accommodation and a 
very basic food supply, mining companies could drive the costs down to the bare 
minimum157. As discussed in section 2.4, the decision to reduce wages was taken 
collectively and implemented swiftly in August 1890 with mine managers agreeing to 
a maximum wage of 40 Shillings (= £2158).  
As various comparative advantage strategies were applied to lower production 
costs, the maximum wage upon which members of the Chamber agreed on was more 
theoretical than a rule of thumb. The Chamber’s policies were difficult to implement, 
as many members feared loosing reliable workers at a time when significant changes 
in the industry were taking place. This was evident in the time lag that followed the 
implementation of wage cuts in the mining companies. In September the average 
wages were still at 63 Shillings a month and by October had gradually dropped to 48 
Shillings159.  
The wage reduction agreements were however short lived. As much as the 
mine owners wanted to reduce wages, shortages of labour led many Chamber 
members to move away from the agreement. By 1893 the wage agreement fell apart 
completely. Due to gradual developments in the service sector of the economy in 
Johannesburg and Pretoria, African workers wanted to avoid the safety risks 
associated with deep-level mining160. New workers to the mines would ask for the  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current increased wages, as opposed to the Chamber agreements that were at this 
point in time applied very loosely or not at all. At the Annual General Meeting on 26 
January 1893, it was stressed that the average monthly payment had risen and 
stabilised at a rate of 48 Shillings161 (= £ 2.17s).  
In order to combat the collective action of Africans from the Transvaal in 
asking for higher wages, the Chamber was convinced that the “inadequate” supply of 
labour could be replaced with a structured labour migration of African workers from 
Portuguese Mozambique and the Cape Colony, which was already by then being 
investigated162. These workers would then be bound to working agreements even 
before entering the Transvaal, reducing the scrupulous mine employers’ risk of 
getting involved in production-disturbing wage negotiations.  
This increased dependence on a stable supply of labour led the Chamber to 
institutionalise the cause by establishing the Native Labour Department at the end of 
1893. The Chamber had to lure labour to the mines while holding wage levels steady 
or lowering them further163.  A six-point charter was drawn up to outline the functions 
of the Native Labour Department164:  
 
 To provide the necessary funds for the carrying out of the proposals 
undertaken by the Native Labour Department. 
 To send agents to arrange with various African chiefs for a supply of labour 
and to provide for their safe conduct. 
 To supply the companies supporting the Native Labour Department with 
African labourers at a quota proportional to their Chamber membership 
subscription fees. 
 The Native Labour Department does not bind itself to any agreements based 
on the length and pay of the employment of African workers. 
 The Native Labour Department will not interfere with or molest any African 
labourers on their way to seek employment at the mines voluntarily and 
without the involvement of any labour agencies. 
 All companies joining the Native Labour Department shall bind themselves 
not to purchase any African labour from any tout or labour agent.  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As modern and enlightened as the codex was meant to be, it was only an 
internal obligation that looked good in an annual report and satisfied the investors in 
London. In reality, the Chamber was ruthless and deceitful in its recruitment drive. 
Working on commission, officials of the Chamber, personifying the image of urban 
wealth and modernity165, developed their exploitive traits, recruiting in the most 
vulnerable of African communities. The Chamber only catered to the interests of its 
wealthy members and took no notice of the social destruction its labour recruitment 
policies had created in the rural African communities166. 
As structured as the recruitment plans of the Native Labour Department may 
have been, the Chamber could not implement all of them without the support of the 
Transvaal government. In this regard, the Chamber did attempt to convince the 
government in Pretoria on numerous occasions of its major recruitment drive that was 
planned to benefit the whole Transvaal economy. As John Stephens summarises it, the 
Transvaal government would however never be found “wanting for enthusiasm when 
called upon to exploit black people as ‘labour units’”167. As Kruger associated the 
Chamber with being an extended arm of British imperialism, he would make sure to 
remain cautious of the Chamber’s attempt to involve the Volksraad in Pretoria in any 
of its financial or imperialistic ventures.  
As fragile and cautious as the relationship between Kruger and the Chamber 
may have been, certain policies had been moderated or modified in the interest of the 
mines through the close cooperation of the Chamber with Transvaal government168. It 
must however be stressed that the Chamber and the Volksraad agreed and were both 
for the gradual implementation of the pass system, which was to control the 
movement of African labourers, no matter where they came from. According to the 
Chamber, “the object of the new [pass] law was to bring the natives under effective 
control and reduce the risk of desertion to a minimum”169. In reality, the pass law 
presented the Native Labour Department with a ‘tagging-system’, which allowed 
recruiters to identify existing workers and their employer, enabling them to look for 
fresh recruits that could be manipulated to join the workforce at even lower rates of  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pay. For the Transvaal government, the pass system brought about a degree of control 
to the movement of African workers in the Transvaal. As many workers came from 
territories outside the Transvaal’s jurisdiction, officials were able to manage the tax-
paying African population. Although this is one issue the Transvaal government and 
the Chamber were willing to work together on, operation of the pass laws was 
difficult because of the lack of funds and the general inefficiency of the Transvaal 
administration170 , limiting the objective of a greater level of control over the 
movements of labour.  
The Native Labour Department managed to continue to operate independently 
of the Chamber, supplying significant numbers of men to the Chamber’s mines, and 
managed to form an agreement with the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique171, 
bypassing many Transvaal laws by recruiting from outside the Afrikaner or British 
spheres of influence. As successful as the diplomatic mission of the Native Labour 
Department to Mozambique was, the Native Labour Department was dissolved at the 
end of 1896 and the Rand Native Labour Association was to continue the work in 
establishing the Chamber’s monopoly on labour recruitment from Mozambique172. 
It must also be stressed that it can be misleading when explaining the political 
lobbying of the Chamber to focus only on economic interpretations of profit and 
loss173. Although the Randlords always put their cost structure in front of politically-
motivated decisions towards the Transvaal government, mutual cooperation between 
the two parties was critical to the political stability on the Rand. With the Chamber 
representing the interests of many foreign mineworkers, the Uitlanders, it was of 
utmost importance that the political integrity of the Transvaal government would not 
become overrun by the Randlords’ personal ambition. 
 
2.8 London, Johannesburg and Pretoria: linked by politics, separated by gold 
 
As Wolfgang Mommsen investigates in his theoretical analysis of Marxist approaches 
to imperialism, he goes on to quote Rudolf Hilferding, a renowned Austrian Marxist 
theorist, who maintained that imperial expansions of all types (be it capital exports,  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take-overs of foreign markets, territorial expansions, and military mobilisation) 
increases the pace at which capitalism expands174. In South Africa, the way financial 
interests were transformed into imperial territorial interests, as represented by 
powerful mine-owners who were largely idealised by personal imperialist agendas, be 
it capital or territorial, would rapidly shape the future of the Rand and Southern 
Africa, and link the local to the global by means of organised capital networks. If 
capitalism was the engine of success for driving the capital-hungry mining industry, it 
was equally the economic system that would unite personal financial objectives with 
imperialist territorial ambitions of the British Empire. Within just a few years, the 
Witwatersrand mines had become the world’s largest source of gold, shifting the 
economic core of the country from the British Crown, namely the Cape Colony, to an 
independent republic in the north-east of South Africa175.  
For the financial hegemony of the British Empire of the late-Victorian era to 
remain intact, the economic developments in a small corner of South Africa was no 
matter to be played down. The rapid economic growth and subsequent political 
confidence of the Transvaal began to interfere with imperial policy in Africa. British 
capital that was entering the Transvaal was not only a by-product of capital markets 
and direct British investments, but also of imperialist policy towards South Africa. In 
this way the British Empire began indirectly to impose its rule on the small Afrikaner 
ruling class, whose tight grip on the Rand and unfavourable treatment of Natal and the 
Cape Colony distorted regional engagement of European powers, involving a small 
Afrikaner-led financial power in a network of European imperialists in Africa. British 
capital required the intervention of the Empire to ‘pacify; those whose land and 
resources were being exploited176.  
From a strategic perspective, Johannesburg and Pretoria began influencing 
local, regional and global economics in very different ways. As all political power of 
the Transvaal resided in Pretoria, just about all the economic power of the Transvaal 
was firmly centred in Johannesburg 177 . Johannesburg had quickly become a 
cosmopolitan city with a large and influential population of foreigners, the Uitlanders. 
In the 1896 census, the white population was made up of 6 205 Afrikaners, 16 265  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British citizens and 15 612 British subjects from the Cape Colony178. The finances 
generated by the foreign community for the Transvaal fiscus experienced an 
enormous rise with the development of the gold industry.  In 1882 the Uitlander’s 
contribution to state finances was £177 000, and by 1889, this figure had risen to  £ 1 
500 000179.  
The large majority of the foreigners in Johannesburg were of British heritage. 
As English was widely spoken and understood, the Boers regarded all Uitlanders as 
English180. Fearing a British stronghold in the economic heart of the Republic, Kruger 
denied Johannesburg normal forms of local government that operated in other villages 
and towns of the Republic181. Besides an economically orientated Diggers Committee, 
that later evolved into the Sanitary Committee, the local government was far from 
what Johannesburg had needed182. As ambivalent as Kruger’s and the Volksraad’s 
attitude towards the political status was, the constant fear of British imperialism in the 
Republic left Johannesburg tied-up in a bundle of bureaucratic red tape. 
With the uncertain political status of the Uitlanders in Johannesburg paying 
advantage to Kruger in Pretoria, the revenue and taxes from the industrial wealth 
generated in the gold fields was to make the Transvaal not only more modern, but also 
more self-sufficient and confident to pursuit its own diplomatic course183. In the early 
1890s, in a bold move much to the discontent of British subjects in the Transvaal, 
Kruger sought to develop closer relations with Germany. Kruger was well aware of 
the industrial might of Germany and German colonial ambitions in Africa. Kruger 
relied heavily on economic cooperation between Berlin and Pretoria, which eventually 
led German expertise and capital in assisting the formation of the National Bank of 
the South African Republic in 1894184. Kruger was convinced that the closer ties with 
the powerful German state would offset Pretoria’s constant fears of British imperial 
expansion into the Transvaal.  
Although British officials in London were very concerned about Kruger’s 
meddling in international politics, they were well aware of Transvaal’s dependence on 
British capital coming out of the City. The British parliament went as far as to  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approach powerful individuals in an attempt to remind Kruger of his need for British 
capital. As already addressed, this dependence was evident when in 1892 official state 
support was given to the Rothschilds when they sought City support in raising a £2,5 
million loan for the Transvaal that Kruger needed for the construction of the railway 
link to Mozambique185. The terms of the loan were set out to keep Kruger from 
interfering in regional British aspirations in Southern Africa. With the growing bad 
sentiment towards British subjects in the Transvaal, British imperialism in Africa 
needed to combine politics and economics in a way that would not disturb the 
sensitive state of the gold market in the City.  
As questioned by Bernhard Makhosezwe Magubane 186 , “can one really 
understand South African history without understanding the role of those who were 
the beneficiaries of African exploitation and dehumanization in the mines and farms 
(?)”187. The fluctuating manifestation of financial and political power that had 
engulfed the Rand created a flow of capital and people that the southern part of the 
African continent had never witnessed before. As the history of this exploitation and 
dehumanization at the hand of European capital had dominated the development of 
historiographical debates in South African social sciences throughout the turbulent 
and polarising academic traditions of apartheid South Africa academia, a new 
framework needs to be applied to this transcontinental socio-economic debate. At the 
beginning of the 1990s, approaching the end of apartheid, historians of South Africa 
learned much from specialists in other disciplines, from historians in other parts of the 
world, and most importantly from historians in other parts of Africa188.  
Liberal historians, often represented by their views in The Oxford History of 
South Africa, have abstracted the economic and political relationship between 
Johannesburg, Pretoria and London from the project of creating a white dominion, 
and tended to argue that racism is incompatible with economic growth, and that 
embracing capitalism would have led to racial and social amalgamation189. The 
obstruction to this capitalist development is represented by Afrikaner power in 
Pretoria.   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Marxist historians have been able to use this “top-bottom” liberal view of 
South African history as a base for socio-economic critique, dedicating particular 
interest to the processes of social stratification and class formation in a multi-racial, 
industrial and capitalist society190. In Magubane’s view, proudly referring to Frantz 
Fanon, “the African since the advent of the Age of Europe and capitalism has 
constituted the wretched of the Earth” 191 . As important “interactions” of 
transcontinental capital and its effects on the people was to the liberals, Marxist 
thinkers applied the transcontinental relationship of power and capital to the 
scarification of South African society, using “class” as their social unit of analysis in 
the bottom-up study of South African people192.  
In an attempt to apply the conceptual framework of the liberal and Marxist 
historiographical schools to the amalgamation of financial and political networks 
between Johannesburg, Pretoria and London, I took guidance in the most 
comprehensive grand narrative of South African society in the post-1994 era, namely 
the New History of South Africa193. Professors Gilliomee and Mbenga coordinated a 
team of 31 South African historians to develop a new grand narrative of South 
African social and economic history, concentrating on new methodological 
approaches and historiographical developments194. The conceptualisation of many 
original sources and secondary literature paints a new picture of New South Africa’s 
past, forming links between South Africa’s industrial past and the social consequences 
economic development had brought about. It is with this methodological global 
historical perspective that I analysed the politico-economic processes of the 
transformation, leading me to a bi-causal relationship between European capital 
diffusion and growth in the Transvaal’s fiscus, as well as the links between European 
economic influence and Afrikaner protectionism.  
 As the global networks of capital linked to social capital, the South African 
reality of 19th century Johannesburg brought on a new transcontinental power struggle 
between Pretoria and London. As divided as historiographical traditions in South 
Africa may be, one can still conclude that the economic gains of industrialisation in 
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South Africa would soon test the political core of power relations between Afrikaner 
political ambition and British economic influence.   
 
2.9 The City under pressure: loyal to the Crown, dependent on the Rand 
 
By the 1890s, many of the ruling elite in Britain were wary of the country’s potential 
financial weakness as exposed during the banking crisis of 1890, when Baring, one of 
the leading banks in the City of London, had to be rescued from liquidation by the 
Bank of England195. The regular biweekly shipments of gold to London from the Cape 
Colony provided London with the security needed by which the City banks could 
maintain the supremacy of the pound sterling without building up a surplus of gold in 
the vaults of the Bank of England196. The stability of this equilibrium was dependant 
on a secure and reliable transfer of gold for the global monetary market. During the 
late 19th century, and especially after the significant growth of production coming out 
of the Rand, in addition to the substantial Californian and Australian outputs, fears 
arose about a possible over-supply of gold197.  
The constant fears of an oversupply of gold came to influence the greater 
monetary course of the British economy in the 1890s. As Russell Ally summarises in 
his investigation of the City of London and the gold standard in the 1890s, “the 
maintenance of the gold standard was indispensable to the City of London’s welfare 
and the prosperity of the nation as a whole”198. According to Ally, the ideological 
division that was present in the British parliament could not decide who should take 
the responsibility of protecting the country’s gold reserves and to what extent the gold 
reserves were adequate to give Britain the leadership of the international monetary 
system199.  
The question historians have also had to address is not necessarily who was to 
take charge managing Britain’s monetary intentions, but if it was at all possible. The 
gold market had always been an international one, with free access open to all buyers 
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and sellers200. In theory, this also meant that any country fearing an oversupply of 
gold could have manipulated its interest rates to issue money and compensate for an 
increase in gold201. Within the imperial context, these fears manifested themselves 
further away from the City of London than expected, putting the concerns over gold 
supply and the practicality of the gold standard in question. In order to stabilise the 
rapid devaluation of the Indian Rupee, as a response to a rapid rise in inflation 
brought about as a result of falling silver prices (caused by increased gold production 
and global tendencies to switch to the gold standard) and poor monetary policy, the 
imperial government closed the Indian silver mints202. The problem remained a 
potential threat to the global confidence over the future of commodity-based monetary 
systems. This problem remained on the agenda of global monetary developments until 
1898, when the Rupee was officially pegged to the gold standard, just in time before 
the problem was to threaten the further existence of the gold standard and the City of 
London’s financial interests203. 
But what did the Indian crisis mean for the City?  The Indian episode showed 
the City bankers just to what extent gold had begun to influence global monetary 
policy and the fragility of global finances that came with it. Monetary policy, the 
influence of the City and the future of imperial finances would consolidate the mixed 
views over the gold standard in the shape of the City-based Gold Standard Defence 
Association, which had been given the blessing by officials at the Treasury and the 
Board of Trade to advocate the power of the gold standard204 as the official imperial 
position on the future of monetary developments within the Empire.  
As investigated by Niall Ferguson, the financial developments in Britain at the 
end of the 19th century had changed British economic policy to the extent that 
“financial rather than industrial domination of the world economy had secondary 
positive outcomes alongside the primary outcomes of ensuring that investors got their 
interest and principal”205. The transition changed the face of economic power in the 
imperial capital. The growth and influence of the service sector, as based on foreign  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investments, gave way to the dominance of a non-industrial economic and political 
elite206 . With the influence of the City firmly stretching beyond the financial 
institutions, a new capitalist network would determine the future of the Empire with 
the 20th century just around the corner. With the finance sector dictating future of the 
Empire and the City’s confidence in the reliability of the gold standard, the gold-
based monetary policy would put Britain’s metropolitan economy and its imperial 
economic policies to a hard test. 
The new financial dominance came not only with the prospects of political and 
economic power, but most importantly, with responsibility and loyalty to the Empire. 
Britain would base the defence of its monetary stability in the event of gold supply 
fluctuations on its position as a creditor nation207 and financial hub of European 
imperialism. As important as lending services were to the City, the City did not 
provide the Empire with protection of the pound sterling. The strategic role of the 
currency would depend more and more on maintaining London’s position as the 
world’s main gold market208. Linking this to the developments on the Rand, Ally 
states, given the pressure on the Bank of England in managing the pound sterling as a 
global currency, it is reasonable to assume that the Bank had a significant interest in 
controlling the vast and critical supply of gold from the Transvaal Republic209. By 
1895 British politicians did not necessarily favour direct action with respect to 
securing control over the Transvaal gold, but did have a major interest in ensuring that 
conditions for the production of gold were favourable to imperial policy, directing 
gold to the London market, and not an imperial rival such as in Berlin210.  
South African gold would now not go unnoticed and would not be left to 
privateers to take control of. As no British politician or financial magnate was 
prepared to explicitly call for direct action to be taken in the Transvaal, the political 
rhetoric of the Empire remained at preserving British dominance in Southern 
Africa211. The evolution of British imperialism in Southern Africa would need a much 
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more discreet course of action, eliminating an explicit London imperative, and 
utilising British expertise on-site on the Rand. 
 
2.10 Privatising imperialism: Rhodes’ financial ambitions on the Rand and 
loyalty to the Empire 
 
As analysed by John Hobson in his extensive study of imperialism, only one fixed 
rule of action seems to exist in promoting colonial links to the colonial core. This rule 
of action is “to promote the interests of the colony to the utmost extent, to develop its 
scheme of government as rapidly as possible, and eventually to elevate it from the 
position of [political] inferiority to that of association”212. The British colonial effort 
in London needed to facilitate this metropolitan link at a much higher administrative 
level than just the flow of capital to the Rand. The idea that the Transvaal had to be 
governed in a way as to cater to British mining capitalists had to be translated into 
politically acceptable terms, combining imperial strategy, individual talent and 
institutionalisation213.   
The basis for imperial expansion and greater institutionalisation of colonial 
ambition in Southern Africa north of the Vaal River had already been established in 
1889, in granting Cecil Rhodes the royal charter for the British South Africa 
Company214. Linking metropolitan goals with economic institutionalisation via private 
persons in the form of a chartered company had by the end of the 19th century become 
a strategic instrument of imperialism215. As described by Wolfgang Mommsen, the 
role of Cecil Rhodes and his British South Africa Company can be seen as a special 
case of sub-imperialism, where an individual links personal imperial ambitions to the 
greater imperialist goals of the metropolitan imperial core216. As the wealth of the 
Transvaal attracted British capital and trade opportunities, Kruger’s aggressive stance 
against Britain made it increasingly difficult for the British administration to direct the 
Transvaal into the British sphere of influence in Africa217. British ruling classes turned  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their attention to the African expertise of Rhodes, a passionate imperialist and 
advocate of the ‘British race’, who epitomised many of the qualities British high-
society saw as noble and loyal to the British cause. Oswald Spengler, in his highly 
acclaimed and controversial interpretations of world history, even went so far as to 
compare Rhodes to an ‘occidental gentleman’ in the Roman imperial tradition, who 
understood the importance of territorial and financial success218.  
 
The Rhodes Colossus. The famous satire drawing from the British Punch magazine that was drawn and 
published in 1892 after Rhodes announced his plans to extend a cable telegraph line from Cape town to 
Cairo. Source: Cape to Cairo. http://www.tothevictoriafalls.com/vfpages/devel/capetocairo.html. 
Accessed on 15 October 2011. 
 
When it came to combining imperial politics and private wealth, Rhodes was 
the master of the game. Rhodes became member of the Cape parliament in 1880, a 
post that opened him up to many new imperial projects. His power was now not only 
confined to the diamond fields of Kimberley and through his new post he was able to 
acquire influential allies219. By 1893, Rhodes had become the most powerful and 
influential Briton on the African continent. Rhodes, simultaneously the Prime 
Minister of the Cape Colony, Chairman of De Beers, Chairman of Goldfields and 
operational leader of the British South Africa Company, won widespread support                                                         
218 Spengler, Oswald. Der Untergang des Abendlandes: Umrisse einer Morphologie der 
W eltgeschichte. (Ungekürzte Sonderausgabe. 1993: pp. 52-53) 
219 Davidson, Appolon. Cecil Rhodes and his time (English Translation by Christopher English (1988: 
p. 69) 
  69 
from the British rulers in London220.  Rhodes had proven his imperial ability in being 
able to combine political with economic resources in his imperial effort to the north of 
the Transvaal, where as already noted, he had hoped to find the Second Rand. His 
opportunistic strategies and use of military means to boost the fortunes of Goldfields 
and the British South Africa Company brought Mashonaland221 and Matabeleland222 
under British control between 1888 and 1893223, in a ruthless campaign, using trickery 
and imperial intimidation to dispose the Ndebele people, who until then had managed 
to govern one of the greatest civilisations in Southern Africa.  
Rhodes’s City connection, in particular his association with the Rothschilds, 
and the powerful Corner House partnership of Wernher Beit, placed him well to take 
advantage of many financial and political opportunities coming out of London224. This 
metropolitan connection gave Rhodes important access to the upper echelons of the 
British ruling class and especially the Liberal Party, as governed by William 
Gladstone until 1894, who epitomised the financial drive of London in the later 19th 
century. After the Liberal ministry in London was voted out of power in the British 
Parliament in 1895, a leadership shuffle paved the way for Rhodes’ enormous support 
in Southern Africa.  
The new Conservative and Liberal-Unionist government under Lord Salisbury 
led to many changes in the imperial structure of governance. Most importantly, 
Joseph Chamberlain, until then closely linked to Rhodes’ economic initiatives via his 
position as President of the Board of Trade, opted to take the Colonial Office, as he 
was a great believer in the future of British imperialism and economic potential of the 
British Empire overseas225. With Chamberlain at the helm of the Colonial Office and 
Rhodes’s Chartered Company representing just to what extend the Empire was willing 
to go to facilitate financial backing for British imperialism, the two ‘gentlemen’ began 
to dominate domestic and international public affairs, symbolising Britain’s close 
cooperation on public and private imperial affairs. On 9 February 1896, the New York 
Times even noted that “means have been found to strike a balance between the 
exigencies of Chamberlain’s political career and the colossal political, financial and 
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social influences that the [Rhodes’] Chartered Company in its defence”226. The means 
that the article was referring to was that “Kruger and his Boers [were] marked for the 
sacrifice” to satisfy the political and financial ambitions of Chamberlain and 
Kruger227. 
 
Published: February 9, 1896
Copyright © The New York Times
 
 
(Excerpt of New York Times article from 9 February 1896. Britain and the Boers. Chamberlain 
and Rhodes agree, and Kruger is their victim.) 
 
As Lenin, ever so critical of Chamberlain summarised, Chamberlain preached 
of imperialism as the true and wise application of the political economy, stressing the 
importance of competition that Britain had to face from Germany, the USA and 
Belgium228. Chamberlain considered the rise of the Transvaal as an economic power, 
producing a quarter of the world’s gold supply to not only be a threat to British 
imperialism in Africa, but Britain’s position as a global power229. The British 
administrative fears in the metropolitan capital needed to be calmed and the Transvaal 
needed to be aligned with Britain’s greater African imperial policies.                                                         
226 Unknown London correspondent. New York Times: Britain and the Boers. Chamberlain and Rhodes 
agree, and Kruger is their victim (9 February, 1896) 
227 Unknown London correspondent. New york Times: Britain and the Boers. Chamberlain and Rhodes 
agree, and Kruger is their victim (9 February, 1896) 
228 Lenin, Wladimir. Der Imperialismus als höchstes Stadium des Kapitalismus (Ergänzte Übersetzung 
aus dem Russischen 1946: pp. 96-97) 
229 Meredith, Martin. Diamonds, Gold and W ar: The Making of South A frica (2007: p. 366) 
  71 
 
2.11 Kruger’s fears and the Jameson Raid: militarisation of the Rand 
 
President Kruger was well aware of the political developments in Britain and became 
increasingly fearful of British attempts to interfere with the political and economic 
future of the Transvaal. Kruger recognised that that it was the tax revenue coming 
from the gold mines that was the basis for Transvaal’s increasing economic 
prosperity230. Kruger, increasingly dependent on conservative Afrikaners and their 
disapproval of mining labour policies, needed to support the mining industry in a way 
that would appease the discontented Randlords and defuse the emotional 
Afrikaners231.  
 
 
Paul Kruger in 1898. Source: This day in South African history. 
http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/chronology/thisday/1898-03-14.htm Accessed on 8 May 2011.  
 
By the end of 1895, Rhodes, fearing an escalation of Kruger’s anti-British 
policies and his neglect of British citizens’ interests in the Transvaal, began to 
actively plan the downfall of the republic232. Rhodes saw his power in the Cape, the 
Matabeleland and Mashonaland as the key to putting pressure on Kruger. He soon 
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began to rally his imperial contacts, with clear intentions of taking British power into 
the Transvaal. 
In London, Chamberlain was careful to avoid any official links to Rhodes and 
his intentions in Southern Africa, but was well aware of the developments taking 
place and wanted to make the most of the imperial opportunity Rhodes had 
presented233. The British were conscious of Kruger’s links to Germany and knew they 
needed to act quickly and efficiently in order to avoid any diplomatic and military 
threats Germany could pose. Rhodes, economically firmly established on the Rand 
with his Consolidated Goldfields, was convinced that a coup in the Transvaal would 
need to involve the Corner House by combining economic and political intentions for 
the Transvaal234. The Randlords, at that time still not entirely convinced by Rhodes’s 
ambitions, were however united in their economic outlook, that with efficient 
government in the Transvaal, the cost of labour, explosives, coal, machinery and other 
strategic imports could be reduced by 15-20%235. With Chamberlain in London, 
Rhodes in Cape Town, Sir Leander Starr Jameson administrating the Matebeleland in 
Bulawayo and the British Randlords in Johannesburg, the scene was set for an 
imperial coup that was intended to replace the Afrikaner government with British 
administration that would cater to British imperial interests in Southern Africa and 
especially on the Rand. 
The plan was to stage an Uitlander rebellion in Johannesburg, which would 
create the conditions for a British force to ‘liberate’ British nationals from the political 
and economic humiliation of the Afrikaners236. The planning and execution of the 
rebellion was to be carried out by Jameson, Rhodes’s loyal business associate and 
administrator in Matabeleland, to the north of the Transvaal.  
The whole rebellion and raid, that soon came to be known as the Jameson 
Raid, was a major political blunder for British colonial administration in Southern 
Africa. The Uitlander rebellion came on 29 December 1895, too late to have any 
significant impact on internal politics of the Transvaal. Afrikaner security forces 
quickly managed to round up and arrest the rebels. On the 2 January, the whole 
rebellion was broken up. Kruger was not prepared to have any political intrusion in 
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his Republic and would now send Britain and Europe a clear message about his grip 
on the Transvaal and its wealth.  
Although there is still much historical speculation around the interest groups 
that had planned the Jameson Raid, the publication of economic historian Geoffrey 
Blainey’s thesis in 1965 has in many respects sent historians of Southern Africa to 
consider the historiography of British engagement in Southern Africa at the end of the 
19th century from two different schools237. Blainey’s thesis states that the Jameson 
Raid was secretly supported by British Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain and 
mine owners, who had a significant stake in the capital-intensive deep level mines of 
the Rand238. The first school that had emerged in the wake of this thesis was that of 
historians emphasising the political motives of British imperialism, looking at 
political and institutional factors of government and its administration. The second 
school follows the Hobson-Lenin tradition of investigating the structural context of 
Britain’s financial hegemony and the dominance of the international monetary market 
looking to secure a stable economic environment on the Rand239. Blainey’s thesis 
definitely links to the Hobson-Lenin theoretical approach of linking capital to the 
greater imperialist expansion and stays away from political theorising of leadership in 
the metropolitan capital and often conflicting colonial policies in the colonial 
territories. Although both academic schools present us with very different 
historiographical approaches, it is still academically consistent to state that the way 
the Raid was executed had an enormous impact on polarising British and Afrikaner 
interests in Southern Africa, giving all Europeans and neo-Europeans in Southern 
Africa clear signs of an up-and-coming war. 
 
2.12 Gold: paving the road to the War 
 
As argued by Blainey, the major shift from outcrop mining to deep mining on the 
Rand changed the relationship between the Transvaal state and capital, social relations 
and technological innovation of the gold industry, capital accumulation and the 
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transformation of Rand capitalism240. The sensitive coexistence of these factors could 
not exist side by side with British imperialist policies that manifested themselves in 
the execution and aftermath of the Jameson Raid, creating a state of fear and 
apprehension to what could ‘loom’ around the corner. 
For the British, the consequences of the Raid were diplomatically inconvenient 
and embarrassing. If things could not get any worse, besides the Raid and the 
disorganised proceedings around the legal trials of the perpetrators, the massive loss 
of cattle through the rinderpest and the anti-British rebellion in Rhodesia, produced a 
very dismal state of affairs for British interests in the Transvaal241. For many African 
leaders, the rinderpest was not just a ‘white man’s disease’ but a socio-political 
transformation that together with the Raid, meant a gradual end to some of the last 
administrative freedoms some African communities had. African leaders in the 
Transvaal, Rhodesia and Basutoland were fed up with the Anglo-Boer rift, and the 
loss of thousands of cattle was attributed to white skirmishes on the Rand.  
The ever-confident Rhodes tried to shake off his involvement in the plot, but 
soon had to resign as Prime Minister of the Cape and never really managed to recover 
his political power and influence242. The colonial phenomenon, a man who was 
adored and idealised by European colonialists, did not achieve the deeds the 
propaganda machines of the mother countries in Europe had foreseen243. Rhodes had 
lost his touch in Africa and the British needed new partners in Southern African 
imperialism. 
Amidst clear suspicions of a possible renewal of conflict with the British, the 
Transvaal reaffirmed its defensive alliance with the Orange Free State244. Although 
the relationship between the Transvaal and the Orange Free State had been divided on 
a number of diplomatic issues concerning economic unions with the British, the two 
Boer republics were united against any external threat to their independence and 
signed a new military treaty in 1897, committing the republics to mutual military 
support.245 Unity and the tradition of independence from the British would soon once  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again test Afrikanerdom at its ideological core. The Boers knew their sole existence 
would be threatened, and the future of the Afrikaners depended on unity of the two 
Boer republics. 
By the end of 1897, the year of Queen Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee, Britain 
reigned supreme over the largest empire in world history246. Britain had led the 
imperial territorial expansion during the European partition of Africa that became 
known as the ‘Scramble for Africa’247 and South Africa was not left out of the 
imperial equation. Chamberlain could not be slowed down in his imperial and 
personal objectives for Southern Africa. Quickly turning his back away from Rhodes, 
Chamberlain continued exerting diplomatic pressure on Afrikaner power in 
Pretoria248. Under Chamberlain, the Colonial Office tried to use old and reliable 
partners in the City, such as the Rothschilds, to limit the Transvaal’s access to British 
and indirectly, European capital249. The Rothschilds, who once made their mark in the 
Transvaal with a generous loan for the Delagoa railway connection, were now trying 
to divert capital away from Kruger. As influential the Rothschilds were in London and 
Paris, they could not stop capital coming from Britain’s biggest imperial threat, 
Germany.  The proof of that was exposed in the Transvaal raising a £2 million loan 
from Germany, which was used to support the Republic’s defence and foreign 
policy250. 
Capital was not the only help Kruger’s government was able to gain from 
Germany. Having heard about the Raid, Kaiser Wilhelm sent Kruger a telegram 
congratulating him on his efforts against British imperialism and offered to send 
marines to Pretoria, an offer that was strongly rebuked by the Kaiser’s grandmother, 
Queen Victoria251. The Government helped Kruger to obtain the latest Maxim guns 
and much of the Essen company Krupp’s latest weaponry252.  With the Transvaal now 
firmly influencing the European balance of power, the British quickly rallied France, 
Russia and the United States to recognise British hegemony in Southern Africa253. 
With European politics now divided by a neo-European occupational state, Britain  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and the Transvaal would have to efficiently use all of their possible tactics to gain the 
upper hand in the colonial future of Southern Africa.  
Kruger was well aware of the fact that the foreign-owned mines were and 
would remain a double-edged sword. On the one hand, he knew the Transvaal’s future 
looked dismal without the growth in taxable revenue coming out of the mines (see 
table below). On the other hand, Kruger knew giving the Randlords too much 
economic and political freedom would invite further imperial provocations from the 
British.  
Revenue and Expenditure of the South African Republic (1881-1899) 
Fiscal Period  Revenue (£)  Expenditure (£) 
Aug 1881  Dec 1881  37908  33442 
Jan 1882  Dec 1882  177407  11446 
Jan 1883  Dec 1883  143324  184344 
Jan 1884  Mar 1884  44557  18922 
April 1884  Mar 1885  161596  184820 
April 1885  Mar 1886  177877  162709 
April 1886  Dec 1886  196236  154636 
Jan 1887  Dec 1887  637749  594834 
Jan 1888  Dec 1888  884440  720492 
Jan 1889  Dec 1889  1577445  1201135 
Jan 1890  Dec 1890  1229061  1386461 
Jan 1891  Dec 1891  967192  1350074 
Jan 1892  Dec 1892  1255830  1187700 
Jan 1893  Dec 1893  1702685  1302054 
Jan 1894  Dec 1894  2247728  1734728 
Jan 1895  Dec 1895  2923648  1948249 
Jan 1896  Dec 1896  3912095  3732492 
Jan 1897  Dec 1897  3956402  3898816 
Jan 1898  Dec 1898  3329958  3476844 
Jan 1899  Dec 1899  4087852  3951234 
Source: (Revised by author for publication in July 1899) Fitzpatrick, James Percy. The Transvaal from 
within (1899: p. 71) 
 
 
With much political tension in the air in the aftermath of the Raid, the 
Randlords, supported by the Chamber of Mines, took a bold decision to reduce 
African labourers’ wages by 30% in April 1897254. Although, as shown before, the 
application of the wage cut was interpreted in many ways and implemented in even 
fewer, the Randlords sent Kruger the message that the financial future of the 
Transvaal would be determined by them.   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In November of 1898, Kruger’s government thought it was once again time to 
show the Randlords Pretoria was not going to take any economic collusion lightly and 
imposed a 5 % tax on all mining profits without any warning or consultation with the 
Chamber of Mines. The Chamber reacted quickly by protesting to the Pretoria 
administrators and showing their discontent by publishing the severity of the 
economic controls from Kruger in local and European newspapers255.  
The press was one of the most important political tools in the contest between 
the Randlords, the Uitlanders and Kruger256. Hobson had stressed that newspapers of 
the South African Press and the City exercised significant influence on imperialism by 
promoting the interests of the financial classes who were responsible for the majority 
of the press’s profits, by way of business profits generated from advertising 
columns257. The fate of the Uitlanders and their discontent with the political and 
economic regulations of Kruger’s government was made visible to the powerful 
financial circles of the London258, rallying support for a direct intervention from 
British administrators in Southern Africa. The British colonial administration in 
London would now become involved in a dilemma of British patriotism and 
republican runaways on the other side of the world. 
 
Satirical drawing of Paul Kruger ‘harassing’ Uitlanders. Source: Unknown British newspaper. Second 
Anglo-Boer War. http://www.theoldscholar.net/BoerWar/Prelude.html. Accessed on 8 May 2011. 
 
Alfred Milner, the South African high commissioner and Prime Minister of the 
Cape Colony since 1897, strongly disapproved of Afrikaner claims to republicanism  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and was wary of the rise of Afrikaner nationalism in the aftermath of the Jameson 
Raid259. Milner was very quick to sympathise with the mine owners and soon worked 
very closely with them, believing only a strong mining industry was the key to a new 
‘British South Africa’260. For the Randlords, Milner soon became the symbol of their 
future in the Boer Republics. Caught between local hostilities coming from Pretoria 
and pressures from the Imperial Government in London, the Rand capitalists put all 
their hope into Milner261. Turning this case into an imperial campaign for civil liberty 
and political freedom, Milner began to put greater pressure on Kruger’s government 
in Pretoria262. This new relationship would elevate the political and economic worries 
of the Uitlanders to a major diplomatic rift between the South African Republic and 
the British Empire.  
In 1898 the Uitlanders organised the South African League to unite themselves 
in their cause for more economic and political freedoms, with the core of its activities 
based on the campaign for British supremacy throughout Southern Africa263. Milner 
would use their grievances for a ‘marketing campaign’ against Kruger, over-
emphasising the role of the League and its problems. Milner also hoped that with the 
Transvaal elections scheduled to take place later in 1898, those members who were 
entitled to vote, could swing the leadership of the Republic into the hands of more 
liberal Boer politicians, creating a political climate favourable to a British takeover264. 
Within the Afrikaner community, Kruger was stronger than ever. For the 
Boers, Kruger had represented a powerful leader who was able to hold the Republic 
together after the imperial threat of the Jameson Raid was eliminated. Riding on this 
wave of local support, the regulations preventing the majority of the Uitlanders in 
taking part in the elections led Kruger to a landslide victory. With a very regulated 
right to vote, the electorate was very small, allowing Kruger to win with a total 
number of 12,858 votes265. 
After Kruger had won the elections, the British had to adopt a far more risky 
approach. By this time, the British were convinced that intervention would be  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necessary to avoid the diplomatic failures of the past266. The need for respectful 
negotiation came not only from British colonial moderates, but also reformists in the 
Transvaal and Orange Free State who wanted to avert war at all costs267. The 
pragmatic situation would also test the colonial imperative in the relationship between 
Chamberlain and Milner. In March 1898, Chamberlain had stressed that peace in 
South Africa was of greatest importance to the development of the Empire in 
Southern Africa and urged Milner to follow a very careful and passive stance towards 
Kruger’s policies in the Transvaal268. Chamberlain had never visited Africa269, leaving 
Milner to formulate many of his own approaches to managing the tension coming out 
of the Transvaal.  
Milner would soon be presented with the opportunity to implement a direct 
approach. The shooting of Thomas Edgar in December of 1898 by a Transvaal 
policeman encouraged the pro-imperial South African League to take a new military 
stance to the fate of foreigners in the Transvaal270. By March of 1899, the League and 
the Chamber of Mines were firmly united in their cause to readdress specific problems 
arising out of the shooting incident and most importantly, a general change of attitude 
of the Transvaal administration towards the mine owners and Uitlanders 271 . 
Chamberlain was confident of victory if any attack from the Boers came. Chamberlain 
went as far as taking a possible war far into all corners of the Empire by securing 
offers of military assistance from Canada, New Zealand, West Africa, the Malay 
States, Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland272. With many diplomatic mishaps 
arising in the following months, it became a question of time before a military conflict 
would break out.  
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Patriotic headlines in New Zealand. Source: Evening Post. 29 September 1899: pg. 2 
 
By the second half of 1899, British imperialist and Afrikaner republicans had 
come to a political stalemate, leaving Milner to conclude that only a military solution 
came into question for the British in South Africa273. During the course of the year, 
the British War Office managed to send 10,000 troops to protect strategic military and 
industrial positions in Natal274. The British had for a long time tolerated and respected 
many of the Afrikaner diplomatic attempts to avert conflict, but time began to run out 
for the Boers.  
On 10 October 1899 President Kruger’s and Orange Free State President 
Marthinus Steyn’s ultimatum to London was officially rejected275. Determined to take 
the first move, the two Boer Republics declared war on Britain on 11 October 1899. 
 The outbreak of the war cast a long shadow on the history of South Africa, 
Africa and the British Empire. The economic, social and political impact the war 
would eventually have on all South Africans created the structural vacuum that would 
lead to a new socio-political momentum, creating the framework for the 20th century, 
which would polarise South African society to levels never experienced before.  
In 1965 Geoffrey Blainey wrote that as fundamental as gold was in 
agglomerating the socio-economic factors for the war, the historiographical traditions 
with respect to the analysis of the financial motives of the Rand gold magnates has 
been brief and generalised276. As divided as liberals and Marxists have remained in 
methodological approach since both historiographical schools established themselves  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in South African academic institutions, both schools still find it plausible to state that 
the last thing Rand gold capitalists wanted was a war277. The liberal school saw the 
South African gold industry as part of a greater (expanding) British Empire, placing 
South Africa and the peripheral Boer republics within a grand narrative of British 
economic history. It was with this grand imperial vision that many liberal historians 
(including De Kiewiet) portrayed British economic policy towards South Africa as 
having many shortcomings and policy failures, but gave praise to high motives of a 
structured, liberal, institutionalised and well-administered greater South African 
economy278. 
For Marxist historians, any sort of appeasement with colonial policy had no 
place in South African historiography. South African history needed to be traced to its 
roots and represented as a class struggle in a class-ridden society created by the 
unequal dimensions of international and South African capitalism 279 . Heavily 
influenced by British leftist such as Eric Hobsbawm, South African Marxists such as 
Legassick, Marks and Bozzoli went out to place gold within a polarising chain of 
events that displaced the supposed ‘positive effects’ imperial capital was intended to 
bring to the gold mines and the communities dependent on it.  
As theoretically different historiographical schools have approached the role 
of gold in the South African economy and society, the relationship between capital, 
mining practices and diplomacy has in many ways gone beyond the social meso-level 
of discourse, leaving the mining communities integrated into a greater macro analysis 
of economic reasoning. It is with this in mind that I will break down the macro level 
into much smaller social units in section II of this investigation, linking the people 
behind gold, capital and the South African War to a far more decentralised social 
investigation.  
 
2.13 Consolidating the argument: African wealth and a European war 
 
The causality of the events that took place between the arrival of Milner in the Cape 
and the outbreak of war has became an issue of much controversy and debate for  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scholars of African and Imperial history alike. The war that broke out in 1899, 
altering African and global history, was not only a war designed by the policies of 
Milner, Chamberlain or Kruger, or only a product of imperialists sympathetic to the 
economic needs of the Randlords, as many Marxist historians have claimed280.  
 Fundamental to the methodological value of the investigation, the importance 
of history and historiographical schools, with specific attention being paid to the 
debate between liberal and radical historians, addresses new approaches in dealing 
with South African economic history. Although the methodological divisions between 
liberals and radicals may not entirely show the structural differences at the theoretical 
core of the economic debate, they do isolate a number of fundamental academic 
approaches. As liberals addressed the notion of “segregated” history by rejecting 
racial discrimination as far back as in the 1920s, they did not entirely rise up to the 
challenge of studying the social stratification and economic marginalisation281. For 
Marxist revisionists, the links between imperialism, colonialism and African 
submission governed their stance on studying the impact of the mineral revolution in 
Southern Africa. 
The liberal and radical historiographical traditions that came to an 
epistemological clash in the late 1960s and early 1970s do not entirely represent the 
broad spectrum of historiographical approaches applied in the study of South African 
economic transition. For conservative counterfactual historians, in my example 
represented by Niall Ferguson, history was far more politicised than socio-economic 
historians may want to see.  The Afrikaner states had to lose their independence at all 
costs, even if it meant war282. For many imperial nostalgists, the war had to be fought 
to ensure democratic freedoms for the Uitlanders and that the gold mines of the 
Transvaal remained safe in the ownership of their capitalist owners283.  
For more traditional Marxists, represented in the early-20th century by Hobson, 
the way capital linked to the demand for cheap labour and Kruger’s inability to 
provide administrative reforms to cater for cheaper labour was the tipping point of 
British efforts to begin the war284. From Hobson to Hobsbawm, the war had been  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significant in outlining the economic roots of British empire-building in the 
development of capitalism285. If gold had linked South Africa to the dynamics of 
global capitalism at the end of the 19th century, then it was British capital that created 
the dependant financial relationship that was far too important for the Empire to leave 
in under the hospice of Kruger and his Boer republic. 
 As it has been argued in my thesis, political development in the Transvaal and 
Britain, were often in conflict with the financial needs of the capitalist system 
connecting London to the Rand and vice versa. The lethal mixture of labour 
exploitation, conflicting dependence on foreign capital, personal agendas of 
influential individuals, imperial policy and Afrikaner nationalism descended onto the 
gold fields of the Rand, changing the fate of Southern Africa and bringing about a 
tragic end to the British imperial century. Paid by British taxpayers, fought by soldiers 
from all over the Empire, but only benefitting a small financial elite, represented by 
figures such as Rhodes and Rothschild286, the war took the exploitation of African 
mineral wealth to a new financial and social low. Before war broke out, Kruger told 
an American journalist, the price of war Britain would need to pay to take the 
independence of the Boer states was far beyond anyone’s imagination287. As many 
historiographical schools have debated and will carry on doing so, I follow Eric 
Hobsbawm in stating, “whatever the ideology, the motive for the (South African) war 
was gold”288.  
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3. Social Factors  
 
3.1 Johannesburg: “Egoli, the city of gold” 
 
As influential as the economic development of the Rand may have been in 
establishing the South African Republic as a global economic player, later leading to 
the Republic’s demise as a consequence of British imperialism, the true impact of 
South African gold influencing the fate of the country and its people can best be 
studied through the social transformation the valuable commodity exerted on the Rand 
and its surroundings. Many studies have hypothesised the links between economic 
and social development, but never before in world history had a mineral discovery 
transformed a secluded, rural backwater and shaped a new country at such a rapid 
pace289. With the core of the transformation taking place in and around Johannesburg, 
the city would soon reflect the way South African society had changed and would 
carry on doing so. 
With contradiction and speculation determining the initial years of the city’s 
development it quickly became a guessing game to determine the true origins of the 
name, Johannesburg, which was given to the city. Some have claimed that the name 
was a tribute to Stephanus Johannes Paulus Kruger, the birth name of President 
Kruger, but an additional two ‘Johannes’s’ laid similar claims290. Of all the names 
associated with the town at the time (mostly of Biblical or anti-Semitic origins), be it 
Joeys, Judasburg, Jewhannesburg or Joburg, the Zulu name of ‘Egoli (sometimes 
written as Igoli), the city of gold’, seams to best illustrate the foundations the city was 
based on291. 
Fathered by gold and mothered by money, Johannesburg’s impatient and 
demanding parents wanted to push their child into the world as soon as it could 
walk 292 . The original tented camp attracted diggers, miners, labourers and 
entrepreneurs from all over Southern Africa and the world. By 1893 the community of 
3,000 diggers that established their camp around the main reef in the early 1880s had  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grown to a town of 100,000 residents293. Out of the 100,000 just about a half were 
white, with only 6,000 being South African-born Afrikaners294.  
The society was male dominated, with a ratio of only one woman for every 98 
men295. With males and masculinity governing the social order of Johannesburg, the 
city quickly developed into a society where strength, opportunity and the constant 
quest for economic and political power regulated the inflow of new fortune-seekers. 
 
 
A 1888 postcard showing the tented field along the main reef. Source: Unknown postcard. 
www.nazarethhousejohannesburg.org/pages/history-of-our-home.php. Accessed on 10 July 2011. 
 
As in any frontier town, the beginnings were very difficult. After the initial 
discoveries of alluvial gold, tents and a few baked-brick houses with tin roofs were 
put up296. Located 55 km away from the Transvaal capital of Pretoria, Johannesburg 
had to be integrated into a greater Transvaal economic chain, where capital and 
produced goods, energy resources and building material could be supplied to the 
growing commercial centre. With no clear sign of the immense wealth of the Rand 
besides the many contradictory reports evident in the early 1880s, the city took on a 
slow development attracting mostly adventurers and rugged gold-seekers with little to 
lose. As described by one adventurer from the Cape Colony, Johannesburg was like a 
“Monte Carlo superimposed on Sodom and Gomorrah”297.  
The dusty streets of Johannesburg were soon crowded with diggers, mine 
workers, businessmen, gamblers and prostitutes. During the first significant boom  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increasing numbers of prostitutes made their way to Johannesburg with the figures 
increasing further with the opening of the railway connection from Delagoa Bay. 
Initially the prostitutes came from the Cape and Natal, with the later influx coming 
out of Europe and New York City298. An 1895 survey counted 97 brothels of various 
nationalities (36 were French, 20 German, and 5 Russian299). 
 As dubious as many of these alternative economies were, there was a clear 
sign that the service industry would profit immensely from the discovery of gold. The 
combination of trade in sex and alcohol accompanied by the predominance of the 
male working population created a distinctive pattern of settlement close to the point 
of sale of these activities300. The activities of the informal economy created a pattern 
of settlement where many white miners would be settled in large boarding-houses 
close to the commercial areas, while many wealthier members from the expanding 
white population were able to move into small houses in the suburbs of Jeppe and 
Fordsburg301, creating the basis for the urbanised South African white middle class.  
 
 
Johannesburg city centre in the late 1890s. Source: South African History Online. 
http://v1.sahistory.org.za/pages/places/villages/gauteng/johannesburg/index.php?id=12&page=0. 
Accessed on 15 October 2011. 
 
The new suburbia that quickly grew around the city created a new living 
structure that needed to be integrated into the already-implemented racial segregation.  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Johannesburg’s geographic position high on the ridge created the impression of an 
island surrounded by two seas of people302. The larger sea was that of the indigenous 
Africans made up of the Pedi, Sotho and Tswana (ethnic) groups who had lived on the 
upper plateau of the Transvaal for centuries before the Boers arrived303. The locations 
or ‘townships’ for the masses of African workers were situated to the north-west and 
east of the main reef304. The Chamber of Mines admitted that the townships presented 
a very unhealthy living condition, but still left plenty of room for the expansion of the 
city to the north of the reefs for the more ‘respectable’ (white) residents305.  
For the thousands of African mine workers, the hard working life had very 
little sense of adventure and romanticism. The African migrants were settled in large 
compounds, which were designed not only to isolate the workers away from the 
greater commercial life the white mine workers were taking part in, but also to 
maximise control and enforce a rigorous and often humiliating living system. With the 
compound manager’s office in the middle of the courtyard, lock-up dormitories, a 3.5-
meter tall compound wall and only one entrance to the housing complex, housing was 
arranged around a system of forced discipline306. The movement of these labourers on 
the Rand and throughout the Transvaal was controlled and limited using the pass 
system, which allowed only those labourers in the possession of a valid pass to move 
freely in Johannesburg, and between the goldfields and the villages of their origin307. 
For many workers, the sheer climatic and housing change from their villages 
would prove to have a high impact on their overall ability to work and live in 
Johannesburg. With Johannesburg being located 2000 metres above sea level, frost 
and occasional snow combined with the confined living conditions of the compounds 
led many African labourers to contract pneumonia and tuberculosis at very high rates 
compared to their white working colleagues308. 
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African workers in a compound. Circa 1890. Source: South African  History Online 
(Apartheid Repressions Project). 
http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/specialprojects/apartheid-
repression/pass-laws.htm.  Accessed on 15 October 2011. 
 
The history of industrialisation presents us with many examples of labour 
forces living in terrible conditions. Be it in Britain in the late 18th century, the United 
States in the 19th or in the Soviet Union throughout the 20th century, the sheer 
expansionary nature of industry held the standards of living for the workers to a bare 
minimum309, integrating their physical labour into the economic value chain and at the 
same time, marginalising their social evolution to the peripheries of the capitalist 
economy. What makes the compounds that constituted the basic living conditions for 
the gold revolution of Johannesburg a very specific case is that the worker’s burden 
was magnified by a culture of racism and the physical burden of African workers 
working harder for minimal wages310. The compounds were not only used to facilitate 
a culture of submission, but a strategic tool in limiting African urbanisation to the 
needs of the mining sector.  
In order to service the expanding suburbia, plans for a suburban tramway were 
drawn up in the late 1880s. In September 1889 the Johannesburg City and Suburban 
Tramway Co. Lt was floated on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange311. Capital was 
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raised quickly312, with most of the shares being bought up by the usual suspects such 
as the Wernher, Beit and Co. partnership and N.M Rotschild & Sons of London. The 
suburban tramway opened its service in February 1891, at the peak of the financial 
recession, servicing a line of 4.75 miles between the suburb of Jeppe on the east Rand 
and Fordsburg in the west.313 Although (due to the recession) the tramway opened at 
the worst time possible, its service encouraged urbanisation and a gradual settlement 
of the suburbs further away from the reef and its auxiliary commercial centre.  
With the crisis over by the end of 1891, and confidence restored in the future 
of deep-level mining, huge amounts of capital began to descend on Johannesburg. 
Virtually overnight, mushrooming towns such as Johannesburg, Krugersdorp and 
Boksburg, were turned into the largest, wealthiest and fastest growing markets in sub-
Saharan Africa314. With large amounts of capital being unevenly distributed between 
the rich European, neo-Africans and the indigenous Africans, Johannesburg soon 
became the scene of a battle of conflicting class and racial interests in which the main 
winners and losers were drawn from Europe, the Transvaal and Mozambique315. 
Although this class society presented Johannesburg with great economic and social 
differences, it was not a rigid cast society, and the city was a place to which men 
would come with no questions asked, regardless of their background316.  
As rough and rugged of an image the city had created, order was well 
maintained by the South African Republic Police force. One British reporter visiting 
the city in November 1895317, even went out to state that Johannesburg presented the 
visitor with an orderly society with ordinary (white) miners, business employees and 
clerks enjoying high wages, giving them no reasons for unrest or revolt against 
Kruger’s government officials318. 
The way the development of Johannesburg was polarised by the impact of 
gold created the social impetus for the turbulent future of South Africa. Gold’s role as 
a social catalyst of transformation was not only evident in the urban development of  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the city and its surroundings, but also in the greater social context of Southern Africa. 
With economic, political and racial divisions creating a complex class system, the 
multi-layered South African society of the late 19th century will be studied further 
through its links and relationship to gold. 
 
3.2 The Rand: transforming African society 
 
When linking the exploitation of labour to European capital in orthodox Marxist 
tradition, the fate of African workers in Southern Africa accurately illustrates how 
European-led economic incursions into the Transvaal goldfields would change the 
political and economic freedom of existence for millions of indigenous Africans. The 
process of colonializing Southern African states was continuous from the late 1830s, 
but took on rapid acceleration in the 1870s319. As Europeans colonialists were not 
always necessarily ready to demonstrate the use of force and violence to subdue 
Africans and quickly turn them into European subjects, new alternative methods of 
colonial expansions, such as infiltration, propaganda, bribery and corruption, were 
applied320. European traders, farmers and administrators spread the need for paper 
money by encouraging individual consumption, trade and created indebtedness 
through the spread of loans, thereby undermining traditional economic patterns321.  
 As discussed by Belinda Bozzoli, the main difficulty that arises with most 
studies of paid African labour in Southern Africa at the end of the 19th century is that 
African workers do not necessarily constitute a working class, but rather a class in the 
“process of formation”322. The notion of a capitalist system that is still not fully 
formed leads the study into the characterisation of the classes that interact during the 
formation of a capitalist system323. This concept is further complicated by the 
dynamics of migrant labour and their constant coming and going to and from 
Johannesburg, the capitalist core of the developing gold mining sector. Bozzoli 
stresses further that the difficulty with classifying classes within a mature capitalist 
society must be acknowledged before attempting to conceptualise Marxist criteria for 
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a developing class of African workers who are still new to the materialism brought 
about by the ‘new capitalist system’324. 
  Many Marxist historians have shown (Shula Marks, Belinda Bozzoli and Alan 
Jeeves) that Afrikaner and British economic policy toward the Africans would enforce 
critical long-term social consequences.  As noted by Paul Rich, the notion of 
possessory segregation and the subsequent geographical distribution of population 
groups based on racial and ethnic lines, the urbanisation of the Rand based on white 
economic needs and an allocation system which ensured a cheap supply of African 
labour for mining (as well as agriculture and later the manufacturing industry) were 
all formulated as part of social engineering, gearing Europeans for greater economic 
and social expansion into Southern Africa325. 
 Although these incursions on traditional economic, political and religious 
values were not taken lightly, Africans were structurally and technologically limited 
in their resistance. Europeans acted ruthlessly in dividing up Southern African states 
into complex political units, forcing them to pledge their allegiance to the Empire or 
after the Great Trek, to the Afrikaners in the east. As stated by Frantz Fanon, this 
force of submission by white colonialists led Africans to an immediate confrontation 
with the colonial order of things, bringing about a permanent state of tension326.  A 
number of campaigns, some more successful than others, were led by African 
societies to put pressure on European infringements. In the end, during the most 
successful of all resistance campaigns, during the Anglo-Zulu War in 1879, European 
brutality shown in the killing of prisoners, extensive burning of villages and slaughter 
of cattle, destroyed the economic basis on which indigenous Southern African society 
operated on327. 
 In the Transvaal, extensive networks of African trade were still existent in the 
1870s. The Tswana people (made up of the Kwena, Ngwaketse and the Ngweto) in 
the north, the North Sotho (made up of the Venda and Tsonga) in the north and the 
Pedi in the east, traded in hunt products such as ivory, hides and ostrich feathers328. 
Agricultural products such as maize and meat allowed them to engage in the diamond 
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trade, supplying the markets of Kimberley and Natal with their produce329. By 1878, 
the African population of the Transvaal numbered 250 000 peasant farmers using 
family labour and local knowledge to much greater efficiency compared to their rural 
Afrikaner competitors, who were mainly stock farmers330.  
As growing markets in the Cape, Natal and Kimberley encouraged surplus 
production, the shift to more efficient farming methods added to the gradual decline 
of traditional African agriculture. Many Africans from the Transvaal had also made 
their way to the diamond mines of Kimberley as wage labourers, bringing back 
modest sums of capital and most importantly, weapons back to their villages. The 
brief period of economic confidence was however short-lived and in 1879, the British 
led military campaigns in occupied-Transvaal conquered the Tswana, Sotho and 
Tsonga territories, setting African societies on a forced course away from agriculture 
and towards proletarianisation331.  
 The discoveries of gold on the Rand were soon to add to the complex nature of 
African labour migration patterns. The first wave of surface mining in the mid-1880s 
had assigned small groups of African labourers, living on the outskirts of the new 
reefs, to minimum-paying jobs of unskilled assistance in digging and washing out of 
gold-bearing gravel332. As the mines went underground, the sheer labour-intensive 
nature of the Rand ore put pressure on industrial developments. The economic 
pressure from the white workers at the mines added to the incentive of developing 
new labour polices on the Rand. The solution to the woes created by the white miners 
was found in the development of a production process, which exploited the growing 
supply of cheap unskilled labour whilst limiting the extent of white employment to 
production sectors with the greatest geological difficulties333.  
 The first humble sums of capital that made their way back to the villages of 
the Transvaal were invested in the purchase of land. After 1886 the Boers of the 
Transvaal were far more willing to sell off their land to Africans as they could get a  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much better price for it than from poor Europeans looking to settle down in the rural 
parts of the South African Republic334. As the forms of residence varied significantly 
with respect to the land on offer, where Africans were allocated to reserves they 
remained active in a mostly subsistent agricultural system, adjusting their production 
to meet demands for the variable tax system335. Although the sheer contractual 
complexity of land ownership by Africans was in many cases concealed by white 
middlemen, it was estimated that as much as a quarter of a million acres of land could 
have been privately owned by Africans in the Transvaal before the outbreak of the 
South African War336. Parallel to this private development, most Africans in the South 
African Republic came under the control of wealthy European landowners and many 
mines investing their profits in cheap and abundant land, as offered for sale by the 
government in Pretoria. This was a vital development in the future of Africans as over 
a half of all indigenous inhabitants of the Transvaal found themselves living on white-
owned private land by mid-1895337. These Africans were now forced to pay rent by 
working on the land or selling their own produce in order to live in their own ancestral 
homeland, resulting in a complex feudal system that only a small number of Africans 
was able to escape338.  
 From the fourth quarter of the nineteenth century onwards, the British and the 
Boers had assumed that once they had conquered a territory they had the means to 
determine African behaviour339. A large body of legislature drawn up to support the 
economic cause of the mines, thereby economically alienating thousands of Africans 
from traditional sources of income, would soon change the way African society took 
control of its economic and social structure. The main question of a labour supply to 
the mines of the Rand was actively raised in 1890, when the Randlords became 
determined to learn from policy failures of Kimberley and apply efficient solutions to 
the, at the time, geographical limitations that deep-level mining was beginning to 
present. Many influential members of the Chamber of Mines began to show anger 
over the unpredictable supply of labour coming out of Natal and the Cape Colony. 
During the course of the same year 85 Rand mines, employing a total of 10 265  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African workers, forwarded a collective plea to the Chamber to organise a supply of 
an additional 2 000 African workers340.  
 
3.3 African workers go underground: deep-level revolution and the demand 
for labour 
 
Although the Transvaal had a large African population, there were very few Africans 
living on or near the Rand341. Before the deep-level revolution, African labourers 
would come to Johannesburg as casual labourers for a few months, earning just 
enough money to buy a few cattle before returning home. After the mines went 
underground a whole new scheme of labour and wages needed to be implemented. 
The Chamber of Mines needed to actively recruit large numbers of labourers to 
appease its impatient members.  
 It became clear by 1893 that the Chamber of Mines had to concentrate on 
trying to secure a consistent and regulated supply of labour to the mines342. The search 
was taken beyond the borders of the Transvaal and the British colonies of Natal and 
the Cape and into territories of other European imperial powers. In 1894, the Native 
Labour Department even developed a strategy to invite labour from Portuguese West 
Africa, the Congo Free State and Cameroon343. With racial rumours and prejudice 
such as “the natives of Zululand, Basutoland, Swaziland and Natal are fine workers, 
but can seldom be persuaded to go underground, while the Bechuanas and Cape 
Kaffirs (sic!) are capricious, and form a very small proportion of the supply”344 
prominent in the Randlord-circles, sources of labour from beyond the Afrikaner 
Republics and British territories were encouraged. As the table below displays, the 
majority of the mineworkers recruited from ‘abroad’ came from Portuguese 
Mozambique. This policy came by way of the 1896 Agreement that the Chamber had 
signed with the Portuguese administration in Mozambique in September345. Large-
scale recruitment was made possible by the completion of the Lourenco Marques 
railway to the Rand in 1895346.  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Native Labour Association’s statistics about the origin of the recruited workers 
November 1896 - December 1898. 
Mozambique  32 271 
North Transvaal  12 535 
Zulu and Swaziland  511 
Basutoland and Cape Colony  5 963 
Bechuanaland and Marico  2 068 
Rhodesia  263 
   53 611 
Source: Hobson, John. The W ar in South A frica: its causes and effects (1900: p. 232) 
 
It was also no coincidence that the major drive for a new supply of labour for 
the Rand had begun in 1896, a time where the Randlords’ and Afrikaner republicans’ 
economic goals were diverging. The Chamber of Mines was very vocal in reporting a 
significant shortage of labour347, while at the same time the Transvaal-sympathetic 
South African Mining Journal was convinced that there was a surplus of African 
labour on the Rand348. What made this time so favourable for the Chamber in its 
recruiting drive was the already-mentioned major rinderpest that peaked between 
1896 and 1897, spreading through much of eastern Southern Africa, killing 90% of 
the cattle and extending the zone of the deadly tsetse-fly infestation into the populated 
valleys of the Limpopo valley in the northern parts of the Transvaal349. The rinderpest 
had in many ways crippled the basic economic foundations on which many Southern 
African societies were based on. With no cattle to be had as part of the deeply rooted 
tradition of the exchange of cattle for women through the bridewealth system350, 
African men became economically vulnerable and were easily persuaded to join the 
wage-pay of the Rand.  
This economic transition amongst the breadwinners began, in many ways, the 
agricultural degeneration of rural societies in the Transvaal351. The rinderpest led to 
re-adjustment and re-alignment in the labour market, which in return manifested itself 
                                                        
347 See Native Labour in South African Chamber of Mines Annual Report for the year ending 1896. 
(1897: pp. 4-6) 
348 Katz, Elaine. Outcrop and deep level mining in South A frica before the Anglo-Boer W ar: re-
examining the Blainey thesis (1995: p. 318) 
349 Ross, Robert. A Concise History of South A frica (2008: p. 73) 
350 Ross, Robert. A Concise History of South A frica (2008: p. 73) 
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in an increasing degree of ethnic specialisation on the Rand352. This was most evident 
in the more ‘proletarianised’ communities from southern Mozambique353, which 
already had experience in various forms of wage labour implemented by the 
Portuguese administration. The more dependent the community was on cattle, the 
more vulnerable the men were to economic migration to the Rand354. Men from the 
Zululand and the Transkai became heavily dependent on wage-labour to provide for 
their communities and adjust to the new economic trends that were being led by the 
commercial framework of the Rand. 
As investigated in the economics section of my thesis, recruitment of labour 
involved a highly illicit scheme of touts, brokers and mining ‘officials’ who used 
many tricks and scams to entice African men to the mines. Even though the political 
engagement of the Afrikaner government in the recruitment may have been passive, 
Pretoria was well aware of the many agreements the Chamber of Mines had made 
with various chiefs and administrators in the South African Republic and abroad.  
The Transvaal government wanted to encourage the movement of migrants 
into the South African Republic, but the Boers, controlling vast territories, were 
anything but satisfied with the movement of migrants en route to the mines355. With 
the expanding rail network of the mid-1890s still not being able to service most rural 
areas, many migrants who could afford the train fare had to make their way to 
stations, which were often hundreds of kilometres away from their villages. Others, 
with no money for the train, would cover the journey into the South African Republic 
and further to Johannesburg, by foot. The migrants would travel in large groups to 
protect themselves against attacks from wild animals such as lions, leopards, 
elephants and rhinoceroses356.  
Once at the mines, the workers were integrated into a complex rotation 
system, preventing them from perfecting enough skills in one production process and 
thereby demanding higher wages 357 . They were told just enough to function 
underground, given no opportunities to form trade unions and were prevented from  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fully understanding the economic structure of the mining industry358. This lack of 
information was strategically implemented to prevent any form of collusion between 
the labourers, leaving wages flexible, and in a position where the Randlords could 
push them further down if a need arose.  
 
 
African workers entering a deep-level shaft. Late 1890s. Source: Mindat Directory. 
http://www.mindat.org/photo-158996.html. Accessed on 10 July 2011. 
 
The submissive system of intimidating labour practices was best reflected in 
the hostel barracks or ‘compounds’ to which migrants were assigned. The sheer 
structure and layout of the living quarters, with the compound manager placed in the 
centre of the building, was conditioned to maximise control and implement a system 
of fear359. With men being confined to minimum space and mobility, the only 
leisurely activities they had would take place in the compounds. African miners 
quickly learned about the ‘bad habits’ of their white co-miners and took their 
excessive consumption of alcohol and tobacco back to the compounds. As a result, 
African workers spent more of their money on intoxicating substances, saving less of 
their wages than their better-paid white colleagues360.   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Even in the first Chamber of Mines report for the year 1890, much was made 
of the excessive consumption of alcohol of the African workers on the Main Reef. It 
was stated that the sale of alcohol to Africans on the Rand had brought on a great loss 
and annoyance to the mining industry361. As troublesome as the issue over alcohol 
remained for the productivity of the mines and the social degradation it led many 
African miners into, the class alliance fostered by powerful members of the Randlords 
and Kruger’s government was largely ignored due to the high direct profits which 
alcohol and its taxation could yield362. 
As indifferent and ambiguous as Kruger’s government was about the flows of 
African labour, from 1896 to the outbreak of the war, the main system of submission 
employed by the government to control labour on the Rand was that of the pass 
laws363. Although various alternative forms of a controlled movement of Africans 
were already implemented in Natal and the Cape Colony, the pass laws in the 
Transvaal would display just to what extent the political outcomes of the gold 
revolution would trickle down into African communities. The first pass laws were 
introduced to the Rand in the wake of the Jameson Raid and the mild recession the 
raid had brought about364. According to the Chamber “the main objective of the Pass 
Law was to establish a complete system of control over the natives at the mines, so 
that they could be traced from place to place from the date of their arrival on the gold 
fields to that of their departure”365.  
It must here be made clear that there were two forms of passes in use in the 
Transvaal. Even before undertaking the journey to the Rand, Africans had to first 
acquire a pass from the district colonial officer or traditional chief or headman, which 
would then be exchanged for a travel pass at the local magistrate’s office for the price 
of 1 shilling366. The travel pass was in many ways a product of the London 
Convention of 1884, which required that the South African Republic controlled the 
movement of all ethnic groups residing within its borders367. Although Kruger was  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strongly against such direct control of all people in the South African Republic, he 
eventually strongly advocated the pass system to please his voters during his final 
electoral campaign of 1898.  
The employment pass on the Rand was solely a product of the extensive 
lobbying by the Chamber of Mines. The mining pass laws attached themselves deeply 
into the psyches of urban African men, who were now being referred to (according to 
the pass) as boys368. The main function of the passes being to control the movement of 
labour between employers on the Rand, the pass also served as a statistical document, 
allowing the government to keep track of the amount of formally employed Africans, 
and as a record of profession, allowing a controlled specialisation of labour.  
 
African mineworkers with a white supervisor. Late 1890s. Source: South African History 
Online. http://www.v1.sahistory.org.za/pages/library-resources/onlinebooks/Luli/Gold-and-
workers/Menu.htm. Accessed on 11 July 2011. 
 
Although the pass laws were directed at industrial workers, they also applied 
to many labourers working as servants in the suburbs369. Many Africans, especially 
the Zulu, were employed as house servants, cooks, gardeners and security guards, 
working in wealthy households of the white upper and middle classes. As these 
workers lived isolated from the cultural fusion that was taking place in the mining 
compounds, they lived a very different life style, often lonely and abused by their 
housemasters, who were not always proficient in adhering to the weekly pay-days. 
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The way gold mining brought about wage-labour led many Africans to an 
even further loss of political and economic sovereignty370. The white-run capitalist 
system created a system that introduced Africans to a money-based commodity 
market, increasing their demand for consumer goods, with the negative purpose of 
financing Afrikaner republicanism and British imperialism371. The rapid integration of 
Africans into the gold mining industry prevented many people from choosing where 
they lived, where they worked and on what their hard-earned money would be spent. 
As much as gold integrated Africans into the capitalist economy, the economic system 
brought about a gradual decline in African’s social and cultural identity, leaving 
traditional values in conflict with the demands of the capital and labour intensive 
gold-based resource economy. 
Even though there was a significant lack of original sources to be found in the 
Transvaal which could illustrate to what extent African worker consciousness was 
influenced by the gold mining revolution, the black elite of the Cape Colony was well 
aware of what social struggle Africans in the South African Republic were facing. 
The most significant member of this missionary-educated elite was John Tengo 
Jabavu, a late 19th century black intellectual, owner and editor of the eastern Cape 
newspaper Imvo Zabatsundu372. Jabavu stressed that the new economic order was 
altering rural and tribal affairs while loyalty to the tribe remained the paramount 
political sentiment373. Although at times supportive of some British policies for 
Africans in Southern Africa, Jabavu concluded that the developments in the South 
African Republic had sown the seeds of a war of races that would dominate the future 
of Southern Africa374. With the benefit of historical hindsight one can say that 
Jabavu’s political writing at the end of the 19th century accurately predicted the racial 
showdown that the social transformation had been developing. It would be very 
foolish to now deduce that gold and the development of the gold industry were the 
sole determinants in the future racial polarization. It is however anything but foolish 
to deduce that gold had in fact created an irreversible economic empowerment, 
changing the Africans position in the core (the Rand) and peripheral spheres (rural  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economies) of economic participation, leaving Africans torn between rural tradition 
and false hopes of the white-governed exploitative labour system of the Rand. 
 
3.4 The British citizens: torn between Empire and golden hopes  
 
The main direct involvement of Britain and British subjects in the Transvaal gold had 
begun with the first annexation of the Transvaal by the British in 1877. Even before 
the main discoveries of 1886, it was British gold from the Empire that had been used 
to stabilise the Transvaal economy between 1877-1880375. As radical pro-British 
South African historian James Fitzpatrick had assessed before the outbreak of the 
South African War, the years of British occupation in the Transvaal had given the 
Boers plenty of economic benefits such as paying of debts, restoring credibility in 
trade and credit, and securing Transvaal territory with help of numerous military 
campaigns by British forces376. However after Kruger had restored Transvaal’s 
independence from the Crown by the end of 1881, the future for British citizens in the 
Transvaal looked uncertain.  
 After the main gold discoveries of 1886, a clear economic and territorial 
interest had once again shifted in the direction of the Transvaal. In 1888, 44 mines 
were in operation, financed by mostly generous British investments, creating a 
nominal capital of £7 million with on output of £1 million377. It must however here be 
differentiated between the British capitalist and the British labourer. The former will 
be discussed in the Randlord section of this social investigation. 
The technical difficulties of deep-level mining, the scale of investments it 
demanded and the initial absence of a skilled African labour force meant that the first 
stage of capital accumulation on the Rand would need an introduction of skilled 
immigrant workers to perform specific tasks of production and oversee production378. 
Many British, European, Australian and North American miners used this opportunity 
to take their sought-after skills to the rapidly-growing mines of the Rand. With the 
criteria for citizenship, in theory and practice, still very vague at the time, labour and  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national identity became a problem on which many disputes of the 1890s would be 
based on.  
The notion of British, British citizens and British subjects does bring up many 
irregularities and inconsistencies throughout many investigations on British 
imperialism on the Rand. As already addressed in my thesis, the Afrikaners used the 
term “English” as a very generic reference to most white non-Afrikaners who used 
English as their primary language in commerce and urban life. As described by John 
Hobson, it would have been a very difficult task to determine the true number of 
British (or ‘English’ to the Boers) in the Transvaal, as it was not clear if the British 
were united in race, language, or sympathy towards the British Empire379. When using 
such broad categories for nationality, (on the Rand) the British would certainly 
include many thousands of Dutch, European Jews, Germans and Americans380. When 
basing nationality on being a subject of the Empire, the list of British would have also 
included large numbers of Australians, Canadians, Irish, New Zealanders and Indians. 
It should therefore not come as a surprise that the number of British in the Transvaal 
by 1899 varies between 30 000381, 70 000382 and even 100 000383. As varied as these 
statistics may be, it is however very safe to conclude that the British made up the 
majority of European foreigners in the Transvaal. 
White skilled labour, of which the British made up the significant majority, 
was divided into craftwork, which was done in the mines, but was not necessarily a 
specific part of the mining profession, and specialised work associated with metal-
yielding mining in hard rock384. The first category of direct involvement was made up 
of professionals such as boilmakers, brass finishers, bricklayers, carpenters, 
electricians and machinists. The second category, made up of professionals with 
trades which were auxiliary to the metal-recovery process, consisted of amalgamators, 
assayers, engineers machine drillers, pumpmen and time-keepers385. With no real 
regulation of professional standards being employed by the government of the South  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African Republic, the British population quickly became regarded as the only 
professionally trained workforce on the Rand. 
With at least a quarter of the Transvaal’s population being made up of British 
citizens by the early 1890s, the British population would play a critical role in the 
social transformation of the Rand. They were recruited from the coal mines of 
Cumberland and tin mines of Cornwall, with many shaft sinkers coming from 
Lancashire and artisans from industrial factories of England and Scotland386.  
A significant number of men made their way to the Transvaal via the Cape, 
where many tried their luck in the diamond industry in Kimberley. Some were just 
ordinary British agricultural labourers who settled in the Cape after their service with 
the Royal Navy. Many of these British men were able to invest the little money they 
brought with them to the Rand in a gold plot on the outskirts of the main reef as 
privateers, or joined established mining corporations in great numbers.  
The demographics also included many scrupulous moneymen, con artists and 
criminals 387  who used the initial social disorder that was created by the gold 
discoveries to their financial advantage. By 1893 gold theft and the illicit trade had 
become such a problem for the Chamber of Mines that a plea was made to the 
Volksraad in Pretoria to establish a special detective task-force to combat the rapid 
increase in gold-related crime388. 
In the early years of gold production on the Rand, the social composition of 
the labour force was made more interesting for the reason that Afrikaners, or even 
African-born Europeans, were virtually not involved in the mining industry389. This 
came about largely due to the Afrikaner’s lack of expertise in the mining industry and 
limited their minor involvement in the mining industry to positions of overseers or 
foremen. The technological changes and rise in African labour after the new cost 
structure involved with underground mining had stabilised, limited their employment 
to a minimum.  
The rapid rise in the amount of African labourers on the Rand after the deep-
level revolution also came as a major threat to many British mineworkers. Many 
British mineworkers were well overqualified for basic manual labour in the mines, but  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did expect to receive much higher wages for their skills. English-speaking artisans 
such as engineers, plumbers, carpenters, builders, drillers and supervisors often 
worked side-by-side with their African colleagues, demanding wages for skills their 
jobs in the mineshafts never required390. This development had created a sense of 
‘structural insecurity’ for those without adequate skills who could be replaced by 
lower-paid black workers391. In October of 1896 the Chamber of Mines even received 
an appeal from the Council of Education to enrol its uneducated young English-
speaking mineworkers in courses such as chemistry, physics, and mathematics, given 
by lecturers from England392. With rising costs of living, many British workers saw 
the prospects of a dismal economic future in the Transvaal with wary eyes and looked 
for support from the British-backed institutional network on the Rand.  
However the Chamber did not differentiate its wage-reducing policies by race 
and it held the displacement of British miners into higher-paid employment as 
inefficient393. The white man saw his livelihood threatened by two enemies: the 
mining capitalist and the African worker394. The vulnerability of African workers on 
the Rand made it possible for British miners to collude against them as influencing the 
mining magnates was far too great of a challenge. This constant fear of a social 
decline for British miners led the industrial unions and institutions to push for job 
reservation and regulation that secured training and apprenticeship for whites only395. 
With institutional support, British miners were able to maintain their status 
quo in the mines as the Native Labour Association gradually introduced the ‘job 
colour-bar’. The first colour-bar was introduced to secure the demand of skilled white 
labour and was applied for the first time in 1893 when African workers were 
prevented from taking employment in the specialist field of blasting396.  
As deep-level mines went in search of deeper reefs, the proportion of jobs 
under the surface for white workers decreased397. In 1897 84% of white miners were  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involved in underground mining, with the proportion being reduced every year398. 
Later by 1907 only 45% of white workers were working underground. This period of 
labour transformation shortly before the South African War and straight after, created 
the basis for mass employment of African labour in the underground shafts and the 
subsequent polarisation of professional labour and the African workforce.  
The typical British mine workers on the Rand had their interests backed by the 
imperial government, the South African League and the Chamber of Commerce. 
Although British labourers were not always supportive of the Chamber of Mines, 
which many saw as a British capitalist enclave with little interest for their personal 
well-being, looking to replace them with cheap African labour, there was strong 
support of the South African League up until the Jameson Raid399. The South African 
League (originally the Anglo-American League) was run by British men from the 
middle-class, looking out for the rights of British and other English-speaking workers 
on the Rand400, put under pressure from Kruger’s government in Pretoria. 
After the Jameson Raid, British miners’ pleas took a turn for the better. As 
already discussed, Kruger’s government in Pretoria was always very sceptical of the 
Randlords’ demands for more stable and cheaper sources of labour. In 1896 Kruger 
did however recognise the significant importance of white miners as future voters of 
the Transvaal by introducing pass regulations for African workers on the Rand.401 It 
was also in Kruger’s interest to support British miners in an effort to prevent British 
militarism in Johannesburg, which became a problem with unemployed miners in 
1897402. 
British workers were not solely employed in the mining industry. The rapid 
growth that Johannesburg experienced during the deep-level revolution of 1892 
increased the demand for white servants as ‘cooks-general’ in the middle to upper 
income suburban homes, or as cooks and servants in hotels and large boarding-
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houses403. The constant growth of Johannesburg and its white suburbia throughout the 
early 1890s had increased the demand for specialist house servants to the extent that 
the Witwatersrand Boarding-House Keepers’ protection Association organised a 
campaign to import specialist house staff from London in 1897404. After 1897 the 
trend was reversed and British house staff lost their domination of Johannesburg’s 
suburbia, giving way to cheaper, and by late 1897, experienced African workers.  
As for the mine owners’ economic grievances, the impact Kruger’s policies 
had on the production costs of deep-level mines contributed greatly to the significant 
rift that had developed between mine owners, British labour and African workers. It is 
not clear if mine owners exaggerated their need for unskilled labour405. What is 
however clear is that British miners did feel intimidated by the social transition that 
was taking place due to the economic demands of deep-level mining. The significant 
wage reduction for African mine workers, as organised by the Chamber of Mines in 
January in 1897, considerably reduced working costs without an accompanying drop 
in labour supply406. Although faced with these economic challenges, British miners 
did not show the initiative that would politicise their collective discomfort with their 
fate on the Rand. Ordinary miners, business clerks and employees were all enjoying 
relatively high wages and did not want to see the Republic done away with407. There 
were no signs that British miners wanted to see a British flag hoisted in 
Johannesburg408, and British miners were left to themselves to seek their own 
solutions with the help of institutions such as the South African League.  
The rise of job protection for British miners was governed by crude capital 
accumulation and racism that spread through South African white society409. At all 
professional levels of mining and suburban employment, African workers were seen 
as a threat to the economic and social security of white labourers. Although it must be 
said that the origin of wide-spread racism in South Africa that developed through 
much of South Africa’s history and manifested itself constitutionally during Apartheid  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cannot solely be based on economic principles of the mines, it is safe to conclude that 
the gold discoveries on the Rand galvanised white society to the extent that 
segregation became the first government-supported labour initiative which would only 
escalate after the South African War.  
 
3.5 The Randlords and Uitlanders: capitalist visions and pragmatic politics  
 
The new economic and social conditions that resulted from the mining capitalist 
revolution on the Rand went a long way to explain the dramatic shift in Britain’s 
policy towards the South African Republic410. From a political point of view, the 
economic prospects of the Rand put diplomatic pressure on the London Convention of 
1884, which dictated “the continued assertion of suzerainty” between Britain and the 
South African Republic 411 . It was precisely during this period that the major 
discoveries of gold on the Rand raised many doubtful questions about the 
independence and sovereignty of the Transvaal by the Chamberlain administration. 
Under this state of affairs Kruger’s administration quickly deduced that Transvaal’s 
independence would be in constant danger412. Keeping this political threat in mind, 
the history of tense relations between Afrikaners and immigrant whites (of which 
British constituted the significant majority) added new divisions to be found as 
political consequences of the gold discoveries413.  
 As stressed throughout my investigation, the critical factor in the wave of 
socio-economic unrest that followed the discovery of gold was largely brought about 
by Rand magnates in their attitude towards the economic development of the 
Transvaal, the South African Republic and Southern Africa. What drove this social 
and economic transformation was the Randlords’ ability to cooperate and collude in 
areas of greatest significance to their personal goals. As there was no competition 
between the mining corporations for a market414, the companies concentrated their 
collective action to cut costs at all corners.  
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 Many of the powerful diamond men from Kimberley had moved to 
Johannesburg by the 1890s415, and were quickly united due to their former contacts 
and economic cooperation. The ability to unite common goals and strategies for their 
economic cause was the key to the Randlords’ economic success on the Rand. With 
the powerful institutional support of the Chamber of Mines, the Rand capitalists had 
the institutional framework they needed to address all of their concerns over labour, 
commercial law and commercial security.  
The Randlords were most certainly unique in their social class and ability to 
distance themselves from other white immigrants on the Rand. When it came to unity 
with broader objectives of the immigrant communities on the Rand, capitalists took 
little notice and were very poorly represented in political initiatives such as the 
Transvaal National Union that was launched in 1892416. In the early 1890s, Randlords, 
convinced of their financial future after the capital explosion that came with deep-
level mining, slowly began to join political movements and offer financial support to 
reformist and progressive Boer politicians417, whom they saw as men with a firm 
belief in the success of mining as the economic future of the South African Republic.  
The Randlords knew that their successful enterprises needed to find a political 
balance between their mines on the Rand, Kruger’s government in Pretoria and the 
capital connections that were dictated by the City of London. Alfred Beit proved to be 
a prime example of how these three facets of Rand capitalism could be connected 
together. To spread his risks and maintain lucrative relationships with all three interest 
blocks, Beit engaged in a major international ‘marketing campaign’. In Paris and 
London he was able to involve the capital services of the Rothschilds 418 . In 
Johannesburg he managed to distribute shares to other Randlords and business allies, 
including the influential editor of the Star newspaper, Francis Dormer419. In Pretoria, 
Beit was able to secure the loyalty of the Transvaal’s state secretary, William Leyds, 
and the chief justice of the Transvaal High Court, John Kotze420. The ability to 
network between the political and financial centres, on a transcontinental basis, 
enabled many capitalists to limit and manage the threat of escalating British and South 
African diplomatic tension.  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 As not all Randlords were British, or were loyal to the British Empire and the 
imperial imperative in Africa, space was created for other capitalist-minded social 
groups to make their mark on the Rand. One of the wealthiest and influential social 
groups to make its mark on the Rand and the future development of South Africa was 
the Jewish community of Johannesburg. As noted by John Hobson, Englishmen such 
as Rhodes and his financial partner Rudd were eventually outsmarted by a small 
group of international financiers, with names such as Marks, Eckstein and Barnato, 
who were “chiefly German in origin and Jewish in race”421.  
The Jewish community of Johannesburg was unique amongst Jewish 
communities throughout the world as its members joined others to become the 
founders of a city422. Before the discovery of diamonds in Kimberley, the Jewish 
community in South Africa was made up of around 4000 Jews, mostly of German and 
English origin423. The diamond and gold revolutions attracted many new arrivals, this 
time mostly from the German Empire, Eastern Europe and the Baltic.  Although the 
official census of 1896 only recognised 6253 Jews in Johannesburg, the active 
population was most twice as large424.  
 Unlike Jewish immigrants in New York or London at the time, the 
Johannesburg community was able to avoid manual labour, being dictated by the 
racial order of the economy and the availability of unskilled African labour425. Jewish 
merchants soon formed the backbone of the new urban middleclass, establishing good 
contacts to rural Boers, and in the process, creating new economic chains that would 
feed the gold economy of Johannesburg with produce from the Transvaal’s 
peripheries.  
Many of the Jewish entrepreneurs, present from the very beginning of 
industrial development on the Rand, rapidly established themselves as influential 
members of the emerging capitalist class426. Contrary to much of the anti-Semitic 
propaganda going around the Rand at the end of the 19th century, only a few Jews 
became Randlords. The wave of Jewish immigrants that arrived after the deep-level  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boom, found it very difficult to establish themselves without help from the Afrikaner 
ruling class and access to capital.  For most of them this meant little or no connection 
to the powerful Randlords who made their fortunes using closed networks based on 
trust, political opportunism and loyalty to the Afrikaners or the British Empire. Jewish 
plot salesman were able to have a significant impact on the gold rush in 1886, but 
many without links to capital in Europe found the going tough after the deep-level 
revolution and without prospects of a stable formal employment, were forced into the 
ranks of many white Lumpenproletariat 427 , who established themselves in 
communities on the outskirts of Johannesburg with just about no ideological links to 
the class struggle that was taking place along the main reef. These economically and 
socially marginalised people, formed a whole new urban development based on illicit 
trade and economically insignificant services.   
Capitalist Jewish links to Johannesburg made significant strides in helping to 
establish the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, with Jewish community members such as 
Carl Hanau, Edouard Lippert, Albert Levy and the Langermann brothers428. In May 
1892, A.R. Goldring became the secretary of the Chamber of Mines429 and was 
quickly dispatched to Pretoria in September to secure underground rights for Chamber 
mines which were struggling to cope with the Gold Law which dictated the 
underground possession of reefs as set out by Kruger’s government430.  
The two most significant Jewish Randlords who used their contacts on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange to the best advantage were Barney Barnato and Sammy 
Marks. Barnato, a member of the Cape Parliament as of 1889, settled his business 
interests with the establishment of the Johannesburg Consolidated Investment 
Company431. Barnato was able to link his political contacts in the Cape with his 
investment partners on the Rand, creating a chain of companies, dealing with 
commercial property and finance around the mines.  
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Barney Batnato. Source: Mining Weekly. http://www.miningweekly.com/article/the-
foundations-of-the-great-barnato-2011-05-06. Accessed on 11 July 2011. 
 
What Barnato was able to do with the support of his contacts in the Cape, 
Sammy Marks was able to do in the Transvaal. As early as 1881, Marks had already 
visited Kruger in Pretoria, discussing the possibility of sizable investment in the 
newly independent Boer republic432. Marks made his fortunes realising government 
contracts for the Transvaal. The first and most important of these was the liquor 
concession he purchased from Kruger’s government, opening a large distillery that 
soon came to be known as the Eerste Fabrieken (Dutch: First Factory). Marks also 
went on to dominate the coal industry and advised Kruger on the railway projects to 
Delagoa Bay.  
Marks was able to expand his business interests through his close relationship 
to Kruger of whom he had said to have “pleasant recollections of the Grand Old Man 
of the Transvaal with his keen, though bucolic, intellect, his frugal manner of living, 
his power of repartee and his sturdy character”433. This ability to dominate industries 
that came with the subsequent expansion of gold mining, established Jewish 
Randlords not only as capitalists, operating within networks between the City of 
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London, Johannesburg and Pretoria, but as integral political pawns of the 1890s 
conflict, where their loyalty to the Empire or the Republic would be tested.  
 
 
 
Sammy Marks’s Eerste Fabrieken. Source: South African Coin Museum. 
http://www.sacoin.co.za/coin_topic8.html. Accessed on 11 July 2011. 
 
Jewish or gentile, the capital revolution had galvanised the Randlords into an 
economically and politically superior social class. Convinced by their ability to 
change the economic fate and influence the political course of Southern Africa, the 
Randlord’s ability to unite under a common identity was prevented by a number of 
issues that would determine the future of Southern Africa and the British Empire. 
   As determined as the Randlords were to expand and maintain their grip on 
the capital coming in and out of the mines and Johannesburg, their political stance 
was anything but homogenous. Throughout the 1870s and 1880s South African 
mining magnates were celebrated by capitalists for their economic foresight, but by 
the 1890s, they had become objects of widespread resentment and dislike in Britain 
and Europe434.  
The main line of division was drawn up by the Randlord’s mixed attitude 
towards the Transvaal’s European immigrants, the Uitlanders. Ever since Uitlanders 
began to flood into the “City of Gold”, Johannesburg bubbled with justified and 
unjustified resentments435. The mix of nationalities that Uitlanders were made up of 
made it difficult to establish their identity between the British Empire and the South 
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African Republic. The Uitlanders436  were made up of a string of international 
communities consisting of Americans, French, German, Italian, Portuguese and the 
British, who made up the majority. This argumentation was often supported by the 
prejudice to be found amongst the British elite due to the belief in the ultimate 
importance of race in political conflict (with the British and Afrikaners seen as races) 
and the notion that the social conflict in South Africa was between the British and the 
Afrikaners437.  
Kruger only tolerated the Uitlanders who flooded the South African Republic 
as he considered them indispensible, but never trusted them, being convinced of their 
intent on overthrowing the Republic by any means438. Kruger went out of his way to 
attempt to divide the Uitlanders and limit their homogenisation. The Pretoria 
government introduced a very conservative school curriculum with Dutch as the 
medium of instruction439. In 1892 Kruger’s government stopped issuing grants to 
schools in which Dutch was not the medium of instruction440. The Republic’s modern 
system of social grants to parents limited Uitlander families to a subsidy of only 2 
shillings per child, while allocating a generous sum of £90 to Afrikaner children441. 
The education system was however at the side-lines of Kruger’s main policy 
in limiting the Uitlanders’ influence in the Republic. The Kruger government 
recognised that it was the tax revenue of the mines and their mostly foreign workers 
who were responsible for the wealth in the Republic442. Fearing that economic 
superiority would quickly turn into a political threat, Kruger remained firm on 
excluding the Uitlanders from most civil rights, most importantly, the right to 
citizenship and the right to vote. For Kruger’s government any extension of rights to 
the Uitlanders meant a proportionate loss of independence for the Afrikaners443. This 
fear of Uitlander influence can be illustrated by how the South African Republic 
granted citizenship to foreigners. Shortly after the Republic regained independence 
from the British in 1881 foreigners were eligible for citizenship after one year of  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parallel to the British community on the Rand, as this section will display. 
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residence. In 1882 the right to citizenship was given after 5 years of residence. By 
1890, South African citizenship could only be obtained after 14 years of residence, 
meaning that many of the miners who came to the Transvaal during the boom of 1886 
and renounced their old citizenships from their home countries, were left stateless444. 
With the increased importance of gold came a progressive limitation of foreigners’ 
rights. What is even more striking is that this citizenship rule also applied to white 
men born in South Africa, namely the Orange Free State, Natal and the Cape Colony, 
of whom many were Afrikaners445. As effective these legal limitations were to be, by 
1896 there were already probably more Uitlander voters than Transvaal Afrikaner 
voters, who still made up the significant majority of rural farmers. 
Although the Uitlanders’ discontent towards these policies was clearly 
advocated by institutions such as the Transvaal National Union and the Afrikaner-
sympathising Reform Committee, it was not until the Volksraad in the session of 1895 
revealed their explicit policy and fixed determination to effect no reform that men 
began to talk of the revolutionary measures becoming necessary446.  
Much has been made of the social and economic polarisation amongst the 
mining community, but it is still difficult to assess weather the political status of the 
Uitlanders was in fact influenced by the gold factor. To formulate a clear link to gold 
on the Rand, one has to establish the Uitlander’s position between the mining 
magnates and Kruger’s government. The Johannesburg Uitlander interests, guided and 
provoked by the imperialist press in Britain, began to campaign against what the press 
depicted as ill-treatment and explicit discrimination against the Uitlanders 447 . 
Although not all Uitlanders were British, and included many radical anti-capitalist 
miners and artisans who despised the British Empire even more than Afrikaner 
dominance, the Uitlander movement was represented as a unified imperial cause448. 
As the Uitlanders were anything but united in their cause and quest for more rights 
and economic privileges, the press used this to its advantage, portraying them as the 
political pawns of the gold revolution.  
The strategic use of South African and British newspapers has sometimes been 
overlooked as much more credible primary sources were made available to historians.  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As investigated by John Hobson, this episode in South African history presents a 
unique example of a large press, owned, controlled and operated by a small body of 
men with the goal of bringing about a conflict, which would play to their business 
interests449. The Cape Times, by the 1890s the most influential newspaper in Southern 
Africa, had half of its shares bought out by Rutherford Harris, a close business 
associate of Rhodes and director of the British South Africa Company450. The Argus 
Group, consisting of the Johannesburg Star, the Bulawayo Chronicle, the Rhodesia 
Herald and the African Review was quickly bought out by Rhodes’s other famous 
associates, namely, Eckstein and Barnato451. Having the press on his side, Rhodes was 
able to infiltrate the Southern African and imperial newspapers, sending out his call 
for the support of the imperial capitalist.  
Rhodes knew very well all of the Uitlanders’ concerns and grievances, but he 
knew even better the complaints of the mine owners452. With Rhodes well ahead of 
his plans in the run-up to the Jameson Raid, not only was there much tension amongst 
the Randlords, but also the Uitlanders, represented by the Reform Committee and the 
Transvaal National Union, were not really sure what they wanted from a possible 
British takeover of the South African Republic453. We can only assume that in the 
immediate future, it was far more important for the Uitlanders to prevent the fall of 
their wages, as Uitlander discontent was primarily economic454. The unity on the 
wage front was at least a significant step in the real economic value of their labour, 
and not the highly publicised political row over citizenship in the South African 
republic.  
The need of maintaining a united Uitlander front against the government had 
constrained the Rand capitalists from reducing wages in the mines and other forms of 
industrial-scale employment455. This wage debate was however secondary to the main 
Randlord initiative, which was meant to be facilitated by the Jameson Raid in late 
1896 and to replace Kruger’s government with leadership that was to be more 
receptive to the needs of British business on the Rand456. Although the Uitlanders  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were to play a critical role in the Raid, their planned uprising was virtually non-
existent. Jameson, who had been charged with organising and executing the Raid 
would later defend himself on the premise that his motivation was solely based on an 
alleged letter457 he received from the Uitlander community, outlining their dismal 
prospects in the South African Republic458.  
With the complete failure and embarrassment of the Raid for the British, the 
Uitlander community took the major share of the repercussions. Although Kruger was 
not entirely convinced by the role of Uitlanders in the Raid and was therefore merciful 
in the treatment of offending Uitlander rebels and conspirators, immigrant political 
threats were to be curbed459. Faced with economic depression in the mining industry 
as well as growing discontent among the Uitlanders and the Afrikaners, Kruger 
seemed to be in a weak position to fight political resentment on all fronts460.   
For the British administration, the Colonial Office, supporting the excessive 
use of Uitlander rhetoric, turned the Uitlander cause into a noisy British campaign for 
civil rights and political freedoms461. As later predicted by Hobson, the way the 
British administration used the Uitlanders to inflate their problems and refine them in 
a way most suitable for the imperial cause, would at most be of the greatest benefit to 
the Randlords. Either way, the prospects of war would have been economically and 
politically unsustainable for both the Randlords and the Uitlanders. Either the 
Uitlanders would become the dominant party, in which case the Randlords would rule 
Johannesburg like Kimberley, controlling the votes by economic force, or if the Boer 
reformists were to remain numerous, taking their political message to non-British 
Uitlanders, the British would find themselves outvoted at the polls, and once again be 
subjected to the practical control of their enemies462. Not hiding his anti-Semitic 
tendencies, Hobson was convinced that the future of the Rand would either be 
dictated by an oligarchy of financial Jews or a restored Boer domination463. 
Although much of this discussion has been based on a Marxist framework of 
financial and social capital, it must be said that little of the sources used have truly  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concentrated on the production of gold and the control thereof. This lack of a 
formalised discussion on gold production within Marxist discourse is no coincidence, 
but a product of many (often inaccurate claims) by the liberal school in the 1960s. A 
significant attempt to address the issue of gold production was undertaken by liberal 
(at times right-orientated) Australian historian Geoffrey Blainey. Blainey claimed that 
financial capitalism had been so broadly analysed and defined that the true nature and 
dynamics of ownership of the deep-level initiative have been largely ignored464. As 
much influence as Blainey had in Marxist historical circles, his views about the 
impact of Kruger’s policies on the production costs of deep level mines were by no 
means as severe as he had claimed465. In the 1990s it also became evident that the 
mining costs of deep-level mining stood in a similar relation to the greater profits that 
were made, falsifying Blainey’s claim on the disproportional nature of the costs 
associated with deep-level mining.  
It is with this in mind that liberal and radical schools have often used many 
politically disputable empirical sources to engage in academic warfare. Not 
underestimating the lack of information I was able to produce on the means of 
production of deep-level mining, I have avoided laying any claims to deep-level 
mining and a possible correlation to greater costs for the Randlords. With the last 40 
years of research being unable to produce more credible data on gold production in 
deep-level mining, there is an academic need to reinvestigate the dynamics of 
production and the real (economic and social) cost structure it involved. What 
however remains within the scope and methodological approach of past research by 
the two historiographical schools, is that the Randlords and the Uitlanders formed a 
formidable threat to the economic power and political influence as envisioned by 
Afrikaner nationalists in the Transvaal. 
The fate of the Randlords and the Uitlanders in the period before the war 
displayed just to what extent European presence in Southern Africa was able to 
influence the economic and political future of the African continent’s wealthiest 
region. Their differences and similarities, united by gold and separated by social 
status, testing European capital and European labour on African soil, were carefully 
used by both British and Afrikaner administrations to turn the quest for the control of  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the gold fields into a political row that would put up British imperialism and 
Afrikaner republicanism in the biggest battle for the white man’s control of Southern 
Africa. Having failed to gain the political control of Johannesburg and the outright 
support of Pretoria, the two social groups would remain pivotal to the course Southern 
Africa would take at the close of the 19th century. As concluded by James Percy 
Fitzpatrick, “someday a grubbing historian may read the back files of South African 
newspapers and marvel that such warnings should have passed unheeded”466. 
 
3.6 The Afrikaners: united in tradition, divided by gold 
 
The gradual rise of British imperialism in Southern Africa by the middle of the 19th 
century was not only a force of submission and displacement for Africans, but also for 
the first Europeans to have firmly established their existence in South Africa, the 
Afrikaners. Although the term Afrikaners became extensively used in the mid-20th  
century for the explanation of historical processes, which led to constitutionally-
backed racial segregation, the Afrikaners had formed the backbone of European 
settlements in Southern Africa since 1652. Although integral to the administration of 
the Rand, the role of Afrikaners in the economic and social transformation of South 
Africa at the end of the 19th century poses many questions about financial logic and 
political consistency. 
Afrikaners have received very mixed reviews in South African 
historiographical tradition. Liberal historians have focused on the Afrikaner’s racial 
prejudices, their Calvinism and xenophobia. Marxist tradition has concentrated on 
explaining the class interest of Afrikaner people with respect to other class 
movements and Afrikaner nationalist historians have investigated the establishment of 
white supremacy and nationalist struggles against British imperialism, which had 
become a constant threat since the British takeover of the Cape in 1806467. Although 
Afrikaner history can often be understood as a concept of urban settlement and 
republicanism, it must be stressed that in many past and present historical works the 
terms Afrikaners and Boers are used interchangeably. Afrikaner historians wrote that 
the Boer race had taken its form in the 18th century, giving their socially distorted 
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lives a tenacity of purpose, power of endurance and self-respect468. By 1807 the 
Afrikaners were composed of Dutch (34%), German (29%), French (25%) and non-
European (5%) communities469. This heterogeneous mix of people from different 
cultures and backgrounds was united in their hate of British rule and cultural 
hegemony in the Cape. 
With the traditional homeland rooted in the Cape, by the end of the 18th 
century there was no single ethnic denominator with which the Afrikaners identified 
themselves. With the advent of British political dominance in the early 19th century, 
even though many Afrikaners were born in Europe, a strong sense of national 
character and uniform cultural identity was beginning to emerge470. This sense of 
national character and unity was fostered by language, namely the dialectic process 
High-Dutch went through in every generation, by the mid-19th century already 
displaying signs of a distinctive language that by the late 1920s became known as 
Afrikaans471. With a clear sense of galvanising identity being threatened by British 
incursions into the agricultural hinterland, the Afrikaners made the most of their local 
knowledge to head off north and east to continue their national heritage as far away 
from British political and cultural pressure as possible. 
After the First Anglo-Boer War, the Conventions of Pretoria in 1881 and 
London in 1884 had seemed to settle two critical questions that were to secure the 
political existence for Afrikaners in their independent Republics: there would be no 
South African Confederation of states and the Transvaal (or as the Afrikaners always 
maintained, the South African Republic) would be left to manage its own internal 
affairs472. British colonialists stopped seeing the Afrikaners as a bunch of farmers with 
good marksman skills and saw them as a developing nation, with the Boer military 
power being called “the biggest unpricked bubble in the world”473. With the Transvaal 
state having its trade restored, enemies crushed (the Northern Transvaal groups of 
Secocoeni and Cetewayo) and its fiscal balance consolidated in a debt to England, 
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repayable when possible, the Afrikaners, firmly established in their republics, were 
full of confidence and hope for the future474.  
The economic transformation for the Afrikaner community began in the 
1860s, when diamonds, and then two decades later gold, were found parallel to the 
already well-established traditional subsistence farming475. Although Kimberley was 
quickly annexed by the Cape Colony, the mining revolutions had firmly integrated 
Afrikaners into the resource-based world economy476. It must also be said that as 
significant as these mineral transformations were for the greater economic 
development of European-dominated areas of Southern Africa, the Afrikaner 
community remained largely at the sidelines of economic prosperity, operating mainly 
in traditional agricultural professions and trades auxiliary to mineral mining. 
 The development of the gold industry would test traditional Afrikaner 
economic practices. The initial years after the discovery of gold proved to be 
politically difficult for the confident and charismatic President Kruger. He 
immediately realised that gold, which had saved the republic from its financial 
troubles, would threaten its very survival and the unity of the Afrikaner people477. The 
pace at which land-owning ‘Burghers’ in the Transvaal were able to adjust their 
agricultural production to the demands of the new gold centre, became a point at 
which Kruger began to question the unity on which urban and rural Afrikaners were 
beginning to differ on. As investigated by John Hobson, economically and politically 
powerful Afrikaners became so detached from Afrikaner society in the Transvaal, that 
the only place one could still meet a ‘real Boer’ was at the morning markets in 
Johannesburg, where they sold their agricultural produce to the hordes of foreigners 
who lived in luxury upon the natural wealth they extracted from the strip of land they 
mined vigorously478.  
As complicated and differentiated as the pattern of industrial development in 
South Africa had been at the end of the 19th century, many global historians have 
sketched the process of class formation and class consciousness for the region as a 
whole479. The industrialisation of the Afrikaner community presents scholars with a  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scaled-down version of global industrialisation factors within a specific community, 
in a very specific part of the world, challenging the values of its existence.  
The proletarian origins of Afrikaners are rooted in the economic 
transformation of the Rand at the end of the 19th century. Although Afrikaners were 
not all enthusiastic about working in the mining industry, many became involved in 
the urban workforce that indirectly served the needs of the mines. This implication 
was such that the most Afrikaners who made their way to the Rand experienced a 
direct change in status from that of rural farmers to that of urban workers, and in the 
process, members of this new proletariat group became dependant on the state and on 
the many forms of welfare which was provided to those who did not find their luck in 
the commercial centre of Johannesburg480. 
 
 
 
 
Drawing of a poor Afrikaner family in rural Transvaal. Late 1890s. Source: Ancestry 24. 
http://gallery.ancestry24.com/v/Photographs/People/boer_people.jpg.html. Accessed on 11 
July 2011. 
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By the 1880s, agriculture provided a livelihood for the greater majority of 
Afrikaners in the Transvaal481. With the Transvaal forming the north-east border of 
the Afrikaaner expansion frontier, there was little room to adopt expansionary farming 
methods that went along with the Afrikaner way of life since the Great Trek of the 
1830s. A wasteful exploitation of agricultural resources contributed to a significant 
crisis of farming methods where overstocking and grass burning destroyed the natural 
vegetation and thunderstorms swept the topsoil away482. The rinderpest of the mid-
1890s could have also not come at a worse time, hitting livestock, the core of 
Afrikaner agriculture, which was not as diversified as the family-run structure of 
African subsistence farmers483. As there is very little evidence as to what impact the 
rinderpest and the exploitation of agricultural resources had on the productivity of 
Afrikaner farmers, one has to look at how Afrikaners saw their immediate future in 
the rural parts of the Transvaal in comparison to the riches everyone was talking about 
in Johannesburg. 
As the gold revolution guided the economic course of the Rand, each 
successive year saw hundreds more Afrikaners taking the journey to the urban centre 
of greater Johannesburg. With no developed transportation network before the 
extension of the railway lines from the coast to the Rand 1892-95, the former rural 
farmers were well positioned to capture new business opportunities in the transport 
sector484. Although there is much disagreement over the figures in many original 
sources, data suggests that in its heyday before the mid-1890s, the transport sector 
provided thousands of impoverished Afrikaners with a lucrative source of income485. 
In addition to the Afrikaner domination of the transport sector, a significant 
contingent of rural Afrikaners joined the growing brick production industry. Just 
twenty-four months after the initial discoveries of gold in 1886, Afrikaners already 
arrived at work to make the bricks, which would help to transform Johannesburg from 
a mining camp into a more substantial town486. The Kruger government was very 
quick in seizing the opportunity to integrate poor Afrikaners into the, at that time,  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slowly-industrialising Rand by allowing many Afrikaner interest groups to purchase 
plots in the vicinity of clay riverbanks, where bricks could easily be manufactured. By 
the early 1890s, the government land bordering the Braamfontein spring to the south-
west of the original Johannesburg mining camp gave rise to a local brickmaking 
industry which quickly became well known as a place of economic refuge for the 
many urbanising Afrikaner families487. 
In order to slow down the gradual polarisation of Afrikanerdom, Kruger’s 
government introduced a conservative education policy based on the teachings of the 
Dutch Reformed Church488. Kruger himself was extremely devout, using his faith to 
support his belief in the South African Republic as the manifestation of all Afrikaner 
values and traditions. Having accompanied his parents out of the Cape Colony in 
1835 when he was only ten years old, being raised as a religious fundamentalist, who 
belonged to the ‘Doppers’, the most conservative branch of the Dutch Reformed 
Church489 and the Bible as just about the only educational tool Kruger ever had, the 
Afrikaner president went out of his way to implement rural Afrikaner traditions within 
state institutions. A comprehensive educational scheme was at first implemented on 
the Rand and in Pretoria, and was later extended to the rural parts of the Transvaal by 
the 1890s490, intended to facilitate a system of values that unified the Afrikaner settler 
ethos with the political needs of the South African Republic. Kruger’s Department of 
Education was against all Uitlander attempts to expand education in English as, 
according to Kruger, this would have led to an eventual destruction of the Afrikaans 
language491. 
The Transvaal had been subjected simultaneously to an industrial revolution, a 
flood of migrants, an advanced form of capitalism and an indirect occupation by 
foreigners492. The rise of economic prosperity within the Boer Republics and British-
occupied territories would slowly lead to their own political marginalisation. 
Afrikaners soon became preoccupied with the fruit of their own labour, indulging in 
activities made possible by the Uitlanders, which according to Kruger were not part of 
the Afrikaner way of life. The Uitlanders and their machinery, their stocks and shares,  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their newspapers, music halls, race horses, bars and brothels, represented something 
that was seductive and unrighteous for the Afrikaner Volk493.  
The Uitlander position within the industrialising society was powerful and 
most of all intimidating for Afrikaner consciousness. As Charles Van Onselen has 
analysed, “the absence of representation amongst the new urban bourgeoisie of the 
Rand was hardly compensated for by the existence of a ‘Dutch’ strand in the middle 
class comprised largely of attorneys, teachers, civil servants, legal agents, doctors, 
notaries, clergymen and traders494”. As this middle class was very small and to many 
extents well integrated within the British-dominated capitalist communities of the 
Rand, the majority of the Rand’s poor and uneducated Afrikaners were forced to 
establish themselves in the lower spheres of the urbanised economic structure495.  
These social developments were not left unnoticed and Kruger’s government 
in Pretoria was very quick to develop policies that not only protected Afrikaner 
cultural interests, but also the economic premises on which Afrikanerdom in the 
Transvaal existed. The government acted directly to consolidate the political power of 
the farmers, by discriminating against foreign miners, a policy based mostly on the 
ever-changing conditions for citizenship in the Transvaal496. The Pretoria government 
encouraged a very unilateral form of development, handing out concessions to 
individuals and syndicates for the cultivation, manufacture and distribution of goods 
and services497. This very pragmatic approach to politically-motivated economic 
security created many local monopolies which in many cases stood in direct conflict 
with efficient development in the mines. The most widely-documented issues that the 
Chamber of Mines tried to put an end to were the activities of the Netherlands 
Railway Company 498 , the Anglo-German Nobel Trust 499  and the Hatherley 
Distillery500 near Pretoria.  Many historians have taken Kruger’s policies of economic 
nationalism as being the core of the argumentation within the context associated with 
the outbreak of the Jameson Raid in December of 1895 and the South African War in  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1899, stressing the intentional use of Afrikaner nationalist rhetoric to maintain 
political power in Pretoria and economic interests in Johannesburg501.  
As unanimously as Kruger’s policies in Pretoria were to reflect Afrikaner 
political, economic, social and cultural interests, the greater Southern African 
imperative illustrated a much different picture. Ever since the South African Republic 
regained its independence under Kruger in 1881, the wealthy Cape Afrikaners 
shunned the Transvaal’s image as the main pillar of Afrikaner society. After the 
discovery of gold they did however respond with envy and awe, hoping that their 
conservative brothers and sisters would use the gold to guide the Republic to become 
a stable state502. The Afrikaner Bond (founded in 1868 in the Cape Colony) saw 
Afrikaner survival and unity as best served by the British free trade system and a 
formalised integration of the two Boer republics into the British imperial system503. In 
this way the Afrikaner Bond tried to propose a customs union with the Orange Free 
State and the Transvaal in 1885 and 1886, an offer aggressively refused by Kruger504. 
Alfred Milner, the South African high commissioner and Prime Minister of the Cape 
Colony since 1897, had written to Joseph Chamberlain just before the Jameson Raid 
that “the Afrikaners in the Cape would no doubt be loyal if it were not for the two 
(Boer) Republics next door505”. Kruger, sensing a disguised political agenda coming 
from the Cape Afrikaners used the customs union episode and many other attempts to 
unify trade throughout Southern Africa to further intensify his efforts to strengthen the 
South African Republic as the only true Afrikaner state, representing all of the 
interests of Afrikaner people throughout Africa506. 
The Jameson Raid would reaffirm Afrikaner suspicion of British imperial 
efforts and would greatly galvanise the Afrikaner stance in pushing for greater unity 
between all Afrikaner communities in Southern Africa.  The Raid revitalised the 
seventy-year-old Kruger, who quickly embarked on arming the state and expanding 
the regular army507. As ambitious as the nation-building policies may have been, the 
economic foundation on which Afrikaners would prosper was put under significant  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pressure. The development of the deep-level mines, the significant increase in African 
unskilled labour, new rail links to the Rand and the surplus of labour during the 
recession of 1896-1897 all put Kruger’s plans for the Afrikaners under significant 
pressure508. Thousands of Afrikaners on the Rand were out of jobs, being replaced by 
better skilled British workers or poorer-paid Africans, and began to question Kruger’s 
policies and goals. 
Using the unstable economic and social conditions to their advantage, the 
Randlords, operating first through the Transvaal National Union and later the South 
African League, believed this would be the perfect opportunity to gain support for 
their British cause in Africa509. The struggle for the support, loyalty and control of 
Johannesburg’s unemployed became increasingly politicised, forcing Kruger and the 
Randlords to implement various social initiatives with the intent of attracting an 
undecided voter’s pool. With the generous help of Lionel Philips, the Randlords 
established the Present Help League in 1895, establishing the Kelly’s Relief Stores 
where poor whites, of whom Afrikaners made up the largest majority, could purchase 
basic necessities at discounted and subsidised prices510. 
Afrikaners became increasingly desperate for economic help and begin to lose 
their sense of a nationalist political agenda, as preached by their faithful Paul Kruger. 
As time went on, Afrikaners sought work in the Rand mines and even joined many 
British-led trade unions, whilst still putting faith in Kruger’s government aid511. As 
mentioned throughout the discussion, it is noteworthy that Afrikaners were largely not 
involved in the gold mining industry. It must however be stated that throughout the 
recession, in the aftermath of the Jameson Raid, many companies such as the famous 
Wernher, Beit & Co. took on significant numbers of Afrikaner unskilled labour, 
advocating good results from the employment of Afrikaners512. The Boer leaders were 
not so firm against this development as their priority was to ensure that the Randlords 
were not to be able to generate an increase in political predominance in addition to  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their financial power513. As complicated and inconsistent as the loyalty of the 
Afrikaners may have been, the government in Pretoria spoke with the knowledge that 
the Transvaal Afrikaners were solidly behind it, dividing political and economic 
loyalty514 between Afrikaner nationalism and British capitalism. 
As investigated by John Hobson, the demands of the gold mining industry, 
growing within a very short space of time to extravagant proportions, could not 
accommodate a stable integration of the adjacent labour market515. As much as the 
Jameson Raid changed the political landscape, Kruger was well aware of the need to 
sympathise with mining needs, as the state grew increasingly dependant on the 
economic power it was generating. Afrikaners, loyal to Afrikanerdom and their 
Republics, faced an uncertain future, trying to adjust to the pressures of urban life and 
growing British imperialism. As traditional and patriotic as rural life may had been, 
the urban and mineral transition sent many Afrikaners living on the peripheries of 
economic and political life into the core of a gold-platted battle between Afrikaner 
republicanism and British imperialism. 
 
3.7 Society on the brink of collapse: the social melting pot  
 
Throughout my investigation it has been stressed that no Southern Africans could 
avoid the social transformation as led by cattle diseases, poor agricultural 
management, territorial displacement, constant formal and informal conflicts between 
the Afrikaners and the British, Uitlander grievances, and the constant structural 
conflict between the rural and urban economies in the last 20 years of the 19th century 
that were all a by-product of the gold revolution on the Rand516. With the South 
African Republic at the core of the transformation, the booming gold industry 
involved neighbouring states, colonies and protected territories, changing the fate of 
all people in Southern Africa.  
 As submissive and oppressive as relations between Europeans and Africans 
were, it was the bicultural relations among South African whites that would lead 
South Africa out the euphoria of economic boom into the perils of imperial conflict.  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As Chamberlain had assessed the state of the South African Republic in 1898, reform 
in the Transvaal or war were the only alternatives which were to be placed before 
officials in the Colonial Office517. The British administration knew well enough that 
the Transvaal government could once again provoke the Empire into yet another 
major crisis in Southern Africa518. Political reforms were largely pushed for by the 
Chamber of Mines519, the South African League and the Uitlanders, forming a non-
unified front, with little momentum of convincing Kruger to accommodate political 
and social demands in the Republic’s anti-British agenda. 
 Marxist approaches to South African history demonstrate a theoretical basis on 
which this duality of white interest (Afrikaners and British) attempted to attain 
hegemony in South Africa520. Bozzoli goes as far as to state that white society had its 
own history of military conquest and class struggle where the often conflicting 
relationships between farmers, mine owners and Rand capitalists makes it difficult to 
find consensus on white hegemony521. It is therefore very problematic to combine 
British imperialism and Afrikaner nationalism in a common theoretical approach to 
the marginalisation of African society in Johannesburg and the greater Transvaal.  
 As effective as Marxist approaches have been in addressing the development 
of social and economic inequalities in South Africa, a macro-social collective 
approach to European imperialism can severely reduce the value of the dynamics 
found in South African class formation. Class formation can in many ways guide 
South African history into an era of common understanding, linking on often parallel 
development of European and African histories in South Africa. In my investigation, 
the attempt to forge the link between separate histories and the need for a ‘common 
experience’ of all South African has been augmented by the relationship to gold and 
its Marxist commodification of wealth, facilitated by the Rand capitalists.  
 The rise and influence of mining lobbyists would stir the social melting pot to 
the brink of political collapse. As investigated by Fitzpatrick shortly before the 
outbreak of the war, and Hobson shortly after the war, the ‘gold-plated’ social 
tensions present within Southern African society at the end of the 19th century tested  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the stability of the Empire and the distance imperialists were willing to go to secure 
favourable social conditions for capitalists expansion on the Rand. Fitzpatrick 
approached his analysis from a very pro-British and pro-unionist stance, emphasising 
the grievances and social limitations of the Uitlanders, calling for British intervention 
as the only solution for securing the rights of all inhabitants of the Transvaal522. 
Hobson’s investigation was largely based on his travels through the Transvaal and the 
Cape Colony where he stressed that the unsatisfiable demand for cheap African 
labour, the successful administration of which the Pretoria government was unable to 
provide, made up the core of the rift that developed between the British-backed 
mining industry and Kruger’s administration523. Hobson went about with a different 
approach to Fitzpatrick, attempting to economically justify the much talked-about 
Uitlander grievances and how these linked to the economic and political factors that 
he believed were stable enough to create a peaceful and prosperous South Africa524. 
 What Fitzpatrick’s political correspondences and Hobson’s balance sheets 
were unable to show is how the socio-economic tension between the Uitlanders and 
the Afrikaners brought about an era of formal racial segregation, exploitation and 
displacement for hundreds of thousands of native Africans. Once the British and the 
Afrikaners had political control of Southern African territories by the end of the 19th 
century, they had the means to govern African lives to suit the needs of the white 
population, namely the rising need for wage labourers and servants in the growing 
industrial centres of the Rand525. As summarised by Victor Allen, “By the turn of the 
century African families had become so dependent upon cash remittances from wage 
employment that it was no longer sensible to talk of tribal economies as a distinct and 
autonomous mode of production”526. Gold and the economic pressures that came 
along with it, took African societies out of the agricultural comfort zone, leading to a 
gradual proletarianisation of the work force.  
The constant need for more workers willing to work for lower wages, turned 
Africans not only into prisoners in their own land, but also into political pawns of a 
global gold industry, where cost-structures governed the level and intensity of human 
exploitation. The relative, and later complete decrease in the number of white miners  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on the Rand reflected more fundamental changes than those simply associated with a 
redistribution of skilled work527. This however did not come with social repercussions 
that in many ways later troubled South Africa throughout the distorted history of the 
20th century. As effective wage-exploitation of African mineworkers was in 
marginalising the white manual labour force on Rand, the strategy stabilised and 
defined skilled work to the disadvantage of Africans. The skilled labour structure that 
evolved shortly before the war in the late 1890s recognised certain realities of 
economic and political power held by the white (mostly Uitlander) working class, as it 
served to maintain and reinforce a strict division of labour in the mining industry and 
its industrial branches, formally confirming the restriction of unskilled work to non-
whites and the lack of solidarity between white and non-white workers528, a scenario 
that would be critical in the evolution of South African society in the 20th century. 
As investigated by many social historians there was no simple balance 
between how Africans in the Transvaal were to be conquered and proletarianised for 
the needs of the industrialising economy529. The rapid social formation that took place 
after the discovery of gold and the subsequent industrial revolution that swept through 
the Rand altered the rural social formation of the region, leaving Africans desperate 
and confused in the new system. Those suffering the most from a quick transition into 
wage labour and the ravages of rapid proletarianisation were swept into the migrant 
labour system and carried to the cities and compounds530. As the rural parts of the 
Transvaal were quickly linked to the Rand by wagon transportation and later trains, 
Africans were able to put gains accruing from the industrial period towards land 
purchases and hiring531.  
As sound as the economic empowerment was intended to be the social 
implications were anything but free-market orientated, leaving many Africans stuck in 
a static and monotonous lifestyle. Many liberal historians praise the social dynamics 
associated with the financial empowerment of communities, but in the case of South  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Africa, Africans were forced to give up their economic surpluses in form of various 
taxes and payments, making them both dependent and exploitable by wage labour and 
migration.  
As social coherence and most elements of the subsistence economy declined in 
the rural areas, the authority of the traditional leader, the chief, was undermined532, 
leaving the people to be administered and harassed by an Afrikaner political and 
British economic system. Africans had never entered wage labour by choice, but 
because of disruptive influences of colonialism and Afrikaner administration533. As 
useful as the migratory system might have been to Africans at first, once all African 
states had lost their political independence and were constantly being manipulated to 
serve the economic needs of the white population, the migratory economic system to 
the gold mines lost its usefulness and economic practicality for Africans534. 
When taking the analysis back to the greater socio-economic collapse of late 
19th century Southern Africa, as later represented by the South African War, the 
problems caused to the mining industry by Kruger’s obstructive and often 
incompetent economic policies535, led Southern African society into a bicultural 
conflict between the Afrikaners and British, and the respective republican and 
imperialistic visions they had for Southern Africa. This bicultural and bi-ideological 
rift was further intensified by the Afrikaners’ passive stance towards British 
campaigns against Africans in the Transvaal during the British occupation of the 
South African Republic, supporting British efforts to bring Africans under European 
control. Only once the Afrikaners’ perceived to be at the receiving end of imperialism, 
once the Transvaal regained its independence under Kruger, were the Boers opposed 
to British imperialism536. This conflict of economics, culture and race was clearly 
summarised by the infamous Afrikaner General Jan Smuts in September 1899 when 
he wrote, “South Africa is on the eve of a terrible blood bath, from which our people 
will emerge either as an exhausted remnant, wood-cutters and water-carriers for a 
hated race, or as victors, founders of a United South Africa, of one of the great 
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empires of the world, an Afrikaner republic, stretching from Table Bay to the 
Zambesi”537. 
As complicated as the diplomatic history of the Afrikaners and British was, it 
was the Uitlanders who clearly represented the most formidable challenge to both 
ideologies trying to make the most of the gold discoveries on the Rand. As 
popularised by the extensive work of Hobson, it was the cunning work of many 
powerful Randlords who made it possible for the Imperial administration to treat the 
Afrikaners as a “compact body of obstinate and reactionary farmers, dominated by the 
personality of one strong and cunning man (Kruger), who is incapable of education 
and spontaneous progress (and) is largely a mischievous perversion of history and of 
present condition538”. The overcoming of this reformist pessimism and administrative 
backwardness was seen by the British Empire as a task of the Uitlanders, who would 
protect and expand their own economic interests and political agenda with the direct 
help and support of the Empire539.  
The ambivalence of the Randlord-led Uitlanders, Afrikaner nationalism and 
British attempts to infiltrate the economic capabilities of the Transvaal combined 
together in a lethal concoction that would poison the end of South Africa’s dividing 
19th century.  As socially daunting as the task of managing a multi-racial society 
might have been in the 1890s, little was done to diffuse the fears of a major conflict.  
Yet to limit the analysis of the gold mining industry’s intra-relationships to 
these social crises is to distort the differences among them and to ignore the degree to 
which mining on the Rand required industry-wide cooperation and political support 
from Pretoria540. With this gold-led industrial reach and ramification of capitalism in 
Southern Africa driving social and economic change, viewed against a wide historical 
and geographical backdrop541, an extensive study of Southern African society will 
always have its structural pitfalls. It is with this regard that one can not draw away 
from the dominant force of capitalism on South Africa, heavily influencing the 
insignificant level of political freedom of Africans and the weak capacity (or total lack  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of interest) of the ruling white classes to engage in social dialogue with them. What 
however remains at the core of the debate is how gold, an influential determinant in 
the global British economy, localised and centralised the Transvaal as the social 
melting pot, where race and ideology exhausted the social structure, and not only 
determined the destiny of a country at the southern tip of Africa, but of the 
industrialising British Empire in a capitalist-driven world. 
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4. Conclusion  
 
As Andre Gunder Frank once vividly stated, “There are no and have never been 
distinct pristine civilisations, societies nor even peoples. The very ideas are nothing 
but ideology, pure and simple although their use occults (that term is chosen 
deliberately!) a simple and complex reality”542. In South Africa of the late 19th 
century, gold became the medium on which societies were transformed, and European 
and neo-African civilisations applied and constructed their political and economic 
ideologies to change the fate of a country and its people. The discovery of gold on the 
Rand and the rapid industrialisation that took place after 1886 was by no means a 
social experiment in the making, but a formidable case study of how economic wants 
surpassed social needs in an already fragile social environment. As intensive as the 
social conundrum of the Rand may have been, it was gold that drew South Africa out 
of the territorial obscurity to the front stage of global ideological and racial conflict. 
 As I have argued (throughout the investigation), the extent to which gold 
brought about institutional by-products, such as the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 
the Chamber of Mines and the Native Labour Department to a gradual agglomeration 
of differences between Afrikaner nationalism and the British imperialism it was trying 
to combat, led to a clear and violent example of how progressive industrialisation led 
to a political collapse, and social ruin of an age-old traditional African society. As 
both political entities responsible represent the socio-economic dynamics of European 
and neo-African conquests in Southern Africa, it was my goal to illustrate how greed, 
ruthlessness and economically motivated loyalty would pave the road to the last clash 
of imperialism in the (long) 19th century.  
Although it was never my intention to debate the causes and further 
consequences of the South African War, a clear link to the economic foundation of the 
conflict in the form of gold was made and argued for. From the British point of view, 
and its already complicated relationship with South Africa, the emergence of rival 
economic powers such as the United States and Germany in the last quarter of the 19th 
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century began to challenge its trading and financial supremacy543. As European and 
mainly British entrepreneurs saw the discovery of gold on the Rand as a blessing for 
their individual fortunes and those of the Empire, the reefs around Johannesburg soon 
became the Pandora’s box of a country and its native people, trying to come to grips 
with the incursions and dispositions the economic forces of imperialism were exerting 
on them. Influencing British administration became the capitalist’s only hope, and the 
political landscape between Johannesburg, Pretoria and London turned into the major 
political rift that in many ways would bring the rural landscapes of South Africa to the 
industrialising front of the British Empire. Many socio-economic factors influenced 
the complex and varied relationship between all groups of people living in late 19th 
century South Africa, but it was clearly gold that played a crucial role in intensifying 
British imperialism in Southern Africa between 1886 and 1899. 
It would be very naïve and abstract for me to attribute the crude developments 
of the gold industry and the subsequent escalation of diplomacy between Britain and 
the South African solely to Britain’s desire to gain control of the goldfields. As 
opportunistically as many British and European individuals used their financial 
connections in the City of London to maximise their share of the Transvaal gold 
industry, which quickly emerged as the world’s largest gold producer, much of the 
political escalation must be attributed to the South African Republic’s tentative 
attitude to economic development and its own nationalist political agenda.  
While whites engaged in their own socio-political skirmishes, the African 
population was marginalised to economic and political infancy. As I have debated 
throughout the investigation, the racial structure of South Africa is most clearly 
constructed and explained in terms of economic growth associated with the 
development of the gold industry on the Rand. The way the rural economy was 
transformed and integrated into the booming financial and produce market of the 
Rand quickly gave way to a widening economic and cultural gap between urban and 
rural Africans, a structural problem that would, according to former South African 
President Thabo Mbeki, plague South Africa well into its post-1994 democratic 
future544.  
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The Liberal and Marxist debate that emerged in force in the 1970s gave way to 
a new scholastic tradition, polarising South African social sciences till this day. With 
liberal historians making significant headway in recognising the common history of 
all South African people, new research on specific links and interactions of the 
various social groups within the gold-driven economy needs to build on the liberal 
traditions that provoked the conservative status quo of apartheid academia. The 
Marxist argumentation about the sources of social polarisation and economic 
marginalisation in South Africa rested on a mix of theoretical, empirical and political 
arguments545. As conducive as Marxist academic traditions have been to reconciling 
South Africa’s divided past, many macro-social approaches have overlooked the links 
between the rural and urban impact of economic empowerment as brought about by 
the discovery, sticking rather to a formalised anti-imperialist rhetoric of class struggle. 
With many questions still unanswered, the ‘Liberal-Marxist debate’ keeps South 
African academia searching in the nation’s past, in an attempt to link conceptions of 
material value and capital to the reconciliation rhetoric of the ‘New South Africa’.  
As noted by Frank Welsh, “the combination of gold on the grandest scale, the 
might of the British Empire on its apogee opposing little Afrikaner communities, the 
first of the modern anti-colonial struggles is all too seductive”546 to global historians 
looking for transcontinental imperial links and connections. One of the major 
challenges in this investigation was the extensive convergence of historiographical 
traditions that I have tried to accommodate from a modern “New South African” 
perspective. As much as Marxist, liberalist, anti-imperialist and Afrocentric literature 
has influenced the rhetoric of my debate, a fair balance was created with the usage of 
British imperial revisionist literature and primary sources (mostly those provided to 
me by the Chamber of Mines) in the form of annual reports, legal documents and 
diplomatic correspondences. Being myself a product of the political transformation in 
South Africa during the uncertain years of the 1990s, I attempted, at all cost, to put all 
personal emotions and motives aside, leaving the divided history of all people of 
South Africa as the true inspiration behind my investigation.  
I could not agree more with Nelson Mandela in saying that “the plundering of 
indigenous land, exploitation of its mineral wealth and other raw materials,  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confinement of its people to specific areas, and the restriction of their movement have, 
with notable exceptions, been the corner stone of colonialism throughout the land”547. 
As violent as mineral revolutions were in financially facilitating the imperialist drive 
through South Africa, it was gold that led to the most formalised direct interventions 
in the lives and traditions of indigenous Africans at the end of the 19th century. Gold 
was the metal on which South Africa was built, exploited, tortured and overrun by 
Europeans.  
As South Africans look at the terrors of the 20th century, united in shame, 
sorrow and reconciliation, gold still makes up the core of socio-economic discourse. 
As political parties, capitalist dynasties and foreign stakeholders continue to debate 
the future of the South African gold industry, we stand together side by side, looking 
into the golden future of the rainbow nation, never forgetting the blood-stained gold 
bars our country was built on.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Remembering Plato, “All the gold which is under or upon the earth is not 
enough to give in exchange for virtue.548”. 
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